Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications
11-2022

Roadmap to Zero-Carbon Electrification of Africa by 2050: The
Green Energy Transition and the Role of the Natural Resource
Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land)
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Columbia University, The Center for Sustainable Development, sachs@columbia.edu

Perrine Toledano
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, ptoled@law.columbia.edu

Martin Dietrich Brauch
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, martin.brauch@columbia.edu

Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, tm2675@columbia.edu

Efosa Uwaifo
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
sustainable_investment_staffpubs
See next page for additional authors
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Perrine Toledano, Martin D. Brauch, Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye, Efosa Uwaifo & Bryan M.
Sherrill, Roadmap to Zero-Carbon Electrification of Africa by 2050: The Green Energy Transition and the
Role of the Natural Resource Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land), Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment & African Natural Resources Management and Investment Centre, African Development Bank
(AfDB) (2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/212

This Report/Policy Paper is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Authors
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye, Efosa Uwaifo, and
Bryan Michael Sherrill

This report/policy paper is available at Scholarship Archive: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
sustainable_investment_staffpubs/212

Report

Roadmap to Zero-Carbon
Electrification of Africa by 2050:
The Green Energy Transition and the Role of the
Natural Resource Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land)

Commissioned by and prepared for the African Natural Resources
Management and Investment Centre, African Development Bank (AfDB)

November
2022

Table of Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................................................. 2
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.

Introduction: A Vision for Africa’s Energy and Economic Development .....................................................................10
1.1.
Africa’s Energy Transformation Through Renewables-Based Electrification ...................................................... 11

2.

A Simple and Illustrative Model of Investment Needs ................................................................................................14

3.

Energy Planning Strategy ............................................................................................................................................18
3.1.
Centralized Energy Infrastructure ....................................................................................................................... 18
3.1.1. The Trunk Infrastructure ............................................................................................................................18
3.1.2. Feedback Loop Between Mining, Industrialization, and Energy Development...........................................20
3.1.3. National Digitization Transformation Strategy ...........................................................................................29
3.1.4. Strong, Flexible, and Digitized Grids ...........................................................................................................29
3.1.5. Preparation to Electrify Transportation ......................................................................................................31
3.1.6. Social and Environmental Sustainability of Renewable Energy Siting and Nature-Based Solutions for
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation................................................................................................31
3.1.7. Financial and Operational Health of Power Utilities ...................................................................................36
3.2.

Decentralized Energy Infrastructure ................................................................................................................... 41
3.2.1. A Least-Cost Approach to Mobilize Technological Solutions ......................................................................43
3.2.2. Energy Justice Through Meaningful Consultations .....................................................................................46
3.2.3. Affordability of the Connection to Grids, Mini-Grids, and Solar Home Systems.........................................47
3.2.4. Affordability and Profitability: Regulatory and Commercial Model ............................................................51

3.3.

Phase-Out of Fossil Fuels: The Remaining Role for Oil and Gas .......................................................................... 56
3.3.1. Impacts of the COVID-19 Crisis on the Fossil Fuel Industry ........................................................................57
3.3.2. Bleak Recovery Outlook for the Global and African Fossil Fuel Industry ....................................................58
3.3.3. Renewables: Lower Costs and Negative Externalities than Fossil Fuels .....................................................62
3.3.4. Fiscal Challenges for Incumbent and Entrant Fossil Fuel Producers ...........................................................64
3.3.5. Recommendations for Africa to Phase Out Fossil Fuels..............................................................................67

3.4.

A Timeline for Energy Development from 2021 to 2050 .................................................................................... 77
3.4.1. Starting Point in 2021 .................................................................................................................................77
3.4.2. Milestones to be Achieved by 2030, 2040, and 2050 .................................................................................82
4. Financing Strategy .......................................................................................................................................................84
4.1.
MDB and DFI Financing....................................................................................................................................... 84
4.1.1. Insufficient Climate Finance Mobilization...................................................................................................85
4.1.2. Insufficient Concessional Funding ..............................................................................................................85
4.1.3. Insufficient Blended Finance ......................................................................................................................87
4.1.4. Urgent Need to Increase Official Finance ...................................................................................................88
4.1.5. African Initiatives to Be Monitored, Amplified, and Replicated ..................................................................89
4.1.6. Role of Country Donors in Enabling MDBs and DFIs to Increase Concessional Finance .............................94
4.2.
Building Local Capabilities to Plan, Procure, and Finance IPPs............................................................................ 95
4.2.1. Preparing and Planning for the Investment (Ministries of Finance/Planning) ............................................95
4.2.2. Utilities and Competitive Tenders ..............................................................................................................96
4.2.3. Leveraging Mining Sector Investment in Africa (Ministries of Mining and Energy) ....................................97
4.2.4. Local Financial Sector and Actors ...............................................................................................................98
5. Next Steps for 2022...................................................................................................................................................102

1

Suggested Citation
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Perrine Toledano, and Martin Dietrich Brauch, with Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye, Efosa Uwaifo, and
Bryan Michael Sherrill. Roadmap to Zero-Carbon Electrification of Africa by 2050: The Green Energy Transition and
the Role of the Natural Resources Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land). Commissioned by and prepared for the
African Natural Resources Management and Investment Centre, African Development Bank (AfDB). New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), November 2022, https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/roadmap-zerocarbon-electrification-africa.

Disclaimer
The views in this report reflect those of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) alone, and not those
who commissioned or engaged with the preparation of the report. We recognize that the subjects covered in the
report remain areas of substantive investigation; CCSI hopes that the publication of this report will support the continued debate and discussion among relevant countries and institutions. Please share any feedback or comments
with us at ccsi@law.columbia.edu.

Acknowledgment
First and foremost, the authors and CCSI would like to express their profound gratitude to the African Natural Resources Management and Investment Centre at the African Development Bank (AfDB) for commissioning this study
and meaningfully engaging in discussions on the topics it covers.
The authors would also like to thank the following experts and their colleagues in their respective organizations for
participating in the Online Workshop on Africa’s Energy Pathways to 2050, held on July 15, 2020, in preparation for
this study; some of them also participated in follow-up interviews by the authors in September and October 2020:
Luis Janeiro of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA); Stephanie Bouckaert, Arthur Contejean, Arnaud
Rouget, Lucila Arboleya, and Yasmine Arsalane of the International Energy Agency (IEA); Christian Breyer and Solomon Oyewo of the Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology (LUT); Mark Howells of the Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden (KTH); Frank Qiankun Wang, Yu Ni, Wei Zheng, and Zi Chen of the Global Energy Interconnection
Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO); Paolo Carnevale of the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM);
and Vijay Modi of Columbia Engineering. The authors would also thank the following experts, interviewed by the
authors in November 2020: Galina Alova, Philipp Trotter, and Francesca Larosa. Finally, the authors would like to
thank Antonio Pedro of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) for reviewing this study.

Acronyms and Abbreviations
AC

Alternating current

AfDB

African Development Bank

ANRC

African Natural Resource Center

AU

African Union

AUC

African Union Commission

CCSI

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

CSP

Concentrated Solar Power

DC

Direct current

DFI

Development finance institution
2

DRC

Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

ESHIA

Environmental, social, and human rights impact assessment

EU

European Union

FPIC

Free, prior and informed consent

GEIDCO

Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization

HSGOC

Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee

IEA

International Energy Agency

IPP

Independent Power Producer

IRENA

International Renewable Energy Agency

LMCP

Last-Mile Connectivity Program

LUT

Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology

MapRE

Multi-Criteria Analysis for Planning Renewable Energy

MASEN

Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy

MDB

Multilateral development bank

MoU

Memorandum of Understanding

PICI

Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative

PPA

Power purchase agreement

PV

Photovoltaic

REC

Regional economic community

REmap

Renewable Energy Roadmaps program

SAPP

Southern African Power Pool

SDG

Sustainable Development Goal

SHS

Solar Home Systems

SDSN

Sustainable Development Solutions Network

SIEPAC

Central American Electrical Interconnection System

UHV

Ultra-high voltage

UN

United Nations

UNECA

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

WAPP

West African Power Pool

3

Executive Summary
All Africans—whether living in urban or rural areas—need access to affordable, clean, efficient, reliable, climateproof, and renewable energy for both residential and productive uses to achieve sustainable development objectives. This report sets out a comprehensive and actionable roadmap for Africa’s zero-carbon energy transformation
by 2050, with most advances achieved by 2030. Natural resource management in minerals, fossil fuels, and land sits
at the core of the strategy.
The world is moving to decarbonization by 2050. This was the dominant geopolitical message of 2021, appearing,
for example, in U.S. President Joe Biden’s online summit with world leaders in April 2021 and in the International
Energy Agency’s (IEA) Report on Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, which stated that there
was “no need for investment in new fossil fuel supply” in a pathway to net zero by 2050. Africa will be part of this
global trend. The UNFCCC COP 26 evidenced the continued commitment to the world to this agenda, with the Global
Methane Pledge and the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use, holding strong promises to respectively reduce methane by 2030 by 30% relatively to 2020 levels and end all deforestation by 2030 while strongly
investing in reforestation. Prospective oil and gas projects in Africa will no longer be pursued as overseas markets
and financing will shrink. The Russian war on Ukraine in 2022 has reinforced the determination of Europeans and
Americans to wean off Russian gas in the short term and off all gas in the medium to long term, seeing in the energy
transition an opportunity to meet parallel goals of decarbonization and energy independence. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2022 notes that, even under a relatively conservative “stated policies” scenario, global demand for coal,
oil, and gas will peak or plateau in the coming years and subsequently fall. The report also notes that the energy crisis
triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though leading to a short-term increase in fossil fuel demand, has consolidated the global long-term shift toward renewable energy, energy efficiency, and electrification. In parallel to this
reality, Africa’s vast renewable energy potential, in the solar and hydropower sectors especially, will engage increasingly bankable and highly attractive investments. In net terms, Africa has a huge amount to gain from a decisive buildup of renewable energy and the capacity to produce the minerals, hardware, and software of the new zero-carbon
energy economy.
Starting from a simple and transparent model of the annual investment volumes needed to provide continent-wide
access to electricity based on renewable sources (Section 2), the report addresses various imperatives and challenges
regarding Africa’s energy planning (Section 3) and financing (Section 4) and outlines recommendations for immediate
implementation of the strategy from 2022 (Section 5).
There are four overarching ideas in our vision for Africa’s energy future.
1. The world economy is truly going to decarbonize. The oil companies do not necessarily believe it today, but
we are convinced that they will soon understand and act accordingly. 1 Just like in the rest of the world, many
pending oil and gas projects in Africa will become un-bankable in the coming years as decarbonization proceeds.
2. Africa needs to frontload its investments in green electrification and digitalization. Our point is that Africa
should borrow heavily, at very concessional rates, in order to build infrastructure and achieve other crucial
SDGs (such as quality education for all children). Debt relief may also be helpful in increasing the fiscal space
for green and digital investments. In accordance with a revised finance system that the United Nations is
working on with the G20, Africa should stop being financed by short-term, high-cost debt that has been
causing repeated deleterious liquidity crises and delaying sustainable development.
3. The international community, guided by the African Union, should dramatically increase the capacity of the
African Development Bank and other African banks to frontload investments in infrastructure.
4. Africa should use its vast continental resources (renewable energy, strategic minerals, biodiversity, and human skills) to develop African productive capacity at all points in the renewable energy supply chain, including a massive scaling up of strategic minerals mining and African supply chains for photovoltaics; electric
Even as we were finalizing this paper, three events were part of this rapid “learning.” The Netherlands Supreme Court ordered Shell to cut
its carbon emissions, including the scope 3 emissions of its hydrocarbon products. ExxonMobil’s shareholders voted over management objections to place on the Board at least two directors committed to the company’s decarbonization by 2050. Chevron’s shareholders similarly
voted to cut the company’s scope 3 emissions.
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batteries; hydrogen and other green fuels; electric vehicles (e.g., electric motorcycles); and digital services
(e-education, e-health, e-payments, and others). In this transition, gas infrastructure should be planned for
carefully to provide flexibility while awaiting further cost reduction of storage technologies and green fuels
for industry.
The main strategic recommendations are as follows:
1. Rapid socio-economic development in Africa will depend on the massive scaling-up of investment in three
key areas: zero-carbon electrification, digital access, and education. These investments are necessary for,
and supportive of, investments in other priorities, including transportation, water and sanitation, housing,
and business development in general and in particular in the productive value chains of minerals (Section 1).
2. Africa’s scale-up of zero-carbon electrification should aim for 100% household coverage by 2030 in line with
Sustainable Development Goal 7 (universal access to modern energy services), the United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, and the African Union’s Digitization Transformation Strategy,
which will set it on track to achieve the African Union’s Agenda 2063 (Section 1).
3. Africa has very high stakes in pushing for the global success of stopping human-induced climate change.
African countries should show a united front through continent-wide institutions, including the African Union
and the African Development Bank, and urge developed and emerging economies to lead a rapid global
transition to renewable energy and decarbonization. Africa’s historical contribution to greenhouse gas emissions has been minuscule, and as such, the continent is incurring net damages from climate change that are
hugely disproportionate to Africa’s contribution. To ensure a just transition to zero-carbon, sustainable economies and societies, Africa has the right to receive significant international official financing for mitigating and
adapting to climate change (Sections 1, 3, and 4).
4. Investments in zero-carbon electrification (as well as digital access and education) should be frontloaded
and supported by large-scale, long-term, official concessional financing by development institutions (most
importantly, the African Development Bank), private-sector investments, and debt relief where appropriate
(Sections 2 and 4). The multiplier of zero-carbon electrification on GDP is high, ensuring the amortization of
the debt.
5. Urbanization will occur naturally as agricultural output per worker rises, which, in turn, will shift new jobs
from agriculture to urban-based industry and services. African governments and continent-wide institutions
should also promote urbanization as part of the overall African development strategy: it will dramatically
lower the cost of providing electrification, digital access, education, and other services compared with rural
areas while making cross-subsidization between urban and rural areas possible. However, existing and future
slums associated with rapid urbanization could hinder these efficiency gains and, therefore, urbanization
should be tackled with public policies for urban planning, housing, services, and jobs (Sections 1 and 3).
6. Urbanization and education will accelerate Africa’s demographic transition to lower mortality rates and
lower fertility rates, which, in turn, will reduce the population growth rate and the youth dependency rate
while increasing the proportion of the population at working age. The demographic transition will thereby
create a “demographic dividend” of economic growth and poverty reduction (Section 1).
7. The rapid scale-up of renewable energy will create millions of new jobs in Africa, directly through the construction of new energy facilities and indirectly through the jobs that electrification and digital access will
induce. Africa should support its educational institutions to prepare the workforce for the new digital and
renewable economy, leveraging the tremendous opportunities offered by digitization and stimulating a reverse talents diaspora (Sections 1 and 3).
8. Africa requires a vast increase in energy production and use, which should occur overwhelmingly through a
massive increase in zero-carbon electricity from Africa’s plentiful renewable energy sources, including solar,
hydropower, wind, and geothermal, with a complementary role for sustainable biomass and synthetic fuels
(such as green hydrogen) in displacing fossil fuels. The three components of the proposed strategy for Africa’s zero-carbon electrification are (1) centralized energy infrastructure, (2) decentralized energy infrastructure, and (3) the phase-out of fossil fuels on economic grounds (Section 3). Natural source management
in minerals, fossil fuels, and land sits at the core of the strategy.
5

9. Centralized energy infrastructure will be needed to meet the energy needs of urban populations, industrial
users, and the transportation sector, whether directly (through electricity) or indirectly (through the production of synthetic fuels) (Section 3.1).
a. The trunk infrastructure will comprise mainly utility-scale solar, wind, and hydropower generation;
smart electricity transmission and distribution networks through interconnection at national, regional,
and international levels; and energy storage facilities. Carefully planned gas infrastructure will provide
flexibility to the system until energy storage technologies reach cost effectiveness (anticipated to be
by 2030) (Section 3.1.1).
b. Africa’s zero-carbon energy transformation provides an opportunity for positive feedback loops between
energy, mining, and industry. The continent’s mining sector tends to grow robustly, especially in the
production of cobalt, copper, rare earth minerals, and other critical minerals for the renewable energy
sectors. Mining, an energy-intensive activity, will provide anchor demand for a robust energy system.
Nascent industries—such as the production of aluminum and cement—also tend to grow strongly and
provide core demand for the scale-up of Africa’s power sector. In turn, an increasingly robust energy
system will support Africa’s industrialization, including industrialization in markets that will further
strengthen the zero-carbon energy system (e.g., the production of green hydrogen, the production and
recycling of batteries, the making of solar panels and wind turbines, and the information and communications technology sector) (Section 1 and Section 3.1.2).
c. A prerequisite to this feedback loop, however, is an upgrade of the governance of the mineral sector and
its value chain, which includes a transparent and enforceable legal framework; a balanced, progressive,
and administrable fiscal regime; and mechanisms to curb corruption and internalize social and environmental externalities by companies (Section 3.1.2).
d. Other important elements of centralized energy infrastructure are increasingly digitized, strong, and
flexible grids and networks of charging stations and other infrastructure needed for electric cargo vehicles to transport passengers and cargo (Sections 3.1.3–3.1.5).
e. African governments must put in place high-quality electricity laws, policies, regulations, planning
frameworks, and implementing institutions to ensure the social and environmental sustainability of
renewable energy siting, the financial and operational health of power utilities, and the liberalization
of the generation sector through the penetration of independent power producers (Sections 3.1.6–
3.1.7).
10. Decentralized energy infrastructure includes solar-based mini-grids and solar home systems for the continent’s rural and other remote areas. They will be run by private companies. Economic, legal, and policy considerations in developing this component will include adopting a least-cost approach to mobilize the costeffective technological solutions, ensuring energy justice through consultations, and ensuring the affordability and profitability of decentralized systems through the use of the appropriate regulatory and operational
frameworks for the last-mile infrastructure (Section 3.2).
11. Demand for land will increase as the climate changes and the roll-out of land-intensive climate and energy
solutions accelerates. Governments must undertake careful land-use and siting analyses that put people and
the environment at the center to avoid the uneven distribution of benefits and costs historically associated
with large land-based projects. Consistent with the UN Sustainable Development Goals and states’ human
rights obligations, minimizing social, environmental, and human rights impacts is key to achieving successful
project outcomes for all (Sections 3.1.6 and 3.2.2).
12. Several African countries will continue to produce and export oil and gas by 2050. These export earnings are
essential for Africa’s growth and development. However, as the world transitions away from fossil fuels and
toward zero-carbon energy, global prices for oil and gas are likely to remain low, opportunities for fossil fuel
exports are likely to diminish, and more economic opportunities to achieve energy access and industrialization are likely to arise from the declining costs of zero-carbon energy. Besides scaling up investment in zerocarbon electrification, we strongly urge Africa to carefully consider the risks of failing to plan for a phase-out
of fossil fuel production and use by mid-century, and to prepare for the decline in oil and gas export earnings
and the global zero-carbon energy transition. Increasing risks by mid-century include a shortfall in fossil fuel
6

export earnings, high-cost access to electricity, lack of access to donor finance, continued social and environmental externalities, and stranded assets. Africa’s successful phase-out of fossil fuels will require action
on several fronts, including the following (Sections 1 and 3.3):
a. Avoiding and minimizing locking in capital in coal, oil, and gas, as well as locking out zero-carbon alternatives: Africa should continue its operational fossil fuel production and exports on a diminishing basis.
Investments in new hydrocarbons in Africa should be restricted to high-quality, low-cost reserves that
can be profitably developed in the context of falling global demand and subdued prices, refraining from
additional costly exploration and infrastructure expansions, particularly in coal and oil.
b. Limiting investments in fossil gas and related infrastructure to those that minimize their LCOE, taking
into account that, like in the rest of the world, gas will continue providing flexibility to the electricity
system until the rollout of cost-effective storage technologies.
c. Considering the potential role of green hydrogen and leveraging existing gas infrastructure to reduce
stranded asset risks.
d. Adopting legal and policy frameworks conducive to the phase-out of fossil fuels, with explicit energy
transition strategies to provide market signals that Africa is determined to move away from fossil fuels
in the long term.
e. Structuring robust industrial and economic diversification policies so that Africa may secure a relevant
role in zero-carbon energy markets (such as the production of green hydrogen and the production and
recycling of batteries), ease its reliance on the collapsing fossil fuel industry, replace jobs lost, and ensure long-term government revenues.
c. Redirecting oil and gas revenues toward diversification in the energy and industrial sectors that will
support the zero-carbon transition while ensuring that the exploitation of remaining African fossil fuel
resources provides meaningful development opportunities and a just transition for those dependent
on the fossil fuel industry.
d. Removing USD 53.5 billion–worth of fossil fuel subsidies throughout the continent, investing instead in
protecting vulnerable consumers and promoting zero-carbon energy infrastructure, research, and job
training.
e. Repurposing national oil companies by redirecting their core activities toward the zero-carbon energy
transition.
f.

Cutting public financing for fossil fuel investment, making sure the lending policies of national and multilateral development banks and development finance institutions do not counter energy and climate
policy goals.

13. The continent must also build local capabilities and operational means to progressively seed independence
from foreign aid and shield against currency risk. In addition, they should not generate the power but rather
orchestrate its generation, putting in place the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks for IPPs (including
mini-grids, solar home systems, and large-scale units) and developing the core grid infrastructure. These
efforts should target ministries of finance or planning and their capacity to prepare and plan for the investment, utilities and their capacity to run competitive auctions, ministries of mines and energy to leverage the
vast mining sector investing in Africa as an anchor demand for investment, and the local financial sector
(banks and institutional investors as well as the creation of a bond market) (Section 4.2).
14. The African Development Bank should lead the overall financing effort, assisting African governments in this
undertaking with blended financing, in which official financial institutions, especially the African Development Bank and other institutions, extend low-interest, long-term financing in conjunction with private-sector
financing. The standards for blended financing should include capital adequacy provisions and other prudential standards for recipient entities seeking official financing for energy-sector scale-ups (Section 4.1).
15. Africa-wide investments in renewable energy should be in the order of USD 136 billion per year, divided
between power generation (USD 96 billion) and power transmission and distribution (USD 41 billion). While
these are still rough numbers, they signal the approximate magnitudes that will be needed. Of the total
outlays on the electricity system, roughly USD 377 billion, or 32% of the total between 2021 and 2030, should
7

be for rural (off-grid) power generation, and USD 795 billion, or 68%, should be for urban and industrial (ongrid) power generation. Of the total new power generation, roughly 83% will be from solar power, 13% from
hydropower, and 3% from wind power, reflecting the resource endowment of the continent. While significant, these new investments are affordable as they represent on average 2% of the continent’s annual GDP.
Taking the cost of the energy system for a household as measured by the Levelized Cost of Electricity, it
represents 5% of annual GDP per capita. These findings, emerging from our simple and transparent model,
represent rough estimates of the magnitude of investment needs, to be refined with deeper analysis (Sections 2 and 4).
16. Africa’s GDP can and should rise rapidly in the coming years, supported by frontloaded investments in energy, digital services, and education. We envision the growth of yearly GDP per capita between 2020 and
2050 at the following average rates: North Africa, 7%; Sub-Saharan Africa (other than the Republic of South
Africa), 8.4%; and Republic of South Africa, 6%. Because of rapid growth, Africa can absorb large amounts of
low-interest, long-maturity debt to finance the rapid scale-up of power generation and power distribution. For
the energy transition to pay for itself, financing must be shifted away from high-interest, short-term debt that
has mired the continent in regular liquidity and economic crises (Section 4).
17. There is a need to increase annual climate finance mobilization for energy systems, from multilateral development banks as well as co-finance, by 10 to 20 times to achieve zero-carbon mass electrification by 2030.
The African Development Bank should be the lead institution in Africa for supporting the large-scale financing
of the renewable energy scale-up. For that reason, the African Development Bank’s direct lending capacity
for power generation and distribution should be scaled up to (at least) USD 20 billion per year. Other partner
financing institutions (including the World Bank Group, the European Investment Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the New Development Bank,
the China Development Bank, and the Green Climate Fund) would be additional partners (Sections 4.1.1–
4.1.6).
18. Though still covering a modest fraction of the continent’s overall needs and potential, there are a few Africabased large-scale energy development initiatives and projects worth monitoring closely for lessons learned
to amplify and replicate the successful aspects of their design. Three case studies look into characteristics
and success factors of the Desert to Power Initiative, the Lake Turkana project in Kenya, and the Benban
Solar Park in Egypt (Section 4.1.5).
19. Key steps should be taken in 2022. We recommend that the African Development Bank, including the African
Natural Resources Center, and the African Union convene a high-level international advisory group composed of the main institutions working on strategies for Africa’s zero-carbon mass electrification leveraging
integrated resource management. Such institutions include the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency, the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization, the Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology, and the KTH Royal Institute of Technology, as well
as the African Development Bank’s Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa, the African Union’s
New Partnership for Africa's Development Agency, the infrastructure programs of the Regional Economic
Communities, and the newly launched initiative by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,
Team Energy.
20. With the support of this international group, the African Union and the African Development Bank, including
the African Natural Resources Center, should undertake the following strategic planning tasks in the coming
year:
a. Drawing up a continental timeline and strategy to phase out fossil fuels and redirect national and international resources and incentives to zero-carbon energy investment while ensuring that current
fossil fuel exploitation serves African countries’ development needs, in particular, when it comes to
providing flexibility to the electricity system.
b. Setting up a working group to update the Africa Mining Vision in light of the opportunities offered by
the energy transition. At its core should be skill development policies to seize the rising opportunities
of the localization of value chains; the operating principles of shared use of mining-related infrastructure, in particular in zero-carbon electricity; and the importance of good governance to avoid missing
the windfall of the energy transition for Africa’s critical minerals.
8

c. Assessing the skills to be developed throughout the continent to seize the opportunities of the energy
transition.
d. Identifying regional priority projects of the trunk infrastructure of the continent, namely, the utilityscale renewable energy projects (solar, hydro, wind, and geothermal) and the regional, continental,
and international interconnections.
e. Identifying the remaining steps to reform regional power pools.
f.

Developing principles of financing and bankability combining concessional finance, political risk, default, currency guarantees, and private capital, building on successful cases.

g. Crafting a strategy to strengthen the planning, monitoring, and procurement capabilities of African
utilities and support their financial and operational health.
h. Drafting Africa-wide norms and standards on the siting policy for renewable energy and land-based
solutions and codifying how to conduct genuine consultation processes in energy investment.
i.

Upgrading the policy and legal frameworks related to investment in information and communications
technologies; investment by independent power producers in large-scale, mini-grid, or stand-alone
generation; local bank lending to infrastructure projects; standards on electric vehicle charging stations; and standards on importing used internal combustion engine vehicles.

j.

Developing country-specific affordability analyses to understand what commercial models and subsidy
levels to promote for under-the-grid and off-grid communities.

k. Develop a communication program on the advantages of renewable energy solutions for the broad
African citizenry.
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1. Introduction: A Vision for Africa’s Energy and Economic Development
The United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7, 2 to be achieved by 2030, includes targets to “ensure universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy services” and “increase substantially the share of
renewable energy in the global energy mix.” 3 The African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 commits AU member states to
speed up actions to build the energy infrastructure needed, “harnessing all African energy resources to ensure modern, efficient, reliable, cost-effective, renewable, and environmentally friendly energy to all African households, businesses, industries, and institutions.” 4 The African Development Bank’s (AfDB) High 5s set as development priorities
for the Bank to “Light up and Power Africa; Feed Africa; Industrialize Africa; Integrate Africa; and Improve the Quality
of Life for the People of Africa.” 5
Rapid socio-economic development in Africa will depend on the massive scaling-up of investment in three key areas:
zero-carbon 6 electrification, digital access, and education. These investments are necessary for, and supportive of,
investments in other priorities, including transportation, agriculture, water and sanitation, housing, and business
development.
Electrification is a fundamental input to development. For far too long, much of Africa has lacked reliable access to
electricity. This has been a major hindrance to development. Yet because of climate change, electrification will become even more important. Most new automobiles sold worldwide after 2030 will be electric vehicles (EVs), making
access to electricity even more essential than in the past. Moreover, the world will increasingly require green (zerocarbon) electricity as part of the global transition to zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050. Africa, like the
rest of the world, will be expected to have a power grid based on zero-carbon energy.
Achieving these goals and bringing zero-carbon electricity to every African is well within reach. Africa has a very high
endowment of zero-carbon energy sources: tremendous solar technical potential spread throughout the continent 7
and considerable hydropower, wind, geothermal, and other sources, varying by region. Africa can achieve a high
share of renewables in the continent’s final energy consumption during 2030-2040, assuming a massive investment
in the coming decade, 8 and increase that share to nearly 100% by 2050. Considering the ineluctable global transition
to zero-carbon energy systems, Africa can reduce its domestic reliance on fossil fuels by 2030 and ultimately eliminate it by 2050. While achieving the goal of continent-wide electricity access by 2030 may initially mean low-level
energy services 9 for many Africans living in rural areas, the level of these services will then improve across Africa by
2050 to meet growing energy use per person.
Four structural changes will shape Africa’s energy transition and rising energy use:

2 With
3

ramifications to many other SDGs (such as SDGs 6, 8, 10, 9, 13, 14, and 15).

“Goal 7,” Sustainable Development, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020, https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal7.

African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, 2015), 16, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36204-doc-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf.

4

5

“The High 5s,” African Development Bank Group, African Development Bank, 2021, https://www.afdb.org/en/high5s.

Throughout this report, we use the term “zero-carbon” rather than “low-carbon” to convey a higher decarbonization ambition through
renewables-based electrification, even though acknowledging that “zero” may, in practice, mean “near-zero” or “net-zero.” We note that
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) does not appear to define “zero-carbon energy” and “low-carbon energy” separately,
merely noting: “Zero- and low-carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and
storage (CCS) or bioenergy with CCS (BECCS).” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing
Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)] (Geneva: IPCC, 2014), 23, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf.

6

7

“Global Solar Atlas 2.0,” Solargis, World Bank, 2020, https://solargis.com/maps-and-gis-data/download.

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Scaling up Renewable Energy Deployment in Africa: Impact of IRENA’s Engagement
(Masdar City: IRENA, January 2019), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Regional-Group/Africa/IRENA_Africa_impact_2019.pdf.

8

9

E.g., 365 kWh per capita per year, which is the target consumption for 2030 used in our model.
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Urbanization: The share of the population that is urban is expected to reach around 59% by 2050, up from
43% in 2020. 10 This increase is a result of both a significant rise in agricultural productivity and the promotion
of urbanization as part of the overall African development strategy. Higher urbanization will greatly lower
the unit costs of providing energy services and will facilitate electrification throughout the economy.



Demographic Transition: Africa will experience a decline in the fertility rate 11 and mortality rate, 12 accelerated
by urbanization and education, which will slow down the population growth rate while increasing the proportion of the population at working age, creating a demographic dividend of economic growth and poverty
reduction. 13



Industrialization: Industry’s share of GDP will rise, 14 supported by massive digital access and a skilled workforce prepared to seize the new digital and renewable economy opportunities.



Economic growth: Annual growth in per capita GDP should reach at least 7% per decade, thereby doubling
per capita income each decade (see Table 1). This growth rate is comparable to that achieved by China during
1980–2020 and should be based on the same principles of China’s super-charged growth rate: high rates of
investment in infrastructure, education, and business capital.

1.1.Africa’s Energy Transformation Through Renewables-Based Electrification
To support this growing energy demand cost-effectively, we envision an energy transformation strategy for Africa
that entails a rapid build-up of the renewable power supply and the replacement of fossil fuels in power, transport,
and industry with zero-carbon electricity (to the extent possible) or with renewable and synthetic fuels. Higher levels
of electrification will also result in energy efficiency gains across Africa. 15 Our focus on access to electricity rests on
the assumption that, by 2050, economy-wide energy demand—from households and the productive sector, including
industry, transport, buildings, and cooking—will be overwhelmingly met with renewables-based electricity, and renewable and synthetic fuels will supply any remaining fuel demand, displacing fossil fuel use.
During the period to 2050, several African countries will continue to be hydrocarbon exporters to world markets.
These export earnings are essential for Africa’s growth and development to 2050. Yet, we strongly urge that Africa

“World Urbanization Prospects 2018,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Dynamics, United Nations,
https://population.un.org/wup.

10

Declining trend in sub-Saharan Africa since 2010: “Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Sub-Saharan Africa,” The World Bank, World
Bank Group, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?end=2019&locations=ZG&start=2010.

11

Declining trend in sub-Saharan Africa since 2010 for all mortality indicators, for instance infant mortality here: “Mortality rate, infant (per
1,000 live births) – Sub-Saharan Africa,” The World Bank, World Bank Group, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?end=2019&locations=ZG&start=2010. This trend might be reversed for a couple of years in some countries due to
Covid-2019 although overall Africa is less hit than other continents. See Yakubu Lawal, “Africa’s low COVID-19 mortality rate: A paradox?,”
International Journal of Infectious Diseases 102, 2021: 118-122, ISSN 1201-9712, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971220322426.

12

13 Covid-19

has undone gains in poverty reductions in many areas but in the longer term poverty will reduce. African Development Bank
(AfDB), African Economic Outlook 2021: From Debt Resolution to Growth: The Road Ahead for Africa (AfDB, 2021),
https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook.
“Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP) - Middle East & North Africa (excluding high income),” The World Bank, World
Bank Group, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS?locations=XQ; “Industry (including construction), value added (% of
GDP) - Sub-Saharan Africa,” The World Bank, World Bank Group, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS?locations=ZG.

14

According to research by the Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology (LUT): “The massive gain in energy efficiency is primarily due to
a high level of electrification of more than 93% in 2050, saving nearly 7200 TWh compared to the continuation of current practices (low electrification).” LUT University and Energy Watch Group, Global Energy System Based on 100% Renewable Energy: Power, Heat, Transport and
Desalination Sectors, (Lappeenranta, April 2019), 102, http://energywatchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EWG_LUT_100RE_All_Sectors_Global_Report_2019.pdf.

15

In addition to electrification, the IEA’s Africa case includes strong energy efficiency policies when it comes to fuel economy standards for cars
and two/three-wheelers (largely absent today), industrial processes, building codes, and home for appliances and cooling systems. Electrification and strong efficiency standards enable growth to be 4 times higher in the Africa case than in the Stated policies scenario while having
a lower level of energy use. International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019 (Paris: IEA, November 2019),
https://www.iea.org/reports/africa-energy-outlook-2019.
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consider the risks of failing to prepare for a decline in these hydrocarbon export earnings as the entire world shifts
to renewable energy.
The first six months of 2021 brought new evidence attesting to this impending global shift, such as U.S. President Joe
Biden’s online summit with world leaders in April 2021 16 and the May 2021 IEA Report on Net Zero by 2050: A
Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, which stated that there was “no need for investment in new fossil fuel supply”
in a pathway to net zero by 2050. 17 The beginning of 2021 also saw three other landmark events in May 2021 affecting oil companies: The Netherlands Supreme Court ordered Shell to cut its carbon emissions (including the scope 3
emissions of its hydrocarbon products), 18 ExxonMobil’s shareholders voted over management objections to place on
the Board at least two directors committed to the company’s decarbonization by 2050, 19 and Chevron’s shareholders
similarly voted to cut the company’s scope 3 emissions. 20 The end of 2021 was marked by the 26th Conference of the
Parties (COP 26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the landmark Global
Methane Pledge 21 and the Glasgow Declaration. 22
The beginning of 2022 has been obscured by Russia’s war against Ukraine. While the war is provoking petroleum
shocks, with prices skyrocketing, it has also prompted Europeans and Americans to wean off Russian gas in the short
term and off all gas in the medium to longer term. The President of the European Commission noted: “the quicker
we switch to renewables and hydrogen, combined with more energy efficiency, the quicker we will be truly independent and master our energy system.” 23 In turn, U.S. President Biden said that “this crisis also presents an opportunity” that will “drive the investments we need to double-down on our clean energy goals and accelerate progress
toward our net-zero emissions future.” 24 The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2022 confirms that, even in the agency’s
relatively conservative “stated policies” scenario, the fossil fuel era is nearing an end, with coal demand peaking in
the coming years, fossil gas demand reaching a plateau by the end of the 2020s, and oil demand reaching a peak in
the mid-2030 and subsequently falling. According to the same IEA report, despite the short-term boost to global
fossil fuel demand resulting from the global energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “the lasting gains
from the crisis accrue to low-emissions sources, mainly renewables, […] alongside faster progress with efficiency and
electrification.” 25
The world prices for oil and gas are likely to remain low, and the opportunities for exports are likely to diminish, not
to increase. Thus, we are arguing for a transformation built around three components: (1) an Africa-wide energy
system based on renewable energy (solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass) as the technology of choice for the
near and far future; (2) a continuation of hydrocarbon exports on a diminishing basis, favoring gas among the fossil
fuels and planning on its use to regulate the electricity system and as temporary feedstock for industry; and (3) preparation for the global transition to renewable energy, including at least some opportunities for Africa to export green

16 The

While House, “President Biden Invites 40 World Leaders to Leaders Summit on Climate,” Press release (March 26, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/26/president-biden-invites-40-world-leaders-to-leaders-summiton-climate/f.

17

International Energy Agency (IEA), Net Zero by 2050 (Paris: IEA, 2021), https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.

BBC News, “Shell: Netherlands Court Orders Oil Giant to Cut Emissions” (May 26, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe57257982.

18

19 Steven

Mufson, “A Bad Day for Big Oil,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/05/26/exxonmobil-rebel-shareholders-win-board-seats.

20 Sergio Chapa and Caroline Hyde, “Chevron Investors Back Climate Proposal in Rebuke to C-Suite,” Bloomberg Green, May 26, 2021,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-26/chevron-investors-back-climate-proposal-in-rebuke-to-management.
21

“The Global Methane Pledge,” https://www.globalmethanepledge.org.

“Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use,” November 2, 2021, https://ukcop26.org/glasgow-leaders-declaration-on-forestsand-land-use.

22

European Commission, “REPowerEU: Joint European Action for More Affordable, Secure and Sustainable Energy,” Press Release (March 8,
2022), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511.

23

24 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Joint Press Statement” Press
release (March 25, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/25/remarks-by-president-biden-and-european-commission-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-in-joint-press-statement.

International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2002 (Paris: IEA, 2022), 29–30, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022.

25
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(zero-carbon) power and green hydrogen (hydrogen produced with green power) to Europe over long-distance transmission across the Mediterranean.
For Africa’s growing industry, the shift toward zero-carbon electrification will mean increased reliance on grid-based
power generated by zero-carbon sources and a diminishing reliance on off-grid diesel power. Africa’s mining sector
will be a key user of grid-based renewable power. The mining sector will grow robustly in future years, especially in
the production of cobalt, copper, rare earth minerals, and other critical minerals for the energy transition. Mining
will therefore provide a core demand for the scale-up of Africa’s power sector. Other industries—metallurgy, batteries, solar PV, wind turbines—will also experience strong growth in the coming years, becoming major users of the
expanded grid. This is also true for the telecommunications and Internet sectors. In short, the renewable power
sector will provide the vital electricity for the expansion of African industry, and African industry will ensure the core
market for expanded energy services (see Section 3.1.2).
Planning for continent-wide access to electricity across Africa must also entail mass electrification of transport in
both urban and rural contexts. Starting with cities with existing grid connections, Africa must plan to electrify its
fleets of light-duty vehicles—including two and three-wheelers, cars, utility vehicles, and small trucks—using renewable power sources and taking advantage of both improvements in range, cost, and market share of electric vehicles
(EVs) as well as recent and expected achievements in battery technologies. For heavy-duty trucks, decarbonization
efforts will focus on a range of options currently being explored, including battery EVs, green hydrogen, biofuels, and
even electric long-distance highways using overhead lines to power trucks. 26
The rapid scale-up of renewable energy will create millions of new, qualified jobs in Africa, including direct jobs
through the construction of new energy facilities, indirect jobs along the electricity value chain, and induced jobs
resulting from electrification and digital access 27 (further discussed below in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.3.5). African educational institutions should prepare the workforce for the new digital and renewable economy.
Pursuing this vision, and based on extensive policy analysis, 28 we set out a comprehensive and actionable roadmap
for African governments—with coordination efforts by the AU and the AfDB and support from other stakeholders—
to drive Africa’s zero-carbon energy development. Starting from a simple and transparent model of the investment
volumes needed for Africa to achieve zero-carbon continent-wide electrification by 2050 (Section 2), we address
various imperatives and challenges regarding Africa’s energy planning (Section 3) and financing (Section 4) and outline recommendations to implement the strategy starting from 2021 (Section 5).

26 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Global Renewables Outlook: Energy Transformation 2050 (Abu Dhabi, 2020), 183,
https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Apr/IRENA_Global_Renewables_Outlook_2020.pdf.
27

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Global Renewables Outlook, 100 et seq.

Superb recent analyses of Africa’s energy prospects by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA), the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO), the Lappeenranta-Lahti University of
Technology (LUT), and other institutions have informed this report.

28
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2. A Simple and Illustrative Model of Investment Needs
We deploy a simple and illustrative model of African electrification to illustrate the rough magnitudes involved between 2021 and 2050. Our purpose is not precision; that can best be achieved in further detailed engineering studies.
Our purpose is to illustrate the general scale of energy use that should be targeted and assess the affordability of the
transformation deemed necessary for the continent. We divide Africa into three geographic zones—North Africa,
the Republic of South Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa (not including the Republic of South Africa)—and consider the
urban and rural sectors in each region, thus describing energy use in six regions:


NA-U: North Africa – Urban



NA-R: North Africa – Rural



RSA-U: Republic of South Africa – Urban



RSA-R: Republic of South Africa – Rural



SSA-U: Sub-Saharan Africa (without the Republic of South Africa) – Urban



SSA-R: Sub-Saharan Africa (without the Republic of South Africa) – Rural

For each of these groupings, we set reasonable normative targets for economic growth and electricity consumption
for 2030 and 2050. Our assumption is for rapid economic growth to mid-century (Table 1), with a corresponding
rapid increase in electricity consumption per capita (Table 2). We believe that Africa should aim for and plan for
roughly 7% growth per annum in per capita GDP, an achievable rate that would close a significant part of the income
gap with the rest of the world. The basis for such rapid growth is high investments in infrastructure, education, and
business capital.
Table 1: Growth in GDP per capita by decade, 2020 to 2050 (USD in constant 2020 prices)
2020

2030

2040

2050

NA-U
GDP per capita

3,699

Annual growth over the previous decade

7,444

13,645

22,337

7%

6%

5%

4,287

8,890

16,016

9%

8%

6%

12,974

21,003

31,219

6%

5%

4%

5,410

10,650

18,427

8%

7%

6%

4,848

9,781

17,248

8%

7%

6%

2,021

4,960

10,181

11%

9%

7%

NA-R
GDP per capita

1,849

Annual growth over the previous decade
RSA-U
GDP per capita

7,431

Annual growth over the previous decade
RSA-R
GDP per capita

2,477

Annual growth over the previous decade
SSA-U
GDP per capita

2,158

Annual growth over the previous decade
SSA-R
GDP per capita
Annual growth over the previous decade

719
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Table 2: Electricity consumption targets by grouping, 2030 and 2050
2019 – Baseline

Groupings

2030

Consumption Level
(kWh per capita per
year)

Consumption
Level
(kWh per capita
per year)

2050

Service Level

Consumption
Level
(kWh per capita per year)

Service Level (see
note under the
table)

NA-U

1,938

2,993

Level 5

4,000

European average
today

NA-R

530

1,241

Level 4

2,993

Level 5

RSA-U

4,270

5,100

Similar to
Spanish average today

6,400

Russian average
today

RSA-R

1,908

2,993

Level 5

4,000

European average
today

SSA-U

408

1,241

Level 3

2,993

Level 5

SSA-R

66

365

Level 4

1,241

Level 4

Source: Prepared by the authors on levels of electricity consumption per capita deemed sensibly achievable for each
region. Note: See Figure 9 for explanations on service levels. 29
Based on these normative targets for 2030 and 2050, we build an annual linear progression of electricity consumption per capita starting from the 2019 baseline. 30 Using UN population estimates, we calculate the total consumption
time series by 2050. The time series also includes total generation, calculated based on the assumption of power
transmission and distribution losses at 15%, 31 as well as installed capacity, assuming a renewable energy blended
capacity factor of 30%.

Level 3: Daily consumption per capita: Minimum 1000 Wh; Level 4: Daily consumption per capita: Minimum 3400 Wh; Level 5: Daily consumption per capita: Minimum 8200 Wh.

29

For the 2019 baseline, we used IEA data on electricity consumption at country level and then applied a rough split of 4 to 1 between urban
consumption and rural consumption. Source for this assumption: Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra, and Lucia de Strasser, “The Challenge of Energy Access in Africa,” in Energy in Africa, SpringerBriefs in Energy (Springer, Cham, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-31992219-5_1.

30

31 Assuming

a fixed percentage for the period, with that being an average rate from system losses dropping linearly from 25% to 10% by

2050.
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Based on the time series of installed capacity, we calculate the installed capacity that will need to be added every
year. We assume that all new installed capacity will be based on renewables; we also assume that the allocation of
the new installed capacity to different types of renewables will reflect the energy potential 32 of each geodemographic
grouping. To simplify, we assume the same breakdown between renewables throughout the time series (see Table
3). Assuming that all new installed capacity will be based on renewables implies that Africa’s current fossil fuel infrastructure is sufficient to ensure baseload and flexibility until the roll-out of cost-effective battery technologies. This
assumption is a simplification to assess the affordability of the transformation deemed necessary for the continent,
as mentioned above.
Table 3: Breakdown of renewable energies for each grouping

Groupings
NA-U

Utilityscale solar

45% of SSA-R
Share of the
Africa-wide
potential used
by 2050, considering existing renewable
plants and the
development
of new renewable
plants as per
our model

Offshore
wind

5%

3%

1%

4%

5%

5%

1%

21%

3%

Geothermal

Biomass

100%
85%

RSA-R
SSA-U + 55%
of SSA – R
(considered
on-grid)

Onshore
wind

Hydro

91%

NA-R
RSA-U

Decentralized
solar

100%

74%

1%

1%

99% of geothermal potential

19% of sustainable biomass potential

100%

20% of solar potential

74% of
hydro potential

97% of wind potential

Source: Prepared by the authors based the rough breakdown of renewable potential between sources of each region.

The renewable energy potential of the continent is provided by the AfDB (“Light Up and Power Africa – The New Deal on Energy for Africa,” African Development Bank Group, African Development Bank, https://www.afdb.org/en/the-high-5/light-up-and-power-africa%E2%80%93-a-new-deal-on-energy-for-africa) and the broad view of the potential for each geodemographic region by: Sebastian Hermann,
Asami Miketa, and Nicolas Fichaux, “Estimating the Renewable Energy Potential in Africa: A GIS-based approach,” (IRENA-KTH working paper,
Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)), 2014), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2014/IRENA_Africa_Resource_Potential_Aug2014.pdf; and International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019.
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Each stock of new installed capacity is multiplied by a unit installation cost that includes a surcharge for batteries of
15%. 33 For grid infrastructure, we leveraged existing studies anticipating regional interconnections to estimate the
surcharge, setting it at 30% of total cost. 34 The installation cost of solar, wind, and geothermal is divided by 1.5 in
2030 and again by 1.5 in 2050; 35 the installation cost of hydropower and biomass remains constant. We also assume
that the mostly-fossil-fuel-based current installed capacity will have a useful life of 40 years and that the new installed
capacity will not be replaced before its economic end of life in 2050.
On this basis, we estimate the annual investment needs for the whole electric system, which over the period averages
USD 136 billion per year (in 2019 dollars), divided between power generation (USD 96 billion) and power transmission and distribution (USD 41 billion). Accordingly, to enable Africa to achieve SDG 7 by 2030 and set it on track to
achieve Agenda 2063, USD 4.22 trillion (in 2019 dollars) must be invested by 2050. Of the total outlays on the power
system, roughly USD 377 billion, or 32% of the total between 2021 and 2030, should be for rural (off-grid) power
generation, and USD 795 billion, or 68%, should be for urban and industrial (on-grid) power generation. Of the total
new power generation, roughly 83% will be from solar power, 13% from hydropower, and 3% from wind power.
We note that our estimate is higher than GEIDCO’s (USD 90.6 billion per year) and IEA’s (USD 120 billion per year).
The main reason for differing from IEA’s and GEIDCO’s estimates is the level of electricity consumption that we consider that the various groupings within the continent should sensibly reach in 2030 and 2050. We reach an average
level of consumption per capita for the continent in 2050 that is similar to that of Europe in 2020, whereas GEIDCO
and IEA anticipate an average level of consumption per capita that is not enough to power home appliances such as
a fridge in 2050 (assuming single-person households).
Our model also considers the extent to which these investment needs are affordable for the continent. While significant, these new investments are affordable as they represent on average 2% of the continent’s annual GDP.
Moreover, we analyzed if these investments are affordable for the average household. Based on the energy mix for
the new installed capacity mentioned above and on the current energy mix, which is based on fossil fuels, we assess
a yearly cost of the system, taking into account the cost of the existing system and that corresponding to the new
investment. The cost is established by multiplying the yearly LCOE by the yearly generation. The LCOE of each energy
source takes into account installation costs, fixed and variable operating costs, and a hurdle rate corresponding to a
concessional financing rate of 5% per year. The LCOE of the new investments (including grid and storage), exclusively
based on renewables and assuming low-cost financing, remains low over the period, hovering between USD 0.09 per
kWh (2020) and USD 0.04 per kWh (2050).
The yearly cost of the system is then divided by the yearly population to assess the per capita cost of the system. To
estimate the affordability of the assumed electricity consumption per household, we then compare the per capita
electricity costs with GDP per capita, assuming the growth rates of 7% for North Africa; 8.4% for Sub-Saharan Africa
(other than the Republic of South Africa); and 6% for the Republic of South Africa.
We find that the assumed electricity costs, measured at the LCOE per kWh, averages around 5% of GDP per capita,
a reasonable and affordable sum for energy outlays. Of course, the ultimate affordability depends on the availability
of large-scale financing at low cost, as we emphasize throughout this report.

33 Estimate

based on International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Utility-Scale Batteries: Innovation Landscape Brief (Abu Dhabi: IRENA,
2019), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Sep/IRENA_Utility-scale-batteries_2019.pdf.
The Transformation Scenario of IRENA sets the grid cost at 18% of total cost (International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Global Renewables Outlook) and GEIDCO sets it at 46% (Global Energy Interconnection Development and Co-operation Organization (GEIDCO), Africa
Energy Interconnection Planning Research Report (Beijing: GEIDCO, 2018)).

34

The sharp decline in cost of solar, wind and geothermal is in line with forecast by IRENA: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA),
Future of Solar Photovoltaic: Deployment, Investment, Technology, Grid Integration and Socio-Economic Aspects (Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 2019),
https://irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Nov/IRENA_Future_of_Solar_PV_2019.pdf; International Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA), Electricity Storage and Renewables: Costs and Markets to 2030 (Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 2017), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2017/Oct/IRENA_Electricity_Storage_Costs_2017.pdf; International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA),
Geothermal Power; Technology Brief (Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 2017), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2017/Aug/IRENA_Geothermal_Power_2017.pdf.
35
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3. Energy Planning Strategy
3.1.Centralized Energy Infrastructure
Africa must build the energy trunk infrastructure made of large, utility-scale hydropower, solar, and other large,
utility-scale generation projects, synchronous regional power pools, and a high-voltage DC grid connecting these
pools. While developing the trunk infrastructure will take the upcoming three decades to 2050, some tasks should
be realized within the next five years:


Developing all policies and action plans at the national level to implement the African Union’s February 2020
Digital Transformation Strategy.



Strengthening and starting the digitization of national grids and making the fossil fuel-based grid compatible
with renewable energy.



Preparing for the development of charging stations for electric cars and public transportation.



Clarifying and strengthening the rules governing land-intensive investments in renewable energies in national investment laws and international instruments such as the Investment Protocol to the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) under negotiation.



Reestablishing the financial and operational health of utilities.

3.1.1. The Trunk Infrastructure
Grid interconnection in Africa is needed for several reasons. One is that while private investment in generation is
booming, with Independent Power Producer (IPP) capacity doubling every five years since 1995, in the absence of
parallel investment in the national and international grid, many projects are experiencing off-taker risks because
either countries can’t absorb the proposed capacity (by some estimates, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and
Uganda could together face overcapacity of 2,689 MW by 2022 and IPPs have been put on hold in Ghana and
Kenya) 36 or the sole potential off-taker is the financially-ill utility. 37
Another reason that grid interconnection is needed is that it enables the complementarity of renewable energy
sources with different profiles (see Figure 1) and improves the stability of the energy supply. While these reasons
have always been true, climate change adds one more reason. Some hydropower-rich countries will suffer from
underperformance while others will over-perform; collaboration through interconnection between hydropower
countries, solar- or wind-rich countries, and hydropower countries can mitigate inequality caused by climate
change. 38

36 Benjamin Attia, “Big Solar Bankability & Utility Performance Can Benefit from Power Pools,” Energy For Growth Hub, September 22, 2019,
https://www.energyforgrowth.org/memo/big-solar-bankability-utility-performance-can-benefit-from-power-pools; Benjamin Xornam Glover,
“400 MW Wind Power Project Stalls,” Graphic Online, July 20, 2020, https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/400mw-wind-powerproject-stalls.html.

Green Climate Fund (GCF), “Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility,” (concept note, GCF, October 5, 2020), https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/25180-afdb-desert-power.pdf. “A public–private partnership called Africa GreenCo is acting as a
credit-worthy renewable energy intermediary, buying power from IPPs, and hedging the default risk of selling to utilities by selling on the
SAPP market (in addition to selling to private off-takers).” “Our Mission,” GreenCo: Africa GreenCo Group, 2021, https://africagreenco.com/about-us.

37

38 “Country-specific

data show that climate change will have significant impacts on most African countries, although the patterns of change
may vary from one country to the other. For example, the hydropower capacity factor in Morocco, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique are projected to decline considerably, while the decrease would be offset by an increase in the hydropower capacity of the Nile basin countries, notably Egypt, Sudan, and Kenya.” “Climate Impacts on African Hydropower,” International Energy Agency (IEA), 2020, https://www.iea.org/reports/climate-impacts-on-african-hydropower.
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Figure 1: Complementarity of water discharge between the Zambezi and Nile River Basins
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Source: Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO). 39
Interconnection also leverages the comparative advantage of each region in large-scale energy potential through
economies of scale (such as the Grand Inga project and the Desert to Power initiative). Once this interconnection is
built, the transformation of the energy production system towards 100% renewable energy can happen faster and
more cost-effectively. For instance, Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda lack sufficient high-quality wind resources, while some of their neighboring countries (Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia) have
wind resources that exceed their projected demand. 40 Instead of developing unreliable and expensive wind generation sources, countries lacking resources would buy from countries with excess capacity under functioning power
pools.
According to SAPP, interconnection in the Southern African region will lead to savings in generation and transmission
infrastructure of USD 1.6 billion per year, 41 while savings could reach USD 5 to 8 billion per year in the WAPP according to the World Bank. 42
When the interconnection is over long distances, the optimization is even higher. Therefore, the roadmap should
likely include the progressive construction of asynchronous long-distance high-voltage DC links connecting the AC
regional power grids, as proposed by the Chinese NGO and think-tank, GEIDCO. An Ultra High Voltage (UHV) grid that
would enable the cost-effective transmission of very high-power capacity (up to 10 GW) over longer distances with
low losses should be actively considered as it will enable Africa to leverage load centers or excess energy in Europe
and West Asia (Arabian Peninsula) to stabilize its grid. 43

39 Global

Report.

Energy Interconnection Development and Co-operation Organization (GEIDCO), Africa Energy Interconnection Planning Research

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), “MapRe: Multi-criteria Analysis for Planning Renewable Energy,” Berkeley Lab: MapRE
Multi-criteria Analysis for Planning Renewable Energy, U.S. Department of Energy and University of California, Berkeley,
https://mapre.lbl.gov.

40

41 International

Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019.

World Bank, “Regional Power Trade in West Africa Offers Promise of Affordable, Reliable Electricity,” The World Bank News, April 20, 2018,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/04/20/regional-power-trade-west-africa-offers-promise-affordable-reliable-electricity.

42

43 Global

Report.

Energy Interconnection Development and Co-operation Organization (GEIDCO), Africa Energy Interconnection Planning Research
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Interestingly, with strong interconnection links, GEIDCO anticipates an installed capacity of 1130 GW in 2050;44 without taking interconnection into account, LUT anticipates that Africa would reach 3059 GW of installed capacity by
2050 while recognizing that interconnection would lower this amount. 45
An interconnection system would, therefore, enable Africa to tap into the full renewable energy potential of the
continent (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Africa’s estimated renewable energy resources, GW

Source: African Development Bank (AfDB). 46
This continental-scale system would entail connecting the following potential developments in large-scale renewable
energy:


Main hydropower bases (above 2 GW) in the basins of the Congo (Central Africa), Nile (East Africa), Niger
(West Africa), and Zambezi Rivers (Southern Africa).



High-irradiation areas suitable for large-scale solar power (above 50 GW) in the Sahara Desert (North Africa),
the Atlantic coastal areas in Southern Africa, and some inland areas in East Africa.



Main areas suitable for wind development (above 10 GW) in the coastal regions of North Africa, East Africa,
and Southern Africa (Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Somalia, and Sudan), with the best offshore wind energy
potential located off the coasts of Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania.



Geothermal power in the East Africa Rift System. 47

The International Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA) Renewable Energy Roadmaps (REmap) program could usefully
refine the exact mapping of the renewable energy potential in each country, 48 while the Multi-Criteria Analysis for
Planning Renewable Energy (MapRE) initiative could help balance sustainability considerations with energy potential
considerations (see further discussion in Section 3.1.6 below).

3.1.2. Feedback Loop Between Mining, Industrialization, and Energy Development
Load centers that already exist through mining activities in West Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa and high
urbanization in North Africa will make large-scale power generation and long-distance interconnection viable. With

44 Global

Energy Interconnection Development and Co-operation Organization (GEIDCO), Africa Energy Interconnection Planning Research

Report.
45

LUT University and Energy Watch Group, Global Energy System Based on 100% Renewable Energy.

“Light Up and Power Africa — The New Deal on Energy for Africa,” African Development Bank Group, African Development Bank,
https://www.afdb.org/en/the-high-5/light-up-and-power-africa-%E2%80%93-a-new-deal-on-energy-for-africa.

46

47 Hermann,
48

Miketa, and Fichaux, “Estimating the Renewable Energy Potential in Africa: A GIS-Based Approach.”

“Remap – Renewable Energy Roadmaps,” International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), IRENA, https://www.irena.org/remap.
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the industrialization of the continent through more intensive agriculture, light industry, and some heavy industry, as
well urbanization (bringing higher incomes, lower connection costs, and more home appliances and cooling systems),
the load centers will become more widespread, enabling the further deployment of the trunk infrastructure. As
GEIDCO expresses, the co-development model of “electricity-mining-metallurgy-manufacturing-trade” can effectively solve the dilemma of large hydropower development (such as the Grand Inga dam) or any other utility-scale
development or grid extension that has not appeared bankable for any actor, MDB, DFI, or private over time.
Cleaning the Governance of the Mining Sector as a Pre-requisite
Table 4 presents estimates of the percentages of world reserves of critical minerals found in African countries, along
with the 2050 projected annual demand of those minerals from energy technologies as a percentage of their production in 2018. Though African governments should read these demand projections prudently and not as grounds
for overly optimistic expectations and plans, 49 the demand for critical minerals for the global zero-carbon energy
transition in the coming decades tends to boost mining activities in resource-rich African countries.
Table 4: Percentage of world reserves of critical minerals in Africa and projected demand increase

Aluminum
(bauxite)
Cobalt

50.7

Copper

2.2

0.2

8.1

1%

0.5

460%

7.8

Iron ore

7%

5.3

494%

0.1

Lithium

Vanadium

Zimbabwe

35.1

2.4

1%
1.0

4.7

2050 projected global
annual demand from
energy technologies as
percent of 2018 global
annual
production
9%

1.4

Graphite

Titanium

Zambia

24.7

Chromium

Manganese

Tanzania

South Africa

Mozambique

Morocco

Madagascar

Guinea

Ghana

Gabon

Mineral /
Country

DR Congo

Percentage of world reserves

1.0
3.1

3.5

488%

40.0

4%

5.6

0%

15.9

189%

Source: Prepared by the authors based on World Bank data on 2050 projected annual demand for 17 critical minerals, 50 and on USGS data on global reserves. 51 Note: USGS MCS 2021 did not list African countries with reserves of
indium, lead, molybdenum, neodymium, nickel, silver, or zinc.

Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Solina Kennedy, and Howard Mann, Don’t Throw Caution to the Wind: In the Green Energy Transition: Not All Critical Minerals Will Be Goldmines (New York: CCSI, May 2020), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Dont%20Throw%20Caution%20to%20the%20Wind_0.pdf.

49

Kirsten Hund, Daniele La Porta, Thao P. Fabregas, Tim Laing, and John Drexhage, Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the
Clean Energy Transition (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2020), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-forClimate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf.

50

51 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and U.S. Department of the Interior, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021 (Reston: U.S. Geological Survey,
January 2021), https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2021/mcs2021.pdf.
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In this context of opportunities, countries must significantly improve mining sector governance. A predictable, durable, and equitable legal framework, implemented by strong institutions, is the foundation of a mutually beneficial,
thriving mining sector that can support further industrialization. “When the rules for compan[ies], government[s],
and citizens are widely known, investments can operate smoothly, governments can manage them effectively, and
citizens can monitor how the benefits of the investment—fiscal and non-fiscal—are allocated.” 52 Africa’s mineral
resources can and should generate substantial fiscal revenues to expand state budgets, necessary for the provision
of essential public services to Africans, including zero-carbon electrification and industrialization. Since mineral resources are non-renewable, they should be translated into long-lasting public investments through a fair and transparent collection of revenues. Moreover, countries and the private sector should leverage mining for upskilling the
workforce through stringent training requirements and partnerships with local institutions 53 and developing energy
and other types of infrastructure, as discussed below. 54 In light of the automation of mines, local content requirements should shift away from targets for local procurement and employment toward targets for training in transferable skills and infrastructure development. 55
The expected rise in mineral demand, including in so far underexploited minerals, gives Africa a second chance to
get the governance right. While governments are responsible for the appropriate administration over the mining
sector, company behavior can undermine their objectives. African governments should accordingly select international companies that are ready to act as corporate citizens in their countries and support the achievement of the
SDGs rather than undermining them. 56 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where at least 50% of the world
reserves of much-needed cobalt are located, is a case in point (see Box 1).
Box 1: The DRC’s journey toward reaping the benefits of cobalt for its communities
Cobalt is a critical mineral for electric car batteries, computers, and cell phones, and the demand for cobalt
from batteries is expected to grow by a factor of four by 2030. 57 This could represent an incredible windfall for
the DRC, given that the country’s cobalt production makes up more than 63% of global production. 58 However,
since the boom has started, the DRC has failed to reap its benefits and is still one of the poorest countries. It ranks
176 out of 188 countries in the most recent Human Development Report, and 77% of its population lives below the
poverty line. 59 But the situation might yet change due to recently reformed policies.

Lisa Sachs and Perrine Toledano, with Susan Maples, Resource-Based Sustainable Development in the Lower Zambezi Basin: A Draft for
Consultation (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), June 2011), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/publications/zambezi.pdf.
52

53 Nicolas

Maennling and Perrine Toledano, Linkages to the Mining Sector in Colombia (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI),
Ministry of Mines and Energy of the Republic of Colombia, and GIZ, October 2019), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/publications/Linkages-to-the-mining-sector-in-Colombia-CCSI-2019.pdf.
“Leveraging Mining-Related Infrastructure Investments for Development (Rails, Port, Power, Water and ICT),” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/leveraging-infrastructure-investments-for-development.

54

55 Aaron

Cosbey, Howard Mann, Nicolas Maennling, Perrine Toledano, Jeff Geipel, and Martin Dietrich Brauch, Mining a Mirage? Reassessing
the shared-value paradigm in light of the technological advances in the mining sector (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
(CCSI) and International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2016), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/publications/mining-a-mirage-CCSI-IISD-EWB-2016.pdf.
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) and Responsible Mining Foundation (RMF), Mining and the SDGs: A 2020 Status Update
(CCSI and RMF, September 2020), https://www.responsibleminingfoundation.org/app/uploads/RMF_CCSI_Mining_and_SDGs_EN_Sept2020.pdf.

56

Martin Brudermüller, Benedikt Sobotka, and Dominic Waughray, A Vision for a Sustainable Battery Value Chain in 2030: Unlocking the Full
Potential to Power Sustainable Development and Climate Change Mitigation (Geneva: Global Battery Alliance and World Economic Forum,
September 2019), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Vision_for_a_Sustainable_Battery_Value_Chain_in_2030_Report.pdf.
57

58 “New Initiative to Support Artisanal Cobalt Mining in the DRC,” The Mining Review: Africa, April 1, 2021, https://www.miningreview.com/battery-metals/new-initiative-to-support-artisanal-cobalt-mining-in-the-drc.
59 Ben

Radley, “The DRC Is Revisiting Its Mining Code. Why Reform Is Long Overdue,” The Conversation, June 28, 2017, https://theconversation.com/the-drc-is-revisiting-its-mining-code-why-reform-is-long-overdue-79937.
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The first problem has been that artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) accounts for about 20% of the DRC’s cobalt
production and is interwoven with the cobalt supply chains. 60 This ASM activity has been associated with “child labor,
fatal accidents, and violent clashes between artisanal miners and security personnel of large mining firms.” 61 Tech
companies have been denounced for overlooking human rights abuses in their supply chains, and Panasonic, Tesla’s
battery supplier, is researching how to avoid the use of cobalt in battery making. 62
The second problem is that, until its 2018 reform, the DRC’s 2002 mining code—prepared with guidance from the
World Bank—aimed at attracting private investment into the mining sector following the 1996 and 2003 Congo Wars.
To make the country attractive, the reform focused on a generous fiscal package. As a result, the 21% government
take was well below the recommended average government tax by the World Bank (46%), and, between 2011 and
2014, total mining resource revenues for the state treasury were not more than 6% of the total revenues of the
mining sector. 63 In addition, contracts—including their social and environmental clauses—were stabilized for ten
years. Mining in the DRC was highly lucrative for multinationals, in particular, since, on top of the fiscal incentives,
the geology is excellent and the operational cost is lower than the regional average. 64
The DRC has decided to reform both aspects. In 2018, it promulgated the Revised Code amending the 2002 Mining
Code and published the Revised Decree amending and supplementing the 2003 Mining Decree.65 The 2018 amended
mining code66 stipulates many tax changes, including a 50% tax on “super profits”; an increase in state equity in new
projects from 5% to 10%; an increase in royalties from 2% to 3.5% for non-ferrous metals and 10% for strategic
minerals, including cobalt; and a reduction of stabilization clauses from ten years to five years, only applicable to
fiscal terms. 67 Though multinational mining companies balked at the changes, they only bring the DRC back to the
regional average. 68
In addition, the Government of the DRC established the Entreprise Générale du Cobalt (EGC) in November 2019, and
its first activities were officially launched in 2021. EGC will support “the commercialization of responsibly sourced
artisanal cobalt [by establishing] safe and strictly controlled artisanal cobalt mining zones [following its] Responsible
Sourcing Standards.” 69 It will purchase all the country’s ASM cobalt ore before taking responsibility for processing
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Initiative to Support Artisanal Cobalt Mining in the DRC,” The Mining Review: Africa.

61 Dorothée

Baumann-Pauly, “Why Cobalt Mining in the DRC Needs Urgent Attention,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), October 29, 2020,
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and marketing. To this end, EGC signed a trading agreement with Trafigura to finance and develop traceability systems and identify industrial buyers. The NGO PACT 70 will be in charge of training stakeholders and ASM miners and
monitoring the implementation of the EGC Standards to ensure the constant improvement of ASM conditions. 71
Despite this considerable progress, the revised mining code could have done much more to curb corruption72 and
address mining’s social and environmental externalities. 73 New regulations to support these matters are still needed.
Feedback Loop Between Mining and Energy Development
With falling ore grades and rising mineral demand induced by the energy transition, energy demand is expected to
increase by 36% by 2035. Electricity demand is likely to grow at an even faster rate, given the trend toward electrification of mines. 74
Over the years, African governments have not sufficiently taken advantage of the opportunity presented by energyintensive mining operations to develop a robust energy system. For instance, in 2013, the World Bank 75 and CCSI 76
assessed that self-generation was the dominant power sourcing arrangement for years to come. In 2019, CCSI could
only find few African case studies of mining projects integrating renewable energies outside of South Africa (see Box
2 on Burkina Faso). 77
Box 2: Solar plant at mine sites in Burkina Faso
Iamgold’s Essakane mine started operating in 2009 and is the largest known gold deposit in Burkina Faso with 2.65
million ounces of recoverable gold reserves and an expected 8.6-year mine life, which could extend past 2030 with
further exploration. In March 2018, Iamgold commissioned a 15 MW solar project from solar IPPs Eren RE and Africa
Energy Management Platform (AEMP) 78 that obtained a USD 16.5 million loan from BNP Paribas subsidiary Banque
Internationale pour le Commerce, l’Industrie et l’Artisanat du Burkina. Iamgold entered into a 15-year power purchase agreement with the developers. The solar plant will connect with the mine’s existing 57 MW diesel generators
to cover up to 8% of the mine’s energy needs. While the mine’s motivation for the project stemmed from the desire
to save on expensive fuel costs (6 million liters annually) and hedge against oil price volatility and supply risk, the
mine and the Government of Burkina Faso also coordinated and together envisioned leaving the fully amortized
project to the community post-closure. To enable such an arrangement, the closure and reclamation regulations
need to be adjusted to exclude the power plant from the requirements to dismantle the mine’s assets. 79
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72

73 “Propositions

D’amendements de la Société Civile au Projet de Révision du Code Minier,” Congo Mines, June 2017, http ://congomines.org/reports/1247-propositions-d-amandements-de-la-societe-civile-au-projet-de-revision-du-code-minier.

74 Nicolas Maennling and Perrine Toledano, The Renewable Power of the Mine: Accelerating Renewable Energy Integration (New York: CCSI,
December 2018), 17, https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/publications/CCSI_2018_-_The_Renewable_Power_of_The_Mine__mr_.pdf.
75 Sudeshna

Ghosh Banerjee, Zayra Romo, Gary McMahon, Perrine Toledano, Peter Robinson, and Inés Pérez Arroyo, The Power of the Mine:
A Transformative Opportunity for Sub-Saharan Africa, Directions in Development—Energy and Mining (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015),
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Ministries of mines and energy should be aware that the lack of integration and co-development between the mining
sector and renewable energy systems often results in missed opportunities. “From the situation where mines have
to self-generate due to a lack of or an unreliable national generation and transmission infrastructure to one where
mines can source power from a large-scale grid, there exists the potential for mining companies to help develop the
national power sector” 80 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Spectrum of power-sourcing arrangements for the mine

Source: World Bank. 81
The model proposed by the World Bank is not new (see Figure 4), but not enough has yet been done. The ministries
of mines and energy should immediately start to integrate the mining sector’s power demand in broader energy
planning as well as amend the legal framework for mining. The goal of these measures is to ensure that mines systematically adopt renewable energies to power their needs and enable sharing with the broader consumer base in
the country. Sharing can happen through on-grid or off-grid solutions benefiting surrounding communities. Figure 4
presents the questions to address to ensure that the power demand of the mining sector is leveraged for broader
development needs.

80

Toledano et al., A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure.

81 Banerjee et al., The Power of the Mine.
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Figure 4: Guidance on questions to address for each power supply arrangement

Source: Authors based on CCSI’s A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure. 82
Box 3: Leveraging the mining sector to develop power infrastructure: examples


In Ghana in 1966–1996, the Volta Aluminum Company Limited (VALCO) smelter was the anchor customer
for the Akosombo Dam, which supplied most of the country’s energy needs, as well as some of the neighboring countries’. 83



In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, in 2009, the Nam Theun II hydropower plant was designed with a
capacity of 1070 MW with 995 MW dedicated for export to the Thai utility under a 25-year power purchase
agreement and 75 MW allocated to domestic consumption. The revenue generated with a credit-worthy offtaker (the Thai utility) provided enough security to finance of the deal. 84



In 2015, in Australia, the Weipa Solar Plant was developed to serve the need of Rio Tinto and 20% of the
demand of the township’s daytime demand. Rio Tinto is in a 15-year PPA with the IPP First Solar. 85
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guidance is included in: Toledano et al., Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure.
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The same logic mentioned above would apply to any existing pockets of energy-intensive industries (for example,
large-scale cement and aluminum in West Africa, steel in Southern Africa, 86 and Internet exchange points in Kenya
and Nigeria87) and mechanized agriculture. 88
Upstream and Downstream Linkages from Mining and Energy Feedback Loop
Nascent or potential new industries could support energy development, which would, in turn, support industrialization. The African mining sector can anchor demand for energy infrastructure development and, at the same time,
provide the mineral inputs needed for the manufacturing of zero-carbon energy technologies in the continent. These
technologies can be used domestically to support the goal of continent-wide zero-carbon electrification or for export
to strengthen African countries’ industrial base, reduce their dependence on commodities, and improve their balance of payments. Opportunities exist in the production and recycling of batteries, the production of solar panels
and wind turbines, and the production of green hydrogen, as discussed below.
Building on Africa’s comparative advantage in critical mineral resources for the battery industry, the development of
a strong battery sector in Africa would provide technologies to support Africa’s zero-carbon electrification and, at
the same time, benefit from the renewables-based electricity generated in the continent as a market outlet. Batteries
will be essential in increasing solar and wind power reliability. The continent’s own battery demand is forecast to
increase from 2 GW in 2015 to 15 GW by 2030 based on extrapolations of current trends and could increase to more
than 30 GW assuming continent-wide access to electricity by 2030. 89 Globally, battery demand is expected to increase more than nine times between 2020 and 2030, mostly due to the increased use of batteries for electric mobility. Thus, the growth of battery demand both within the continent and globally could represent an opportunity for
investment in battery production and recycling in Africa. 90
The same is true for the production of solar panels and wind turbines. The Integrated Energy Plan of South Africa
interrogated the value chains of energy generation technologies. The report isolates those inputs available in South
Africa and assesses the localization potential for those inputs not immediately available. They find a localization potential of 45% and 49%, respectively, for solar PV and wind. 91 They also assessed that it was relatively “easy” to
localize the entire solar PV value chain, while only 3% of the wind value chain was likely to remain imported. 92 The
Department of Trade and Industry in South Africa also released a wind energy localization roadmap and a PV localization roadmap. 93 Another study found that the local tower producers are more likely to enter the global value chain
closer to the location of deployment, as towers are bulky and difficult to transport. Comparatively, since blades and
nacelle components both require high technical skill, it may be challenging to switch their production location as
well. 94 The participation of the continent in the production of solar panels is also visible outside of South Africa in
Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Ugandan, Tunisia, and Tanzania, with a total annual production

86

International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019.

Joseph Cotterill, “Cabling Africa: The Great Data Race to Serve the ‘Last Billion,’” Financial Times, January 30, 2021,
https://www.ft.com/content/adb1130e-2844-4051-b1df-a691fc8a19b8.

87

According to the UN, 12 African countries including Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia are showing strong
growth in mechanized agriculture. Busani Bafawa, “Mechanizing Agriculture Is Key To Food Security,” Africa Renewal, April 9, 2019,
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2019-july-2019/mechanizing-agriculture-key-food-security.

88

89 Brudermüller,
90

Sobotka, and Waughray, A Vision for a Sustainable Battery Value Chain in 2030, 4.

Ibid., 11.

91 Department of Energy of the Republic of South Africa, “Integrated Energy Plan,” Staatskoerant, November 25, 2016,
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/IEP/2016/Integrated-Energy-Plan-Report.pdf.

Tobias Bischof-Niemz and Terence Creamer, South Africa’s Energy Transition: A Roadmap to a Decarbonised, Low-Cost and Job-Rich
Future, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2018), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429463303.

92

Escience Associates, Urban-Econ Development Economists, and Chris Ahlfeldt, Photovolaic Electricity: The Localization potential of Photovoltaics and a Strategy to Support the Large Scale Roll-out in South Africa (2013), https://resources.solarbusinesshub.com/images/reports/42.pdf.

93

Thomas Hebo Larsen and Ulrich Elmer Hansen, “Sustainable Industrialization in Africa: The Localization of Wind-Turbine Component Production in South Africa,” Innovation and Development (January 27, 2020): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/2157930x.2020.1720937.

94

27

capacity of around 650 MW across 20 assembly plants. Plants to make local wind-turbine components are also present outside of South Africa in Egypt, Kenya, Morocco. 95 The localization potential of the value chain is further induced by the rise in carbon costs that make fragmented global value chains, as currently operated, expensive because of the GHG emissions of transportation and waste. 96 This is another opportunity of the energy transition that
provides industrialization opportunities.
Another example is the development of a green hydrogen market in Africa. Green hydrogen is hydrogen produced
using renewable energy, typically through electrolysis (splitting H2O into hydrogen and oxygen). The costs of producing green hydrogen are decreasing, and in North Africa, for example, they “are expected to be two to three times
lower than in most of Europe or Japan.” Leveraging both its renewable energy potential and its domestic fuel demand
for transportation and industry, Africa could develop a strategy to produce green hydrogen. In exactly this way, for
example, the Minerals Council in South Africa is advocating for a national hydrogen strategy, combined with the
build-up of the South African platinum sector, to establish a domestic fuel cell industry. 97 South Africa’s Department
of Science and Technology (DST) developed the National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies Research, Development, and Innovation Strategy (Hydrogen South Africa, HySA) to support the development of the hydrogen and fuel
cell value chain in the country. 98 In addition to stimulating the demand for minerals and metals, investment in green
hydrogen can provide African countries opportunities to create jobs throughout the value chain, develop specialized
skills, and reduce energy costs. 99 In addition to meeting domestic industrial and transportation needs, African countries producing green hydrogen could increasingly export it to meet growing global demand, particularly in Europe. 100
In fact, the EU’s 2020 Hydrogen Strategy highlights Africa as a potential supplier of cost-competitive green hydrogen
to the EU. 101
In sum, current and future energy-intensive industries cannot survive in Africa without inexpensive and reliable
power. At the same time, they can anchor demand to make the investment in inexpensive, clean, and reliable energy
infrastructure viable. Mining can, in addition to constituting anchor demand, provide the necessary mineral inputs
for low carbon technologies, provided that public policies are in place to guarantee good governance and high-quality
education for workers. 102
Africa can and should leverage both existing and nascent industries to make the energy system more robust; in turn,
an increasingly stronger energy system will support faster industrialization, thus creating a feedback loop between
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industrialization and energy. Strategies should include revising the Africa Mining Vision in light of opportunities arising from climate change policy and the global energy transition. 103

3.1.3. National Digitization Transformation Strategy
In February 2020, the AU released an ambitious yet feasible digitization transformation strategy for the continent
aiming at building a Digital Single Market in Africa by 2030, equipping all people with safe and secure access to least
6 Mbps all the time at an affordable price, establishing and improving digital networks, implementing policies and
regulations required to stimulate and accelerate digital transformation for national, regional, and continental development (such as local data protection regulations to encourage the formation of local data centers that enable internet speed 104), among other goals. 105 Realizing this vision at a national and regional level is critical to modernizing
the grid, as discussed below. Countries should embark on this mission immediately. Thanks to forward-looking ICT
policies, Kenya is Sub-Saharan Africa’s fastest-growing ICT market, with ICTs having increased productivity throughout the economy and contributing to raising Kenyans’ standards of living, 106 thereby evidencing that AU’s Digitization
Transformation Strategy is feasible.

3.1.4. Strong, Flexible, and Digitized Grids
The construction, reinforcement, and upgrade of the transmission grid in parallel with, and in anticipation of, the
build-up of generation is fundamental to decrease the risk of renewable energy investment. The Lake Turkana wind
project in Kenya illustrates the difficulty of investing in a utility-scale project when the transmission infrastructure is
not yet in place. Project commissioning, which was due at the end of 2017, was delayed by 15 months due to the
prolonged construction of the 428-km transmission line to the power grid. 107 In 2017, the Kenyan government agreed
to pay the wind farm developers EUR 46 million in capacity charges in compensation for the delay as well as a monthly
surcharge to be passed on to consumers. 108
Moreover, many national grids are not ready for renewable energy integration and are operating close to their voltage limit with frequent load-shedding, “thus lacking a uniform base-frequency which enables injection of solar power
in a distributed manner.” 109 Bringing the necessary upgrade will imply considering “several technical factors such as
voltage variations, power plants reactions under faulted systems, interactions with protection systems, and the overall operational flexibility for dispatch centers.” 110
To this end, it is necessary to plan for a switch to digitization, enabling smart grids that integrate smart operation
and control, multi-renewable energy complement, storage, contingency and flexibility reserves, and efficient utilization. Where the broadband network is sufficiently developed, this investment should be immediately undertaken for
a full roll-out within five years. In countries where broadband deployment is still weak, digitization will take more
time and should be prioritized. While this is a heavy lump-sum investment, it will deliver significant savings down the
road (see Box 4).
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Box 4: Digitalization of the utility’s value chain

Source: McKinsey. 111
When it comes to storage, the combination of smart grids and interconnection will enable the regulation of supply
and demand of power and help rationalize storage technologies, balancing out the intermittency of renewable energy. Until electricity systems reach this balance, in Africa and worldwide, gas will continue playing a role in ensuring
the flexibility of the system (see Section 3.3.5).
LUT’s energy model for Africa, which does not include the potential benefits of interconnection, provides an upper
boundary on how much of the electricity demand should be covered by storage throughout 2050. Given the recent
and upcoming massive cost reduction of battery technology (see Figure 17), LUT anticipates it as being the technology of choice for electricity storage (85% of the storage output by 2050) while thermal energy storage becomes the
most prevalent heat storage technology with around 57% of heat storage output by 2050, following the expected
drop in cost of Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) technology, which is already gaining ground in South Africa. 112
Moreover, East Africa has the advantage of being endowed with strong solar and wind potential (as well as geothermal). Both interconnection and the hybridization of renewable energy load profiles within national borders will help
the rationalization of investment in battery storage. For example, the construction of an 80 MW solar–wind–battery
hybrid facility is expected to start in 2021 in Kenya. Signed with Australian and Japanese developers and costing USD
150 million, the project will have 20 wind turbines and 40,000 solar panels, in addition to sufficient battery capacity
to store the latent energy for after-hour use. This project is significant as Africa’s largest hybrid project to include
battery storage in the project scope. 113 Similar opportunities should be carefully mapped out.
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3.1.5.

Preparation to Electrify Transportation

As discussed in Section 1, for light-duty vehicles (cars, sport-utility vehicles, and small trucks), the improvement of
EVs in cost is such that the path forward is clear. 114 EVs will be in growing circulation in Africa within 10 years, especially if limits are put on the age of imported vehicles. 115 Half of the African countries do not currently place any
restrictions on the import of used vehicles. 116 An Africa-wide policy to phase out ICEs and phase in EVs is therefore
warranted. A master plan for charging stations should be developed along with the supporting policies needed to
operationalize it. South Africa demonstrates a set of forward-looking policy tools that could be emulated.
Box 5: South Africa' strategy to develop EV charging stations
In 2013, South Africa set up the uYilo Programme within the Green Transport Strategy of the national Department
of Transport to promote the introduction of electric and hybrid-electric vehicles. It brings together higher education
institutions, science councils, and companies to accelerate the development of new technologies to support the
flourishing of the EV industry in South Africa. 117 In 2014, a collaboration began between BMW, Nissan, the South
African National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI), Gridcars (a private company), and the Technology Innovation Agency’s uYilo e-mobility program to provide advice and recommendations on charging station standards. From
this partnership, three main standards were enacted as regulations for EV charging within South Africa. 118
As of 2019, there were 137 charging stations throughout South Africa, mainly dotted along major highways 119 and
primarily supplied by international equipment manufacturers. To support the development of the local industry in
charging station manufacturing, South Africa developed the uYilo Kick Start fund to make grants to local suppliers.
120

The uYilo project also includes a smart grid facility to “provide a live-testing environment for electric vehicle fleets
and the related infrastructure ecosystem.” It tests technologies such as “solar EV charging, second-life EV battery
storage systems, BackOffice management, AC charge points, DC fast chargers, and the leading Vehicle-to-Grid technology.” 121
3.1.6. Social and Environmental Sustainability of Renewable Energy Siting and Nature-Based Solutions for Climate
Change Mitigation and Adaptation
Demand for land will increase as the climate changes and the roll-out of land-intensive climate and energy solutions
accelerates. Indeed, renewables are estimated to be 15 to 500 times more land-intensive than fossil fuels. 122 As such,
the construction of solar, hydropower, and wind projects, as well as the development of transmission infrastructure,
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could significantly impact ecosystems and nearby communities. Therefore, there is a need to review the rules governing land-intensive investment in renewable energies in national laws and international instruments, including the
Investment Protocol to the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) under negotiation, and update
them if necessary.
Hydropower projects have long been mired in controversy due to their potential for disastrous impacts on people
and the environment. In 2000 the World Commission on Dams estimated that in the preceding 50 years, 40 to 80
million people worldwide had been displaced due to dams. 123 Communities who live on or near lands affected by
reservoir flooding are most acutely affected, though communities downstream from a project may also suffer detrimental impacts due to changes in river flow. 124 Hydropower projects may also result in biodiversity loss, deforestation, and harm to species in the reservoir area as well as species that live in or use rivers. While potentially avoiding
some of the human impacts of large-scale hydro, smaller scale and run-of-river hydro projects are not guaranteed
to result in less significant environmental impacts. 125
More recently, wind projects have come into the spotlight due to land and human rights concerns. 126 In Kenya, the
Kinangop Wind Park project was canceled due to land-related disputes, 127 and communities affected by the Lake
Turkana Wind Power project sued the Government of Kenya over the lack of community participation in the land
allocation process for the project. 128
Similarly, solar parks in semi-arid regions of India and Egypt have affected grazing rights and increased water stress. 129
These impacts have important implications for renewable energy project planning: governments must undertake
careful land-use and siting analyses that put people and the environment at the center. Consistent with the UN SDGs
and states’ human rights obligations, minimizing social, environmental, and human rights impacts is key to achieving
successful project outcomes. To avoid the uneven distribution of benefits and costs that have historically been associated with large development projects, governments should take several measures listed as follows.
Institutionalize Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). An SEA “informs planners, decision-makers, and affected
public on the sustainability of strategic decisions, facilitates the search for the best alternative, and ensures a democratic decision-making process,” thereby “enhance[ing] the credibility of decisions and lead[ing] to more cost- and
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time-effective EIAs [Environmental Impact Assessments] at the project level.” 130 An SEA process involves predicting
and analyzing the potential direct, indirect, and cumulative negative and positive effects of the proposed project,
minimizing direct, indirect, and cumulative negative social and environmental impacts to maximize positive impacts
and opportunities, building the data collection capacity necessary to inform and monitor design and implementation,
integrating the views of civil society, particularly affected communities, and enabling their influence in the development of plan and policies. 131 An SEA process makes it easier to envision and plan for sustainable siting and technology
alternatives to reach a specific objective, such as equipping the country with large-scale power generation.
Identify and mitigate risks at the project level. Rigorous environmental, social, and human rights impact assessments
(ESHIAs) should inform and influence siting and licensing decisions. These impact assessments must be produced by
independent and credible experts, the findings should be consulted on widely with affected parties, and both the
findings of the assessments and the consultations should inform and meaningfully influence government decision
making. In addition, impacts, as well as the adherence to mitigation measures and management plans, must be continually and systematically monitored throughout a project’s life cycle. Given that political realities may result in
governments deprioritizing ESHIA results in their decision-making processes (see Box 6), civil society, financiers, and
development partners have an important role in calling on governments to uphold rigorous ESHIA standards and
always look for the most sustainable alternative when building infrastructure.
Box 6: The politics of ESHIAs: the Stiegler’s Gorge Dam in Tanzania
The Tanzanian government’s decision to move ahead with the controversial Stiegler’s Gorge Dam demonstrates the
importance of the timing and quality of impact assessments and the influence of those assessments on the ultimate
decisions taken by governments. The environmental impact assessment that was carried out in the Stiegler’s Gorge
Dam case was deemed inadequate by independent reviewers, and despite the concerns raised by domestic and
international actors over the dam’s potential impact on fragile ecosystems, the government is moving ahead with a
project expected to result in the deforestation of nearly 1000 km2 of the Selous Game Reserve, a UNESCO World
Heritage site. 132
Recognize and respect legitimate tenure rights. The Africa-owned Guidelines on Large Scale Land Based Investments 133 and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure both call on governments to respect the rights of legitimate tenure holders in the context of land-based investments. Without such recognition, the
rights of people who do not have a formal title to land or whose rights may not be immediately visible (such as the
rights of pastoralists) may not be accounted for in renewable energy project consultations and any resettlement
planning and compensation process.
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Consult affected communities and obtain their consent. Various conventions, decisions, and guidelines mandate participation by affected communities in decisions that affect them and their lands. 134 In the case of Indigenous communities, their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is required. 135 Integral to the concept of FPIC is the community’s right to withhold consent to a project. In the context of large-scale energy projects that would have a major
impact on Indigenous territories, and especially in situations involving relocation, absent the community’s consent,
the project should not go ahead. 136
Avoid resettlement. Resettlement of communities for renewables projects should be avoided. A recent review of
dam-induced resettlement literature concludes that “we are still collectively a long way off being able to devise
effective approaches to resettlement that can achieve good outcomes.” 137 Examples abound of poorly designed and
executed resettlement plans. In some such examples, communities resettled in the context of Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam have complained that they have been relocated to land with no access to natural water sources, 138
and communities resettled in the context of the Olkaria geothermal plant in Kenya have complained about the exclusion of women, orphans, and elders from compensation arrangements. 139
Where strictly necessary, any resettlement should be conducted in accordance with all relevant laws, including human rights laws. At a fundamental level, a resettlement framework should require:


Comprehensive, fair, and adequate compensation to be paid to restore the resettled individual or community to the same or better quality of land and living standards as prior to resettlement. Livelihood restoration
should be a central goal.



Close and regular consultation and collaboration with all segments of the affected community throughout
the process, including to inform socio-economic baseline studies that assess the impacts of resettlement at
the household level. This community involvement is important to ensure that resettlement plans are designed appropriately and with the benefit of community input and knowledge.

Given the potential externalities involved in developing large-scale energy projects, energy development planning
should be accompanied by a siting framework that allows anticipation of possible:


Land-use requirements of energy infrastructure with maximization of co-location between renewable energy
sources to minimize land use for both generation and transmission



Land-use impacts of energy infrastructure



Land-use constraints on energy infrastructure. 140

Tools are now being developed to assist energy planners and policymakers in this undertaking. For instance, the
Africa Clean Energy Corridor (ACEC) is an IRENA initiative aiming to accelerate the expansion of renewable energy in
the Eastern and Southern African power pools that was signed in January 2014 by nineteen Ministers of Energy and
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heads of delegations. ACEC developed an interactive interface to identify “cost-effective, equitable, and environmentally sustainable wind, solar [PV], [CSP], and geothermal energy zones to facilitate the planning effort of the
initiative. 141 It leverages the multi-criteria analysis developed by the MapRE initiative, which includes environmental
protection criteria in addition to the traditional planning criteria. 142 A more complete multi-criteria analysis would
also include social criteria.
There is also the SAVi tool developed by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to equip policy-makers and investors with an assessment of the costs of economic, social, and environmental risks as well as
positive and negative externalities. 143 For hydropower, for instance, it includes various cost factors that are often
ignored in traditional cost-benefit analyses and asset valuations, such as sediment transport, dredging needs, and
costs associated with lost agriculture production and lost tourism opportunities. 144
When implementing nature-based solutions (NBS) for climate change mitigation or adaptation, design and implement
legal and policy safeguards so that the NBS benefit both people and the environment. The International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) loosely defines nature-based solutions (NBS) as “actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural and modified ecosystems in ways that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively,
to provide both human well-being and biodiversity benefits.” 145 NBS cover a range of interventions that include approaches to adapt to and mitigate climate change. There is a growing sentiment globally and on the continent support ingNBS: 146 the IPCC’s report on Climate Change and Land considers the role of NBS in removing and storing
carbon, for instance, and UNECA and the AfDB have championed the potential of NBS to respond to climate change
and improve livelihoods on the continent. 147
Despite support for NBS by key actors and institutions, some approaches that fall under this “umbrella concept” 148
are controversial. The IPCC Climate and Land report warns that some approaches to mitigation, applied on a largescale, risk increasing competition for land, for instance. This includes afforestation, reforestation, and bioenergy with
carbon capture and storage, 149 each of which may have serious implications for food security, land rights, biodiversity, and water security. 150 For example, afforestation efforts have, in some instances, resulted in the growth of low
biodiversity value monoculture plantations that only capture a fraction of the carbon compared with natural forests
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over the long term. 151 REDD+, an initiative to prevent deforestation and forest degradation, has also come under
scrutiny: its efficacy in reducing emissions has been questioned, 152 and numerous projects are associated with human rights abuses, including displacement of Indigenous and local communities. 153 In addition, some warn that NBS
linked to carbon markets and offsetting schemes allow wealthy countries and companies to continue unsustainable
consumption and pollution rather than incentivize the drastic emissions reductions that are urgently needed. 154
Soundly designed NBS must be gender-sensitive; 155 promote, not worsen, food security; and avoid measures that
may result in increased emissions or decreased biodiversity in the long term. 156 If NBS are planned for land belonging
to or customarily used by Indigenous or local communities, they should be “designed, implemented, managed, and
monitored by or in partnership with Indigenous peoples and local communities through a process that fully respects
and champions local rights and knowledge and generates local benefits” (NBS Guidelines). 157 Finally, climate finance
should be directed to communities that are the stewards of the land that is the site of an NBS and local level adaptation efforts. 158

3.1.7. Financial and Operational Health of Power Utilities
A World Bank study on the financial health of utilities has estimated the scope for reducing utility deficits through
increased operational efficiency. 159 Of the 39 countries studied, only the Seychelles and Uganda fully recover their
operation and capital costs (see Figure 5). The problem with inefficient utilities in Africa boils down to high costs and
low revenues. The issues with low revenue collection are that utilities suffer shortages and power outages, which, in
turn, incentivize customers to not pay their bills or connect to the grid illegally.
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Figure 5: Comparison of electric supply costs with cash collected in 2014 USD per kWh billed

Source: World Bank. 160
The impact of the four most common drivers of revenue loss—underpricing of tariff rates, transmission and distribution losses, bill collection losses, and overstaffing on utilities—is shown in Figure 6. For some utilities, inefficiency
and mismanagement are particularly acute. Transmission, distribution, and bill collection losses combined make up
more than half of the quasi-deficits 161 in 21 utilities and more than three-quarters in 13 utilities. 162

160
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161 Difference between the net revenue of an efficient electricity sector covering operational and capital costs and the net cash collected by
the utilities.
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Figure 6: Decomposition of quasi-fiscal deficits in Africa in 2016

Source: World Bank. 163
Continent-wide zero-carbon electrification cannot happen without healthy and strong utilities, including the entry of
new private utility companies with robust balance sheets. A massive pan-African program is needed to help
strengthen utilities and regulate the entry of new utility companies.
Restoring electricity quickly and making it easier to pay bills
Reforms of existing utilities could start with increasing service quality in the short term through restoring electricity
quickly and taking advantage of the advances in paying bills easily (through mobile phones, automatic teller machines, supermarkets, and other easily accessible locations with extended hours of service). Such improvement in
services will require the development of an information system to collect complaints and the systematic measurement of service quality. 164 Additionally, a tailored strategy is needed to tackle the issue that slums account for 60%
of Africa’s urban population, and, for this reason, “many African cities are not set up to take advantage of the productivity and efficiency opportunities” from having a growing concentrated and urban population. 165
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Reducing technical and non-technical losses through digitization
In addition, a program to bring transmission and distribution losses down to 10% should be implemented. Here the
latest progress in digitization should help utilities in Africa leapfrog and lead to considerable savings after the lumpsum investment.
Based on a variety of inputs—such as geographical information, historical anomalies, and meteorological information—utilities can predict the likelihood of system failure at different points along the value chain. Using predictive
modeling in this way can help utilities to forecast failures before they happen and strategize funding to modernize
equipment before failures occur. Figure 7 highlights how predictive failure modeling can work.
Figure 7: Predictive failure modeling

Source: McKinsey. 166
When digitization is applied not only in a particular area of a utility’s supply chain but throughout, it brings significant
savings potential. While the greatest potential savings are from improvements in the transmission, distribution, and
customer interface areas, generation and corporate administration also stand to gain (see Figure 5).
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Figure 8: Potential cost savings by utility sector

Source: McKinsey. 167
Deploying smart meters
The residual practice of shared meters should be addressed by replacing shared meters with individual smart meters
on every connection. These smart meters will allow for a more accurate understanding of individual consumption,
helping tariffs better target purchasing power. Illegal connections and meter tempering should continue to be sanctioned. Prepaid meters are already a solution for both low-income households and utilities in some countries, provided that the electricity is actually delivered. Prepaid meters can be paid for in small increments and they help
households avoid reconnection fees when electricity is cut due to delayed payments; additionally, for the utility,
prepaid meters improve revenue collection. 168
Increasing transparency of tariffs of medium- to large-size consumers
Alongside service quality improvements, tariffs should increase to cost-recovery level. Importantly, the burden of
this increase should be shouldered by those that have the ability to pay, such as large- to medium-size consumers
and more energy-intensive businesses. If tariffs increase with no service quality improvement, their political feasibility might be threatened. In addition, tariff increases should be incremental, and the trajectory of the increases should
be transparently communicated. 169
Targeting unbundling but strengthening IPP and planning framework first
When discussing how to strengthen the health of utilities and improve the efficiency of the energy sector, the question of energy reform and unbundling of services arises. One of the main reasons for unbundling is to remove the
conflicts of interest that arise within state-owned vertically integrated utilities. The generation and self-purchase of
power causes a departure from least-cost planning and procurement methods within the company, negatively affecting the public. Working instead to establish an independent generation, transmission, and distribution system
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will create competition by allowing for privately funded companies to get much more extensively involved. In Africa,
only 10 out of 54 countries have vertically unbundled utilities. 170
While the World Bank has a standard model for utility unbundling, which provides nine clear steps to achieving a
clearly unbundled power sector (see Box 7), the World Bank’s Doing Business database displays a low correlation
between unbundling and operational efficiency. 171
The World Bank has noted that more important than full unbundling is the ability to recover costs through tariffs (as
discussed above), the operation efficiently grounded in sound least-cost planning (see Section 3.2.1), competitive
procurement (see Section 4.2.2), and the ability to give IPPs the rights and obligations associated with discrete investments in generation. 172 These should be the priorities of a program of utility strengthening.
Box 7: World Bank’s standard model for unbundling
The nine steps in the World Bank’s standard model for unbundling the power sector are:
1) corporatization, transforming of the power utility company into a separate legal entity with associated rights
and obligations;
2) commercialization, introducing pricing and metering improvements to improve cost-recovery;
3) requisite legislation, passing laws that provide a legal mandate for private industry to enter the energy
sector;
4) independent regulators, establishing regulatory bodies that can manage the newly competitive sector;
5) sector restructuring, unbundling state-owned utilities vertically into separate companies;
6) independent power producers, securing new investment from the private sector with long-term PPA;
7) divestiture of generation assets, divesting state ownership of generation assets;
8) divestiture of distribution assets, divesting state ownership of distribution assets; and
9) competition, introducing wholesale and retail markets.
Source: Development Bank of Southern Africa, “Briefing note: Unbundling practices and opportunities for private
sector engagement in energy transmission in Africa.” 173

3.2.Decentralized Energy Infrastructure
Because Africa’s population and its electricity demand continue to grow, exacerbating the electrification gap, achieving 100% access by 2030 174 even at low electricity levels will require connecting on average 60 million people per
year, with roughly half of those being through off-grid solutions. 175
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Such an ambitious target will only be achievable with a structured roadmap that should be put in place in 2022 with
the following principles: 176


Exploitation of the maturity and flexibility of solar technology and integration of all technological approaches
and delivery models, from centralized electricity grids to decentralized solutions such as mini-grids and SHS,
following the least-cost approach (see Section 3.2.1).



Consideration of access to electricity in the context of human needs and energy justice with consultations
and energy education at its core (see Section 3.2.2).



Incorporation of policies that ensure affordability for low-income populations while enabling private sector
investment in both stand-alone SHS and mini-grids (see Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4).



Sponsorship by governments across all levels and adoption by all relevant stakeholders and designed to survive political transitions.



Regular review and assessment to draw lessons learned from previous phases.

The first three principles are reviewed in subsequent sub-sections, while the last two are illustrated by the case
studies in Ghana (Box 8) and Morocco (Box 9), two countries whose governments showed unwavering commitment
to increasing access rates over the years while regularly adjusting plans to mobilize the best-fit technological solutions.
Box 8: Ghana’s continued progress on the National Electrification Scheme from 1989 to 2019
In 1989, Ghana had a growing electricity crisis: only 15 - 20% of its population had access to the grid. 177 A blueprint
called the National Electrification Scheme (NES) was developed to provide electricity to all settlements with an adult
population of over 500 (4200 communities) within 30 years. The plan aimed to use electricity to drive industrialization, wealth creation, and improvements in the standard of living across the country. 178
This plan involved 69 projects to be carried out in six 5-year phases. 179 The plan was based on a two-year National
Electrification Planning Study and recommended the use of main grid (for communities with a population of more
than 500), mini-grid, and renewable stand-alone systems depending on the suitability of each area. 180 The first phase
of the NES involved electrifying the district capitals and the towns en route to them, with other phases focused on
extending the grid to other regions depending on economic, political, historical, and cultural criteria. A related program called the Self-Help Electrification Program has been accelerating grid connections for communities within
20km of the grid so long as they provide the poles for the low voltage lines (typically wooden poles from felled trees)
and have a minimum of 30% of the houses in the community wired. 181 The government’s responsibility, then, is to
provide the conductors, pole-top arrangements, transformers, and other installation costs. 182
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By 2009, the twentieth year and fourth phase of the project, the access rate had grown to 67%.183 To catalyze achieving the targets of the NES in the next decade, the government passed the National Energy Policy in 2010 and set the
goal to increase generation from 2,000 MW to 5,000MW and electricity access from 67% to 100% by 2020. To provide a safe and reliable electricity transmission grid, the government planned to support the mobilization of new
funding for transmission infrastructure development, enforce technical regulations and operational standards, and
provide support for the maintenance of existing transmission infrastructure. In addition to grid electricity, the National Energy Policy intends to promote the development of solar and other renewable forms of energy through
favorable regulatory and fiscal regimes and by partnering with local universities to research opportunities to reduce
the cost of solar and wind energy. 184
By 2018, the electricity rate further increased to 84.3%, with 11,000 communities connected to the national grid at
a total cost of USD 2 billion. 185
Financing for the NES came from three sources: grants, soft loans and credit facilities, and taxes and government
revenues. It is important to note that despite changes in government over the 30-year period, implementation progress on the NES and NEP was unwavering. The NES/ NEP strategies have been regularly reviewed over time to always
reevaluate the least cost technology option depending on the off-grid context and the investment options available. 186

3.2.1. A Least-Cost Approach to Mobilize Technological Solutions
Electrification roadmaps developed by countries need to apply the least-cost approach, leverage the existing opensource data and tools, and mobilize all technological solutions (grid extension, mini-grids, and solar).
The least-cost approach uses geospatial data to map the least expensive pathway to achieve full electrification per
country. By inputting the population density, growth rate, projected electricity demand, the generation depending
on the technology, transmission and distribution costs depending on the distance from the grid, as well as the lifetime
of assets to be used for electricity delivery, the least-cost model determines the added electricity capacity, the investment requirement, and the best-fit electrification approach for each community. 187 Projecting electricity demand as mentioned above will entail determining the service level best served by each technology (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Service level and suitable electrification technology

Source: Lighting Global. 188
With this type of tool, government and power sector actors can plan how to meet a particular electrification objective
and evaluate multiple scenarios to optimize the electrification process. Optimizing from a cost and demand perspective is critical where tariffs are too high for many households and may be below cost-recovery levels for an investor,
degrading their willingness to invest. This optimization strategy has enabled Morocco to reach a 100% access rate
within less than 20 years (see Box 9).
Box 9: Morocco’s experience in least-cost planning
Morocco’s rural electrification program (PERG) has achieved a 100% electrification rate, with 2.1 million households
connected to the grid and 71,000 connected to decentralized systems. Some of the key success factors in Morocco’s
rural electrification program were the following:
i.

Grid extension was based on the least-cost optimization principle, although political interference drew electrification slightly toward more expensive grid connections (at the expense of least-cost off-grid solutions).
The first phase of the program involved connecting only households with extension costs lower than
MAD 10,000 (EUR 890). This limit was progressively increased to MAD 14,000 in 2002, MAD 20,000 in 2004,
and MAD 27,000 in 2006. Customers for whom grid extension costs exceeded these set-points were allocated individual SHS or mini-grids.

ii.

PERG was able to improve project economics through cost efficiency, e.g. initiatives such as shorter lowvoltage (LV) poles (20% reduction on poles cost) and transformers on poles (35% cost reductions for transformers).

iii.

PERG also provided options tailored to consumption for individual customers, who were able to choose from:
a. A 50 Wp PV capacity system that provided only household lighting.
b. A 75 Wp and 100 Wp PV capacity system for household lighting and electronic media such as TVs.
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c. A 200 Wp PV capacity system that, in addition to lighting and audio-visual, was also able to provide
refrigeration service. 189
Throughout the years, PERG followed clear indicators relative to electrification costs, levels of demand, and ability
to pay to adjust the technical option for electrification (e.g., grid versus SHS). The program was divided into five
stages, and the utility, ONEE, leveraged its increasing experience from one phase to the next to optimize the electrification costs. 190
Open-access tools are now available to assist stakeholders in this undertaking and should be relied on to plan for
electrification. First, there is the Global Electrification Platform, 191 a tool developed by ESMAP, World Bank, and KTH
Royal Institute of Technology, which makes publicly available geospatial data from 59 countries 192 and provides the
best-fit electrification pathway for a particular geographical area as granular as 1 km2. 193 This tool leverages the
interactive Open-Source Spatial Electrification Tool (OnSSET), 194 a dynamic GIS-based tool that can be customized
and updated as needed. Enriching the OnSSET results with additional data such as diesel cost, geographic adaptability, distance to the closest city or road, and resource availability will improve the accuracy of results.
Using this approach, the IEA in its African case (AC), based on the AU’s African 2063 agenda, anticipates that for full
electrification access by 2030, the energy deployment should be based on grid electrification and densification for
most urban areas and one-third of rural areas. 195 Mini-grids have a role to play in both urban areas where the grid
has not arrived yet and rural areas that are sufficiently dense. Building on the expected unit cost decrease of minigrids by two-thirds by 2030, the World Bank sees the mini-grid share in all new installed capacity growing to 40%. 196
Results vary a lot according to the characteristics of countries. In Togo, a country targeting full electrification by 2030,
planners using GIS-based LCOE analysis have concluded that the split will be heavily targeted towards last-mile grid
extension (i.e., electrifying households in localities already connected to the grid), with mini-grids only making up
4.5% of the new installed capacity (see Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Results of LCOE-based planning in Togo

Source: Lighting Global. 197

3.2.2. Energy Justice Through Meaningful Consultations
Decentralized energy is one solution for last-mile energy access, but such systems are not always designed to meet
the needs of low-income residents, 198 particularly when consultation processes are overlooked. In Mozambique, the
lack of consultation around a EUR 2.5 million mini-hydro project resulted in the system bypassing a local mill. Electrification of the mill was a priority for residents, particularly women who traveled long distances to use a dieselpowered mill in neighboring Malawi. 199 In Peru, where a massive solar off-grid solution program was deployed, similar challenges arose around participation, cultural sensitivity, and failures to meet energy needs. 200
Meaningfully engaging with all segments of rural communities, including women and marginalized groups, is necessary to build trust, determine energy needs and priorities, understand capacity-building requirements, and assess
the affordability of electricity for residents. In Peru, when projects actively engaged communities, there were lower
rates of payment default, while projects that did not involve the participation of local communities tended to end in
project failure. 201
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Training and public sensitization around the uptake of renewables in rural areas 202 are also key to enabling energy
justice. In Peru, for example, as part of the country’s Rural Electrification Scheme (REI Part II), rural schools are prioritized for access to electricity. Having these newly powered schools as focal points, the Peruvian government uses
videos and leaflets prepared by professionals to promote knowledge of renewable energy for both children and
adults. The government then collaborates with private distribution companies with service in rural communities to
use them as local educators for renewable energy education. With an outlined curriculum for renewable energy
education, the government has identified a number of rural schools in different departments throughout the country
so as to have the greatest educational impact in rural communities. 203
Educational outreach, in turn, lowers the pressure to extend the grid connection when this is not the least-cost
solution (which, in turn, causes affordability problems); this situation happened in Morocco despite a well-crafted
plan based on a least-cost solution (see Box 9 above).

3.2.3. Affordability of the Connection to Grids, Mini-Grids, and Solar Home Systems
Grid connection
Connection fees and tariffs are still unaffordable for many African households (see Figure 11). Connection fees are
the costs of wiring, metering equipment, and professional services that can be passed on to the customer. To offset
this connection fee, some households share electricity meters; however, the combination of the consumptions puts
the poorer households in higher tariff brackets, which exacerbates the unaffordability. 204
Figure 11: Monthly bill for 30kWh and connection charge as percentage of monthly household income

Source: World Bank. 205
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Tariff unaffordability is where the ability or willingness to pay for electricity is lower than the applicable rates. Where
this occurs, customers may reduce their demand, use inferior substitutes or circumvent payment. As a result, utilities
cannot recoup their investment while end-users cannot afford electricity. Each of these challenges should be addressed head-on to alleviate roadblocks to mass electrification. The affordability problem differs per country and
requires a bespoke solution. In Kenya, an affordability analysis revealed that many off-grid households and communities located near the grid remained unconnected because they could not afford the connection fee. To solve this
problem, Kenya’s government kicked off the Last-Mile Connectivity Project, whose goal was to connect a minimum
of 284,200 residential and 30,000 commercial customers to the grid with no grid extension. 206 (see Box 10). Such
affordability analysis should be deployed in every country to assess electrification gaps that can be closed through
subsidies and minimal additional infrastructure deployment.

Box 10: Providing electricity access to under-grid population in Kenya
In 2013, in Kenya, despite the extension of the grid to 90% of public facilities (schools, hospitals, etc.), only 26% of
households were connected.
In 2015, using 20,000 geotagged structures across 150 rural communities in Western Kenya, researchers found that
even in areas of high population density and extensive grid coverage, electrification rates were on average 5% among
rural households and 22% among rural businesses. More surprisingly, half of the unconnected households lived
within 200 meters of a low voltage power line, 207 proving that there is sometimes a gulf between the availability and
accessibility of electricity.
The main reason was the high cost of grid connections. For example, the median cost of a deployed transformer was
estimated at USD 21,820, leading to household connection costs of USD 412 (2015 costs), at least 30% higher than
residents’ average willingness to pay. 208 Despite the government’s push for 100% electrification to be achieved, it
was yet to make economic sense for the provider and buyer.
To address this, Kenya’s government instituted the Last-Mile Connectivity Program (LMCP) targeted at “under grid”
rural and low-income areas. The LMCP pre-financed all the distribution and connection costs, including meters, to at
least 314,200 potential customers, supporting economic growth and poverty reduction. It reduced the KES 35,000
cost of grid connection by 57% per household and provided subsidized loans when households were unable to afford
the reduced fee.
The project was spread across four phases. The first phase connected households within 600 meters of an existing
transformer. The second phase focused on the outskirts of cities. The third phase involved extending the grid by
providing new transformers and extending the low-voltage network. The fourth and final phase involved installing
additional transformers and increasing customer connections to transformers. The project cost was estimated at 99
MMUSD, with the African Development Bank as the key lender (91%) and the Government of Kenya funding the
remaining 9%. 209
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The LMCP was planned to connect 1.2 million people and to run from 2015 to 2020. During this time, Kenya’s access
to electricity rate grew from 41% (2015) to 65% (2016) to 64% (2017) to 75% (2018). 210
Off-grid consumers
In Africa, the least-cost option is, on average, four times most costly between the most remote areas and the easily
accessible ones (see Figure 12). 211 While decentralized solutions are the most adapted to remote settings, the high
costs inevitably require a subsidy policy to support widespread availability. Government subsidies, either to the supplier or the customer, are a proven approach to financing SHS and mini-grids. Given the competing uses of funds
such as healthcare, education, and security in many African countries, as well as the size of debts and deficits in these
countries, public subsidies are a means of financing that should be leveraged as strategically as possible to fill gaps
from other financing avenues.
Figure 12: LCOE to achieve universal access by 2030 according to the IEA

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA). 212
A partition of the territory into roughly three types of areas—urban, peri-urban, and remote rural—could be helpful
to design subsidy allocation. In urban areas, the electrification rate, average population density, and ability to pay
are high; SHS might operate when the grid is unreliable, but subsidies should remain limited (and net metering, as
piloted in India, could be a better solution). 213 In peri-urban areas, electrification rates are limited, but there is high210 World
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to-medium population density and ability to pay; subsidies will be at a moderate level and support connection to
SHS until grids and mini-grids are extended. In remote rural areas, significant subsidies per household are to be
expected to support connection to SHS (as Togo has done; see Box 12 below). Higher granularity would help target
subsidies even better.
Urban areas might also support cross-subsidies to fund the electrification of rural areas (as Morocco has done; see
Box 11). As of 2019, 59% of the Sub-Saharan African population is estimated to be rural, which means that the customer base needed to cross-subsidize rural households may not be sufficiently large; this is particularly true when
tariffs are too low. Countries that do not suffer from underpricing of their tariffs—that is, countries able to charge
better-off, larger consumers more to help finance grid extension to rural areas—may be best positioned to apply
cross-subsidies. According to the World Bank, 214 as of 2016, only Niger, Togo, and Uganda fall into this category.
However, with growing urbanization expected by 2050, cross-subsidizing (much like Morocco's approach in its electrification program) will increasingly become a viable solution that should be relied on in the roadmap to 2030 and
2050.

Box 11: Cross subsidies between urban and rural areas in Morocco
Morocco’s rural electrification program (PERG) sought to address issues identified in the implementation of a similar
program, the National Program for Rural Electrification (PNER), which had achieved fairly limited success. One of the
factors of PERG’s success, compared to PNER, was the financing approach that tackled the affordability problem.
PERG applied the least-cost approach and promoted mini-grids and SHS where the cost of grid extension was too
high. Consequently, ring-fenced funds for rural electrification were set up with contributions from the utility and a
levy on electricity sales to alleviate the end-user’s financial burden for rural electrification.
About 100,000 homes were identified as candidates for SHS, and PERG allowed consumers self-select either paying
MAD 2500 (EUR 220) per household upon connection or MAD 40 (EUR 3.60) per month over seven years. This
amounts to 20% of the total cost of electrification and is sourced from household income or NGO support. In addition, the local municipality contributes 25% of the cost, which amounts to paying either MAD 2085 (EUR 185) at the
start-up of electricity supply or MAD 500 (EUR 44) per year for each household over five years. Lastly, ONEE—the
utility company—covers the remaining cost of electrification (up to 55% of the total cost) using solidarity tax (2.25%
of grid electricity sales) and donor grants and financing. 215
The solidarity tax was generated by charging on-grid customers in urban areas. In addition to this charge, grid electricity consumption also attracts a 14% VAT charge. 216
Subsidies should also proceed from an affordability analysis that could be supported by development finance institutions (DFIs) and could apply to both the supplier and the consumer depending on the multiplier effect. The most
vulnerable segments of the population should generally be supported. This is what Togo has done (see Box 12).
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Box 12: Public subsidies for off-grid electrification projects in Togo
In 2018 Togo set up a country-wide electrification program (CIZO project) to increase the access rate from 27% in
2015 to 50% in 2025 and 100% by 2030. 217 As part of this program, already in 2018, the government awarded two
firms—Bboxx and Soleva—tenders to supply 300,000 SHS by 2022 across the country. 218 The SHS products range
from 51 Wh to 650 Wh and are paid by consumers through mobile payments. 219
An affordability analysis assessed that if the daily price of Bboxx’s SHS product were reduced to XOF 85 (USD 16
cents) from XOF 160 (USD 30 cents), 220 the potential market would grow to over 500,000 units sold, which would
help electrify 56% of Togo’s off-grid households in line with the national electrification strategy target. 221
To improve affordability, Togo offered the licensees (Bboxx and Soleva) the opportunity to use the Togo Post Office,
at a 20% discount, for transportation, storage, and product display. In addition, they benefitted from Value Added
Tax (VAT) and duty waivers. 222
Furthermore, to stimulate adoption, the government began in 2019 to offer a monthly subsidy of XOF 2000 to households that procured this system to partly cover its monthly fee of XOF 4800. The subsidies are also disbursed via
mobile money accounts and will stretch for three years. The 11 regions where electrification rates are below 10%
are prioritized for this subsidy. 223 By September 2018, Bboxx had installed over 4,000 units of its SHS. 224

3.2.4. Affordability and Profitability: Regulatory and Commercial Model
In the context of forming a PPP-enabling environment, which enables affordability for consumers as well as profitability for suppliers, reducing the number of subsidies needed, the following principles are important:


Building a strong institutional framework



Leveraging mobile payments to finance energy as a service



Encouraging the electrification of co-productive uses



Facilitating data sharing



Subsidizing private investors based on results (rather than upfront and unconditionally)

Building a strong institutional framework
Two models for decentralized energy have been observed. In the first, decentralization system deployment happens
through the free market with incentives (for suppliers) and subsidies (for buyers). The alternative is for regulatory or
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utility companies to grant territorial sub-concessions to mini-grid or SHS providers through what is called an integrated system. 225 The latter model is more conducive to fast-paced and efficient electrification that enables energy
justice at the same time. It, however, necessitates an operationally and financially sound utility and strong strategic
direction. Morocco is a good example of such a situation (see Box 13).

Box 13: The role of utility ONEE in the adoption of decentralized energy across Morocco 226
From 1994, Morocco progressively liberalized its electricity policy, allowing the utility ONE (later renamed ONEE) to
enter into power purchase agreements with private investors. Further partnerships and concessions resulted in the
privatization of electricity generation and distribution, enabling ONEE to focus on transmission and setting the strategic direction of electricity programs.
In addition, ONEE set up a rural electrification directorate to drive rural electrification. Its flagship program PERG (as
also mentioned in Box 11 above) achieved significant success because of a strategic model that over time evolved
towards integrating community participation, cross-subsidies, and a well-laid-out partnership between ONEE and
private firms.
The partnership involved ONEE outsourcing off-grid electrification to private partners using a ten-year, fee-for-service model where the partner provides the unit, and the customer, the municipality, and ONEE collectively pay for
it. The partners were responsible for identifying market expansion opportunities, preparing and signing electricity
subscription contracts with the end-user on behalf of ONEE, procuring and installing all solar PV system components,
providing free post-installation service, and collecting the connection fee and monthly fee. On its part, ONEE determined the end-user’s or village’s eligibility, certified the PV systems to be installed, and conducted quality control of
their performance. ONEE also remained the owner of the installation and the client relationship.
A strong utility or rural electrification agency, in either case, supported by a strong Ministry of Energy, is the basis of
creating an enabling environment for a PPP that is attractive to the private sector while taking into account the
consumers’ ability to pay. While the costs of construction and operation are borne by the private sector, there is a
range of public sector tools that could support this investment. Those mobilized by Togo to enable electrification by
2030 are demonstrated in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Range of public sector tools to support the development of the off-grid market

Source: Lighting Global.. 227
As SHS and mini-grids are different types of investment, they require distinct public support tools. In particular, the
main risk to the business model of mini-grids is regulatory, related to tariff level and setting (often approved by the
regulator) and the competition with the grid at a certain point in time. The main risk for SHS is customers’ ability to
pay. From the tools mentioned in Figure 13 above, creating concession zones that are temporarily exclusive for minigrids, setting up a transition model for when the grid arrives (as Tanzania has done 228), and clarifying and standardizing licensing procedures will help address the regulatory risk, while the guarantee against payment default will help
address the revenue risk for SHS.
Leveraging mobile payments to finance energy as a service
The digitalization of communication and financial services (mobile phones, mobile money accounts, and associated
telecommunication and payment infrastructure), as well as the increasing penetration of mobile phones in the continent (from 700 million in 2017 to 1 billion by 2023 229) has been instrumental to the development of mini-grids and
SHS markets in the last five years. 230
For their SHS, customers are increasingly being offered affordable payment plans over several months or years, often
with an initial deposit followed by periodic (e.g., daily) payments which cost less than what customers currently
spend on alternatives such as kerosene (these are also called rent-to-own models). Moreover, mobile networks enable direct communication with customers, remote operation and maintenance of devices, and even the option to
disable functionality for defaulting customers. 231 Thus, “in the past five years, Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) solar companies
have raised over USD 360 million in capital and served about 700,000 customers in East and West Africa.” 232
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In Kenya, M-KOPA has been a pioneer. 233 In Togo, the CIZO project (mentioned in Box 12) aimed at providing electricity for 300,000 households in off-grid areas while also leveraging a national mobile payment platform enabling
PAYG modes of payments. 234 Despite being one of the smallest economies by GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa, Togo’s total
mobile phone subscription of 6.2 million is 77% of the total population (some customers have multiple SIM cards). 235
In a country with a banking rate of 15%, 236 mobile money has increased access to financial services for the population,
and thus, the accessibility of renewable energy products and services. One company, in particular, Bboxx, although
not selling any equipment, uses smartphones to automatically turn on and off rented solar and battery systems based
on whether or not payment was received. 237
PAYG is now enabling the storage-as-a-service and energy-as-a-service models. The idea is that the off-grid customer
buys an electrification package and can rent batteries, solar panels, and home appliances for a small fee—by some
estimates, less than USD 10 per month. This offer allows for energy access at a fraction of the cost of ownership. 238
The latest technology solutions offered by the private sector should be assessed before setting a subsidy package.
For instance, here, ownership of SHS and home appliances is not required to raise development outcomes, so subsidizing ownership is not necessary.
In some countries, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have deep penetration into rural areas. For instance, in Togo,
they are present in 43% of rural areas as of 2015. 239 This presence could be actively leveraged to support the off-grid
solar sector with both consumer finance and distribution. Synergistic partnerships could be established between
solar solution distributors and MFIs; MFIs would develop solar-specific financial products with affordable lending
terms for the consumer through PAYG (as is already the case in Togo, for instance) while solar distributors would
focus on their core business instead of engaging into financial solutions too. As the solar market matures in some
countries, providing an enabling environment to disaggregate the value chain of solar could lead to important cost
reductions and higher affordability. 240
Encouraging the electrification of co-productive uses
Co-productive uses of electricity integrate consumption by industrial and domestic users and small and mediumsized enterprises (SME). Productive uses of electricity not only impact the industrial and commercial sector but also
increase consumption, raise household income, and boost willingness to pay for electricity, so they contribute to
solving the affordability question. As a result, private companies, such as providers of mini-grids and SHS, have
started considering how to support the development of commercial activities alongside the electrification of communities in order to ensure the sustainability of their investment. 241
For instance, irrigation pumps require systems of higher power (from 500 W to a few kW) than what is usually offered
by PAYG solar companies (5–30 W range), thus enabling the creation of new consumption centers and leveraging
irrigation pumps as anchor demand. 242
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In Ghana, the DFI consortium behind Endev partnered with Ghana to incorporate productive uses of electricity at
the community level. A Light Industrial Zone set up with grid electricity, where SMEs, cooperatives, and artisans were
encouraged to relocate, increased their productivity. This project resulted in giving access to electricity to 375 SMEs
and 1500 people. Moreover, electricity for mechanized farming was provided through grid extension, benefiting 213
farmers and 7 solar PV-powered irrigation pumps. Funds were channeled to where demand was, using subsidies.
Farmers who were willing to pay 60–70% of the total investment were given subsidies for 30–40% of the cost of the
solar PV irrigation system, including installation and maintenance. 243
Moreover, renewable energy technologies that provide electricity access at the household level can also be used to
provide access to clean drinking water for both consumption and agriculture. An interesting project in that matter is
the Ikondo-Matembwe project in rural Tanzania. It serves eight villages and consists of two community-scale hydropower mini-grids that power an anchor client, an agribusiness focused on producing animal feed, while providing
electricity and water to the surrounding households. A cost-benefit analysis based on the results of this project
showed that a 20-year renewable energy project serving several needs has more than twice as much economic impact on a local community than a project serving one purpose. In particular, this integrated approach has a multiplier
effect linked to the increase in local purchasing power emerging from better education, improved agricultural
productivity, and time saved from having water and energy access on site. 244
DFIs and Ministers should jump on the bandwagon, which will imply further coordination between the ministries of
water, agriculture, industry, and energy. Local agriculture cooperatives can also be efficient channels to satisfy productive uses. 245
Facilitating data sharing
Across Africa, limited access to local financing and small market sizes are examples of challenges that have eroded
the profitability margins of SHS. Data monetization could be an opportunity to reverse this trend towards revenue
growth. 246 Moreover, the lack of information on consumers’ behaviors, needs, and willingness to pay has discouraged
mini-grid operators (with margins even lower than SHS providers) to penetrate remote rural areas, particularly given
the difficulty in appropriately sizing, designing, and pricing the system. 247
During their operations that started in the early 2010s in rural Africa, SHS providers have been able to acquire significant data on markets—such as electricity demand and population—and customers—such as their willingness to pay
and creditworthiness. This data can be a key source of insights for mini-grid operators when making investment
decisions. Monetizing this data is an opportunity for SHS providers to grow revenues and for mini-grid or grid operators to de-risk their projects and plan their market entry. 248
Where the government is the owner of the client relationship or providing a concession to the SHS or mini-grid
provider (for example, as in Morocco (see Box 13 above)), it is possible to leverage its influence to facilitate data
sharing. In addition, DFI providing equity and loans to private investors can enable and facilitate this data sharing
(see Box 14 below).
Data sharing as a service provided by the government also helps de-risk the market. For instance, Togo is securing
DFIs’ help to run a national study on consumers’ readiness to pay and a pre-feasibility study to facilitate mini-grid
investment. The World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) has a database of over
26,000 installed and planned mini-grid projects around the world, 249 which could help support governments in putting together the data needed to support the investment.
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Subsidizing private investors based on results (rather than upfront and unconditionally)
There are some markets in which a product or service provider has no or low incentive to participate, perhaps due
to exchange rate fluctuation, market size, low permeation of financial services or mobile payments, or poor business
or regulatory environments. It is particularly important to use results-based financing in these cases as it is an incentive-led approach that closes the viability gap in a way that rationalizes the use of subsidies while ensuring electrification results.

Box 14: Results-based financing in Zambia
Beyond the Grid Fund for Zambia (BGFZ) is a social impact procurement fund led by Power Africa and the Swedish
government that closes the viability gap between energy providers and customers in Zambia. It was set up in 2017
to bring affordable, renewable, off-grid energy to 1 million people in Zambia by 2021.
BGFZ periodically invites off-grid energy companies to apply for results-based funding to provide clean, modern, and
affordable energy in a specific market in Zambia. The application uses a “reverse auction” mechanism where BGFZ
asks the investor to set an incentive per connection that they require to roll out their product to the market.
The bidding companies are evaluated based on value for money and the viability of their business plan. BGFZ nominates winning suppliers and sets market target, quality, warranty, and minimum service for them, continually measuring their performance through electronic tracking of product and awarding funding as they perform. BGFZ also
works with the Zambian government and other stakeholders to get approval and support for the program and the
products.
Suppliers, on their part, share data with BGFZ, providing them crucial market intelligence that serves to further derisk the market for other investors. In addition to the direct benefits, jobs are created (agents, technicians, etc.), and
complementary products (e.g., TVs and radios) are introduced into the market.
Since 2017, BGFZ has impacted 901,000 beneficiaries and facilitated the sale of 173,275 energy service subscriptions.
Beyond the Grid Fund for Africa was set up in 2019 to replicate the success of BGFZ in Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mozambique, and Zambia. 250
Critical to results-based financing should be ensuring that only quality-certified products are on the market. For instance, in Togo, only 13.8% of solar products on the market are certified. Here the World Bank’s Lighting Global
certification helps maintains industry-approved quality standards. 251 Licenses and subsidies should only be granted
to certified products to help protect the consumer.

3.3.Phase-Out of Fossil Fuels: The Remaining Role for Oil and Gas
African policymakers must determine, on economic grounds, the extent to which fossil fuel production and export
can be part of their energy and economy over the next three decades. 252 The destiny of Africa’s remaining coal, oil,
and natural gas resources represents a fundamental consideration for governments in determining the possible trajectories of zero-carbon energy development. This consideration is relevant in all African countries with significant
endowments of these resources and related expectations or concrete plans to exploit and extract them for revenues
and development, whether these countries are incumbent or new producers in the fossil fuel industry. Here we
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explain why we believe that Africa’s energy development should focus on a gradual and, to the extent feasible, substantial phase-out of the domestic use of fossil fuels by 2050, and with the expectation of falling export revenues
from fossil fuels in the years to 2050.
Africa accounts for a relatively small historical share of global greenhouse gas emissions: for example, only 5.8% of
global historical emissions of CO2, even when including emissions from land-use and land-use change, come from
Sub-Saharan Africa. 253 Looking more narrowly at global cumulative energy-related CO2 emissions since 1890, Africa’s
contribution has been limited to 2%. 254 Accordingly, based solely on the principle of countries’ common but differentiated responsibilities to protect the climate system, 255 Africa would be well-positioned to claim an entitlement to
exploit its fossil fuel resources to the limits of the remaining carbon budget, leaving the burden of mitigation to highemitting countries. This is the approach adopted by some analysts, who argue that Africa should not shy away from
ramping up exploration and exploitation of its fossil fuel resources to power—and generate revenue to fund—its
economic development strategies. 256
However, our justification for suggesting a deep decarbonization pathway for Africa’s domestic energy system by
2050 lies mainly in economic considerations. Africa has ample supplies of zero-carbon energy; the production cost
of this energy has radically dropped in the past five years, reaching competitive levels with fossil fuels on a nonsubsidized basis; and there is a global conversion to EVs and other forms of electrification. The combination of these
factors provides Africa the opportunity to follow the global trend and invest in zero-carbon energy, materials, and
products for African consumption and global export. Against this backdrop, it is wiser for Africa to anticipate and
prepare for a gradual decline in export markets in hydrocarbons as the world economy shifts to net-zero emissions
by 2050. Africa should also reconsider the role of fossil fuels in providing access to energy domestically. While gas
can continue serving industry’s feedstock needs and baseload and flexibility needs in African electricity systems until
the full deployment of cost-effective storage technologies, basing the energy policy on the build-up of fossil fuelbased infrastructure would create increasing risks in the next decades, including high-cost access to electricity, lack
of access to donor finance, continued social and environmental externalities, 257 and significant asset stranding. Fossil
fuel investment, while justifiable in limited cases, should not divert policy-makers’ attention from building an integrated zero-carbon domestic energy and industrial system that will best serve Africa’s interest in the long term.

3.3.1. Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis on the Fossil Fuel Industry
Reduced demand and prices were already an evident trend in fossil fuel development in the recent past, and in 2020
they became even more accentuated. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused an unprecedented global economy-wide
crisis; in the petroleum industry, in particular, it led to even lower oil prices, between USD 20 and 40 for most of
2020. 258
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African planned oil and gas investments were particularly affected as prices remained below their break-even prices
of USD 45 to 60 per barrel (see Figure 14). 259 As a result of the pandemic, other signs of the industry’s decline were
exacerbated in Africa’s established and new producers alike: drilling rigs were left idle, relatively high-cost projects
delayed or paused, licensing rounds postponed, and exploration plans cancelled.260
Figure 14: Top 2020–2022 crude oil and gas FIDs in Africa facing the risk of getting delayed

Source: Rystad Energy. 261

3.3.2. Bleak Recovery Outlook for the Global and African Fossil Fuel Industry
Before Russia’s war against Ukraine, under optimistic scenarios, oil prices were expected to recover to pre-COVID19 prices in the next five to seven years to no more than USD 60 per barrel range: in Exxon’s estimates, Brent oil
prices would vary between USD 50 and 55 per barrel between 2020 and 2025, hitting USD 60 in 2026 and 2027; for
BP, prices would be around USD 55 until 2025; for Shell, long-term crude prices would be at USD 60. 262 In a pessimistic
scenario, prices do not return to past levels. 263 The war is now causing petroleum shocks, with oil and gas prices
skyrocketing well above the anticipated levels for post-COVID-19 recovery. Some established African producers may
benefit in the short term from these higher price levels. However, these higher prices are likely very short-term, as
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the war is also pushing Europeans and Americans to accelerate their energy transition to avoid long-term dependence on fossil fuels. With Europe’s accelerated pivot away from oil and gas, the IEA’s 2022 forecasts of a peak in
global oil demand in the mid-2030s and a plateau in global gas demand by the end of the 2020s even under the
stated policies scenario, 264 and Africa’s limited capacity to swiftly increase production and mobilize investment in
new projects (with a historical average of 12 years between discovery and production in sub-Saharan countries), it is
unlikely that most African producers will benefit from supplying oil and gas to Europe and other global markets. 265
Despite the higher prices due to shocks, there is inherent uncertainty in longer-term price estimates, and the global
transition to zero-carbon energy sources tends to not only reduce supply opportunities 266 but also cause a structural
decline in long-term oil prices. 267 For example, according to some studies, a swift transition to zero-carbon energy in
line with a 2°C trajectory would lead to long-term oil prices between USD 40 and 50; 268 even lower prices could be
expected for compliance with a 1.5°C trajectory. According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2022, 269 which updated the net-zero emissions scenario originally presented in the IEA’s 2021 Net Zero by 2050 report, 270 the outlook
for oil and gas under that scenario is as follows:


The oil price (in real terms) will be around USD 35/bbl by 2030 and USD 24/bbl by 2050.



Gas import prices (in real terms) in 2050 would fall to a floor of approximately USD 5 per Million Btu by 2030.



Oil demand would drop from 94.5 million bopd in 2021 to 24 million bopd in 2050.



Gas demand would drop from 4,213 billion cubic meters (Bcm) in 2021 to 1,159 Bcm in 2050.

Despite the falling costs of oil production, the average break-even prices for most oil sources remain higher than
current prices. 271 Therefore, the low prospects for price recovery make for a bleak outlook for a rebound of the fossil
fuel industry, particularly in African oil-producing countries, where the cost of production is not globally competitive
at the new price levels. For example, in 2016, the estimated production cost in Algeria (USD 20.40 per barrel) was
more than twice the cost of production in Kuwait (USD 8.50), and the production cost in Angola (USD 35.40) and
Nigeria (USD 31.60) were three times the cost in Saudi Arabia (USD 9.90) (see Figure 15). 272
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Figure 15: Total cost to produce one barrel of crude oil

Source: Market Realist. 273
Lower long-term oil prices and the diminishing role that fossil fuels will play in the global economy tend to frustrate
the expectations of other new oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa that rely on projects with high production costs,
as companies may ultimately give up developing them. For example, oil prices below USD 40 would put more than
half of Uganda’s potential oil production at risk, and prices between USD 40 and 60 would put over one-quarter of
its new projects at risk. Senegal’s scenario is even worse: its entire projected production would be at risk with prices
between USD 40 and 60 (see Figure 16). 274 The case of the Turkana project offers a preview of what could happen in
Uganda, Senegal, and other high-cost producers (see Box 15).
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Figure 16: Share of total oil and gas production from operating and prospective projects

Source: NRGI. 275
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Box 15: Turkana project
The Turkana project is located in Kenya’s South Lokichar basin and covers onshore Blocks 10BA, 10BB, and 13T,
Kenya’s first oil fields. The project’s Final Investment Decision (FID) was expected in 2019, but the FID is still pending,
and the commercial partners—Tulow, Total, and Africa Oil—have had trouble staying committed to the project despite already investing nearly USD 2 billion in exploration. 276 The uncertainties of the market relative to the cost of
the project are tipping the balance towards the exit of the commercial partners. An analysis done by Open Oil and
InVhestia in 2018, under a much more optimistic scenario (USD65/ barrel), showed that the consortium would need
to commit to substantially higher production than they were publicly announcing and the 20% participation of the
National Oil Company would not yield extra profits until the 2030s. 277 In a 2020 analysis, Open Oil and inVhestia
explained that with prices below USD 53 per barrel, the National Oil Company of Kenya would never reach breakeven,
and with prices below USD 72, it would never reach a positive net present value with a 10% discount rate; additionally, under all price scenarios, the rates of returns for the contractors are low or inexistent. 278

3.3.3. Renewables: Lower Costs and Negative Externalities than Fossil Fuels
Fossil fuel producers tend to experience declining export potential for their hydrocarbons, considering the global
trend to transition away from fossil fuels toward zero-carbon energy sources that are increasingly competitive from
an economic standpoint and technically viable, accompanied by increasing desirability of deploying renewable power
generation for their domestic use.
Bloomberg NEF forecasts that renewable energy sources could meet half of the world’s energy demand by 2050. 279
In late 2019, electricity costs from new solar PV plants were 83% lower than ten years earlier, 280 and renewable
energies are now competitive with fossil fuels on a non-subsidized basis. Coal is being phased out in many parts of
the world. 281 The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of renewable energy sources has been decreasing globally over
the past decade (Figure 17) and is expected to continue to decrease in Africa as the continent advances toward largescale development of renewables. 282 In Europe, China, and Japan, the benchmark LCOE for battery storage (4-hour
duration) has dropped to USD 150/MWh, half of what it was in 2018. 283

276 Ron Bousso, Bate Felix, and Shadia Nasralla, “Total and Tullow Launch Joint Sale of Stakes in Kenyan Oil Project: Sources,” Reuters, January 23, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-m-a-oil-kenya/total-and-tullow-launch-joint-sale-of-stakes-in-kenyan-oil-project-sourcesidINKBN1ZM1FZ.

Johnny West and Stephen Gugu, “Turkana oil field, Kenya: Narrative Report,” (InVhestia Africa and Open Oil, Decemeber 2018),
http://openoil.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ooinv_ke_turkana_narrative_181212.pdf.
277

278 Ibid.

Ramanan Krishnamoorti, “What Does The Oil Price Crisis Mean For The Energy Transition?,” Forbes, March 13, 2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2020/03/13/what-does-the-oil-price-crisis-mean-for-the-energy-transition.

279

BloombergNEF, “Falling Clean Energy Costs Can Provide Opportunity to Boost Climate Action in COVID-19 Recovery Packages,” BloombergNEF (blog), June 10, 2020, https://about.bnef.com/blog/falling-clean-energy-costs-can-provide-opportunity-to-boost-climate-action-incovid-19-recovery-packages.
280

Gaurav Ganti, “Coal Phase-Out,” (briefing, Berlin, Lomé, and New York: Climate Analytics), https://climateanalytics.org/briefings/coalphase-out.

281

282 See,

e.g., LCOE of various power sources in Africa over time (USD cents/kWh). Global Energy Interconnection Development and Co-operation Organization (GEIDCO), Africa Energy Interconnection Planning Research Report.

62

Figure 17: Global LCOE benchmarks for solar PV, wind, and batteries

Note: The global benchmark is a country weighted average using the latest annual capacity additions. The storage
LCOE is reflective of utility-scale projects with four-hour duration, including charging costs.
Source: BloombergNEF. 284
Analyzing electricity costs and LCOEs provides only a partial assessment of the societal impacts of the energy system;
taking into account the significantly high negative externalities caused by fossil fuel sources of energy strengthens
the argument for Africa to invest in renewables-based electrification and move away from fossil fuels. The external
costs of coal, oil, and gas include environmental damage from resource extraction, air pollution from combustion
and industrial processes, and impacts of extreme weather events resulting from climate change. 285 An IRENA study
concludes that when internalizing these external costs estimated to amount to USD 3–10.5 trillion per year globally,
the increased use of renewables by 2030 could generate global annual savings of up to USD 4.2 trillion, an amount
15 times higher than the cost to deploy those renewables. 286 According to one estimate, the combination of health
costs and work absences as a result of fossil fuel-related air pollution generates costs of USD 8 billion per day worldwide, the equivalent to 3.3% of global GDP. 287 By adding calculated mean externalities to LCOEs, another study finds
that wind, geothermal, and solar thermal would be among the most socially cost-effective electricity sources, with
coal energy being the most uneconomical. 288
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3.3.4. Fiscal Challenges for Incumbent and Entrant Fossil Fuel Producers
The energy transition will pose fiscal challenges to several African economies that are highly dependent on oil and
gas earnings. Africa accounts for 9 of the top 40 countries in oil and gas revenues as a share of GDP (‘petrostates’).
Figure 18 shows that the fiscal dependence of these nine countries on oil and gas revenues ranges from 12% to 81%
of average government revenues between 2015 and 2018.
Figure 18: African petrostates’ fiscal dependence on oil and gas revenue

Source: Carbon Tracker. 289
Ironically, the heavy dependence of these economies on oil and gas has not been conducive to overall economic
development, a phenomenon widely summarized as the “resource curse.” The high dependence on fossil fuels in
Africa’s main fossil fuel–producing countries, resulting from poor governance of the sector and the economy more
broadly, has led to a lack of economic diversification and a very small fiscal capacity in taxation other than fossil
fuels. 290
Even established African oil producers currently face formidable challenges, including increasing global competition,
reductions in long-term demand, inadequate regulation, lack of local expertise, political and social instability, and
risks of economic distress in countries with resource-based loans. 291 In many African countries, the fiscal breakeven
price—the oil price needed for the country to achieve fiscal balance—is significantly higher than current and expected oil price levels. For example, in Nigeria, the fiscal breakeven price is USD 144 per barrel; 292 in Algeria,
USD 109.3, and in Libya, USD 70.3. 293
The zero-carbon energy transition will exacerbate the global decline in demand for oil and gas, resulting in a significant fiscal impact on the governments of hydrocarbon-dependent countries. A study by Carbon Tracker forecasts
government revenue in the world’s top 40 petrostates under three scenarios: 294
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1. Industry Expectations: business-as-usual production, assuming long-term oil prices at USD 60;
2. Low-Carbon (Base-Case Prices): reduced demand under a low-carbon scenario while continuing to assume
oil prices at USD 60; and
3. Low-Carbon: reduced demand under a low-carbon scenario, with a flat price assumption of USD 40, roughly
corresponding to the marginal breakeven price in Carbon Tracker’s analysis, and accounting for the expectation that lower demand will lead to lower pricing.
Figure 19 shows that total government revenues between 2021 and 2040 would be 51% lower in the Low-Carbon
than in the Industry Expectations scenario, amounting to a USD 13 trillion gap.
Figure 19: Future (2021–2040) government revenue under different demand/price scenarios compared to last five
years and last decade

Notes: * 2010–2019 and 2015–2019; extrapolated to 20-year values for comparability.
Source: Carbon Tracker. 295
Revenues from fossil fuels in top-ten African producers to 2040 will remain below the levels achieved in the mid2000s to the mid-2010s in both IEA’s Stated Policies and Africa Case scenarios (see Figure 20). In this context, the
IEA points out that “changing energy dynamics make it risky to assume that ample [fossil fuel] resources will translate
into reliable future revenues” for African countries. 296

295

“Ibid. 26.

296

International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019, 157.

65

Figure 20: Net income from oil and gas production in top-ten producers in Africa, 2000–2040

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA). 297
The fiscal challenges faced by incumbent producers also apply, and are even greater, for prospective or new producers. An analysis of 12 sub-Saharan countries that made their first major oil and gas discoveries between 2001 and
2014 evidenced that, in all cases, these discoveries failed to deliver the expected development benefits. In 4 countries (Guinea Bissau, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Sierra Leone), discoveries were deemed commercially unviable, which is an inherent risk in petroleum exploration; in the other 8 (Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda), timelines from discovery to production were, on average, 73% longer than
the initial forecast. In the 3 countries that reached the production stage, government revenues were much lower
than forecasts (90% less in Mauritania, 60% less in Niger, and 50% less in Ghana). In several of the 12 countries,
revenue expectations have led to increasing national debt. 298
While, in theory, fossil fuel investment can bring not only revenues but also other co-benefits through domestic
linkages—by bringing technology and know-how that can spill over to other sectors and anchoring the broader development of the economy—these linkages and their positive socio-economic impacts have not always materialized
in resource-rich countries. 299
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3.3.5. Recommendations for Africa to Phase Out Fossil Fuels
As the world ramps up efforts to achieve global climate change mitigation objectives, regardless of the weight and
role African countries should or will have in that achievement, fossil fuel reserves will be considered stranded resources, becoming uneconomical to be explored. In addition, existing investments in fossil fuels and related infrastructure will become stranded assets, losing their economic value earlier than anticipated. 300 The stranding of fossil
fuel resources and assets and the resulting need to phase them out will cause substantial negative impacts to both
incumbent and new fossil fuel producers in Africa.
Africa should plan for a rapid fossil fuel phase-out for various reasons: to seize the increasing direct cost advantage
of renewables, to minimize the economic costs imposed on Africans of the negative externalities associated with
fossil fuels, to anticipate the drop in international prices and demand for fossil fuels, and to prepare for the reduced
availability of international finance for fossil fuel investments. 301 Below are recommendations for African countries
to manage their fossil fuel phase-out.
Adopting Legal and Policy Frameworks Conducive to the Phase-Out of Fossil Fuels
Current legal and policy frameworks in Africa aggravate existing fossil fuel–dependence on incumbent producers and
encourage new producers to continue to hold overly optimistic expectations based on coal, oil, and gas. For instance,
Nigeria’s 2020 capital budget relied on plans to produce 2.1 million barrels of oil per day throughout the year at a
price of USD 57 per barrel. 302 Coal and gas generation dominates the energy masterplans of countries in Eastern and
Southern Africa. In 2040, the two regions expect 47% of total power to come from fossil fuels, even in their high
renewable scenarios. 303
African countries should adopt legal and policy frameworks with explicit energy transition strategies to provide market signals that Africa is determined to move away from fossil fuels in the long term. Beyond removing the existing
inconsistent frameworks, governments can look for inspiration in established, internationally competitive fossil fuel
producers outside Africa that are moving toward zero-carbon energy. For instance, despite being the least expensive
and most competitive source of oil globally, 304 Saudi Arabia tripled its renewable energy target. The United Arab
Emirates, another competitive oil producer, launched its “Energy Plan 2050,” aiming to cut carbon dioxide emissions
by 70%, improve energy efficiency by 40%, 305 and reach a 50% stake in clean energy by 2050. 306
Avoiding and Minimizing Carbon Lock-in
African countries must proceed with caution to avoid and minimize locking in capital in coal, oil, and, to a lesser
extent, gas, as well as locking out zero-carbon alternatives. It has been suggested that Africa could respond to the
resource and asset stranding risk “either by switching up a gear on renewable power in a bid to meet development
and climate change goals or by pumping fossil fuels faster while they still can.” 307 A more nuanced view is that African
countries “need to be sensible in deciding which sectors to develop, focus on phasing-in low- to no-carbon technol-
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ogies (leapfrogging carbon-intensive development) and avoid creating new stranded assets as a fossil fuel development model will be too risky, but they need to move fast as any delay in action will only increase the amount of
stranded assets.” 308
At the same time, renewable electricity generation, transmission and distribution grids, charging points for EVs, battery production, and green hydrogen will require more investment. 309 Africa is a promising host for this investment:
while it accounts for less than 10% of the global share of oil production, it is endowed with 39% of global technical
solar and wind potential. Most North African countries and the Republic of South Africa have solar and wind technical
potential 100 times greater than their current energy demand; this figure rises to above 1,000 times greater in most
of sub-Saharan Africa. 310
Accordingly, all African countries should focus on making zero-carbon energy investments, ramping up their solar,
wind, hydropower, and other renewable generation as well as storage capabilities and electricity infrastructure, and
recognizing that pursuing costly oil and gas exploration and exploitation would likely prove to be an uneconomical
course of action, leading eventually to stranded assets. Established fossil fuel producers, while continuing to exploit
existing resources from operational investments only to the extent they might be competitive, should refrain from
additional costly exploration and infrastructure expansions, particularly in coal and oil.
Cautiously Limiting Investments in Fossil Gas and Related Infrastructure, Consistent with a Phase-Out by 2050
Whether and to what extent fossil gas should play a role in the transition from other fossil fuels to renewables should
be decided on a country-by-country basis, considering that ultimately a mix of technological solutions—including
green fuels, storage, grid development, demand management, and flexible renewables—will allow for a fully renewable-based grid and feedstock for industry, eliminating the need for fossil gas. 311 On the path to this outcome and
while waiting for more affordable storage technologies, measured and careful investment in gas could, if well managed, help cut emissions from more carbon-intensive fuels (particularly coal) 312 and support renewables by “balancing intermittency, providing reliable energy,” and possibly, in certain contexts, “offering affordable investments and
consumer prices.” 313
For the IEA, even if it would be desirable for Africa to leapfrog to renewables, which should be developed as rapidly
as possible, there would be opportunities for fossil gas to complement the expansion of solar PV and replace diesel
and heavy fuel oil in sub-Saharan Africa, given the region’s need to fuel industrial growth. 314
Recent major gas discoveries in Egypt, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania could positively
influence the outlook for some gas development. Higher supply capacity from foreign liquefied natural gas (LNG)
producers abroad at low prices and technological innovations in LNG could also lead to a demand boost for African
gas importers. 315 However, significant challenges persist for fossil gas in sub-Saharan Africa, including its small market
size, infrastructure limitations, and affordability concerns. 316
Possibly technologies in floating storage regasification units (FSRU), compressed natural gas (CNG), mini- and smallscale LNG, and small-scale regasification plants could help address these challenges without locking in capital as the
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small size of infrastructure, in theory, should necessitate lower demand to reach breakeven, a shorter period to
amortize and less capital to develop. FSRUs can even be redeployed when no longer needed and eliminate the need
for costly onshore infrastructure. These new technologies could also help commercialize associated petroleum gas,
that could be flared otherwise, without incentivizing the extraction of excessive non-associated gas fields to amortize
the infrastructure. 317 Small-scale LNG is also increasingly discussed as an opportunity to reach users in remote supply
areas relying on expensive diesel through “virtual pipelines” (as used for transportation fuels). 318 As of today, however, even in the United States, “many projects fail to get off the ground due to the technical, financial, and logistical
issues that [mini-LNG] developers often encounter.” 319 In particular, despite the progress, depending on the technology, the small-scale infrastructure might still suffer from a lack of economies of scale. 320
Another possibility is to take advantage of both the wasted gas and the spare capacity at pipelines and LNG terminals
when it exists. For instance, by doing so, projects in North Africa could break even within a couple of years and
displace 15% of Russian gas supplied to Europe. 321
In light of these challenges and uncertainties, African countries choosing to afford a role for fossil gas in their energy
transitions should limit their investments in fossil gas and associated infrastructure to those that minimize their LCOE,
use spare capacity at pipelines and LNG terminals, and ensure the regulation, through flexibility, of the electricity
system. Any investment in domestic infrastructure for residential and industrial use of gas should be considered with
caution, to factor in negative externalities and avoid asset-stranding risks. The assessment of the economics of gas
infrastructure should include a comparison with the present and future economics of renewable energies associated
with storage technologies and green fuels and consider a timeline consistent with a phase-out by 2050.
Considering the Potential Role of Green Hydrogen Leveraging Existing Gas Infrastructure
Increasingly using fossil gas infrastructure for hydrogen and in future retrofitting it for use with green hydrogen only
may further reduce stranded asset risks. 322 When not accounting for grey hydrogen’s negative externalities, green
hydrogen (produced from renewable energy) is still more expensive than grey hydrogen (produced from fossil fuels).
However, the production costs of green hydrogen are falling due to diminishing costs of electrolyzers and renewable
energy. Green hydrogen may become competitive with blue hydrogen (produced from fossil fuels while using carbon
capture and storage) in the coming decades (see Figure 21).
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Figure 21: Green hydrogen production costs versus grey hydrogen production costs

Source: IRENA 323
Starting to blend hydrogen with fossil gas in pipeline networks at even a 5% penetration level would spur demand
for green hydrogen and reduce its costs. Transporting hydrogen in existing and refurbished gas pipelines is still being
studied, and those pipelines would need to be upgraded when hydrogen concentrations exceed 20% of the total
gas. 324
However, IRENA notes that adjusting equipment standards to use more hydrogen may take time and that the potential for hydrogen should not serve as an excuse to build more pipelines for fossil gas. 325 As discussed in Section 3.1.2,
Africa could also look at green hydrogen production, once competitive, for domestic use and export. 326
Gas- and coal-based hydrogen is currently produced and used at an industrial scale in Africa to make ammonia-based
fertilizers and refine oil (out of gas in Algeria, Egypt, and Nigeria and out of coal in South Africa). With the deployment
of solar power and the technology evolution of hydrogen-making by water electrolysis, Africa could be well-positioned to make green hydrogen concurrent with the development of heavy industry such as steel in Africa. 327 Moreover, research is advancing to make hydrogen out of food waste, and a study in Nigeria has shown the potential to
displace 6.05 million liters of diesel fuel through this method. 328

323

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Global Renewables Outlook, 181.

324

International Energy Agency (IEA), The Future of Hydrogen.

325

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Global Renewables Outlook, 191.

326 International Energy Agency (IEA), The Future of Hydrogen; Aurora Energy Research, “Hydrogen Could Be a €120 Billion+ Industry in Europe by 2050.”
327

International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019.

328 T.R. Ayodelea, M.A. Alaob, A.S.O. Ogunjuyigbeb, and J.L.Munda, Electricity generation prospective of hydrogen derived from biogas using
food waste in south-western Nigeria,” Biomass and Bioenergy 127 (August 2019): 105291, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2019.105291.

70

Adopting Reformed Industrial and Economic Diversification Policy and Creating More Jobs in Zero-Carbon Electricity
Generation and Storage
As African countries move away from fossil fuels, they should also swiftly reform their industrial policies to green
existing industries, enjoy the cost advantage of renewables, and secure a relevant role in markets that are forming
or expanding significantly thanks to the energy transition and in which Africa has competitive advantages. 329 These
markets include, for example, the production of green hydrogen 330 and the production and recycling of batteries
(see Section 3.1.2). 331
With a reformed industrial policy geared toward zero-carbon energy, industry, and jobs, Africa can ease its reliance
on the collapsing fossil fuel industry, replace jobs lost, ensure long-term government revenues, and allow the continent’s continued sustainable development in line with Agenda 2063. 332 The potential benefits of renewables in job
creation are roughly three times higher than fossil fuel-based energy. 333 As of 2018, solar PV jobs in Africa represented 4% of 3.6 million jobs globally in the solar industry, 334 whereas Africa enjoys only 1% of the global solar PV
installed capacity. 335 Togo has jumped on the bandwagon of the solar boom, creating five solar academies to train
3,000 technicians on solar kit maintenance and installation techniques (see Box 12). South Africa, which has adopted
an energy transition strategy (see Section 3.1.2), stands to benefit significantly: as compared to a business-as-usual
scenario based on the government’s current projections and energy plans, if South Africa reaches net-zero by 2050,
it will gain 3.3% in GDP, 18% in welfare impact, 336 and 1.2% in total employment (direct, indirect, and induced). 337
Redirecting Oil and Gas Revenues Toward Diversification and the Zero-Carbon Energy Transition
Africa’s fossil fuel–producing countries—whether established or new and regardless of how dependent they are on
hydrocarbons—should immediately start to invest their fossil fuel revenues in industrial diversification and other
policies to support the zero-carbon energy transition, ensuring that the exploitation of remaining African fossil fuel
resources provides meaningful development opportunities rather than nourishing the fossil fuel sector. The sooner
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structural economic issues are addressed, the faster countries will reap the benefits of the transition. African countries may consider using their oil and gas revenues to improve institutional capacity to enact and enforce policy and
monitor progress in the following key areas: 338


Minimization of the carbon footprint of remaining competitive fossil fuels (for example, by imposing stringent carbon emission standards, outlawing routine venting and flaring, and regulating non-routine flaring)



Transparent and balanced fiscal frameworks for remaining competitive fossil fuel investments to support
public investment in diversification;



Shared use of the infrastructure built or used by remaining competitive fossil fuel investments to leverage
more co-benefits from the industry;



Economic diversification, employment, education, and reskilling to guarantee a just transition for affected
workers and communities;



Support to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to build domestic supply chains; and



Sound management of resource revenues to finance the sustainable development agenda.

Phasing Out Fossil Fuels Subsidies
While making energy more affordable could help achieve greater access to electricity and other social goals, fossil
fuel subsidies (FFSs) are generally poorly designed and have negative economic, social, and environmental impacts.
By distorting the energy market in a way that artificially lowers coal, oil, and gas prices, they discourage the deployment of renewables, impose significant costs on governments and taxpayers, disproportionately benefit the wealthiest consumers, and create incentives for energy waste and increased CO2 emissions. The G20, the IEA, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other organizations have, accordingly, been promoting FFS reform. 339
The IEA’s list of the top 25 countries by value of FFSs in 2019 includes four African countries—Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
and Nigeria—with a combined amount of USD 35.3 billion in subsidies. Notably, in 2019 FFSs accounted for 16.7% of
Libya’s GDP, 7.6% of Algeria’s, and 5.2% of Egypt’s. 340 According to IMF data for 2017, FFSs were in place in 25 other
African countries, amount to a total of USD 17.75 billion (see Table 5).
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Table 5: Fossil fuel subsidies in Africa, 2017/2019
Region / %
of FFSs in
Africa

Northern
Africa
66.30%

Eastern Africa

14.34%

Central Africa

4.98%

Southern
Africa

Fossil Fuel
Subsidies

Year of
Analysis

Algeria

Yes

2019

13.30

7.6

Egypt

Yes

2019

15.90

5.2

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Yes

2019

4.40

16.7

Morocco

Yes

2017

0.40

0.4

Tunisia

Yes

2017

1.17

2.9

Burundi

No

2020

-

-

Comoros

Yes

2017

-

0.1

Djibouti

No

2020

-

-

Eritrea

No

2020

-

-

Ethiopia

Yes

2017

0.01

0.3

Kenya

No

2020

-

-

Madagascar

No

2020

-

-

Malawi

Yes

2017

0.15

2.4

Mauritius

No

2020

Mozambique

Yes

2017

1.11

8.8

Rwanda

Yes

2017

0.03

0.4

Somalia

No

2020

-

-

Sudan

Yes

2017

0.23

0.5

South Sudan

No

2020

-

-

Uganda

Yes

2013

0.38

1.5

United Republic of Tanzania

Yes

2017b

1.06

2.0

Zambia

Yes

2017

2.15

8.4

Zimbabwe

Yes

2017b

2.49

14.1

Angola

Yes

2017

0.48

0.4

Cameroon

Yes

2017

0.86

2.5

Central African Republic

No

2017b

-

-

Chad

No

2017b

-

-

Congo

Yes

2017b

0.70

8.0

Democratic Republic of the
Congo

Yes

2020

0.60

1.5

Equatorial Guinea

No

2017b

-

-

Gabon

Yes

2017

-

0.0

Sao Tome and Principe

No

2017b

-

-

Botswana

Yes

2017

0.10

0.5

Lesotho

No

2020

-

-

Namibia

Yes

2017

0.10

0.7

Country (Pre-tax values)

Value
(billion USD)

% of
GDP
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Region / %
of FFSs in
Africa

Country (Pre-tax values)

6.97%

Western
Africa

7.41%

Fossil Fuel
Subsidies

Year of
Analysis

Value
(billion USD)

% of
GDP

South Africa

Yes

2017a

3.50

1.7

Eswatini

No

2020

-

-

Benin

No

2017b

-

-

Burkina Faso

Yes

2017

0.18

1.5

Cape Verde

Yes

2017b

0.06

3.4

Côte d'Ivoire

Yes

2017b

1.17

2.9

Gambia

No

2017b

-

-

Ghana

No

2017

-

-

Guinea

No

2017b

-

-

Guinea-Bissau

No

2017

-

-

Liberia

No

2020

-

-

Mali

Yes

2017

0.18

1.2

Mauritania

Yes

2017

0.05

1.1

Niger

No

2017b

-

-

Nigeria

Yes

2019

1.70

0.4

Senegal

Yes

2017

0.59

2.8

Sierra Leone

No

2017b

-

-

Togo

No

2017b

-

-

Source: Prepared by the authors based on IMF. 341
FFS reform is advancing, including in Africa. Taking advantage of low oil prices in 2014 and 2015, Morocco phased
out consumption subsidies (with the exception of bottled butane), with petrol and diesel prices now linked to the
international market. 342 Other countries are following suit. For example, Egypt committed to reduce fuel subsidies
by 40% and electricity subsidies by 75% in the 2019–2020 financial year. 343 Even so, the figures above—and troubling
examples of policy reversals or postponements 344—indicate that more work is needed to remove FFSs across Africa.
The 29 African countries with FFS in place, with a total value amounting to USD 53.5 billion, should initiate or expedite
FFS phase-outs, drawing inspiration from Morocco, for example, and taking the “golden opportunity” of the low fuel
prices resulting from the COVID-19 crisis to eliminate FFS. Lower prices make fossil fuel subsidy removal easier for
importers because of the smaller adjustment of end-user prices and impact on inflation. This is also the case for fossil
fuel-producing countries, for whom lower prices mean significant revenue losses and pressures on public finances
and the broader economy. Importantly, subsidy removal should be accompanied by broader energy policy measures
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Policy Network, UN Environment Programme, IMF, and GIZ, 2020, https://greenfiscalpolicy.org.
“Data and Statistics,” IEA, https://webstore.iea.org/download/summary/2736?fileName=IDR_Morocco_ES_UK.pdf; IEA, “International
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targeted at protecting vulnerable consumers and promoting renewables. 345 As the OECD suggests, “money spent
supporting coal, oil, and gas could instead be invested in sustainable energy infrastructure, research and job training.” 346
Repurposing National Oil Companies for the Zero-Carbon Energy Transition
African countries that have national oil companies (NOCs) should start redirecting the core activities of their NOCs
toward the zero-carbon transition. This process might start with winding down the commercial role of NOCs and
turning them into strict regulatory entities. This kind of reform is critical when the revenues held by the NOC, and
therefore dedicated to fossil fuels, are much higher than the revenues invested in other development priorities. For
instance, in 2015, the sales revenues of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria’s NOC, “were
more than 5 times the country’s health expenditure, nearly 7 times its foreign aid receipts, and more than 15 times
the value of the country’s sovereign wealth fund. 347 Box 16 presents critical reform efforts recommended for NNPC
that can be useful to other African NOCs as they reconsider their role and repurpose themselves for the energy
transition.

Box 16: Critical reform efforts for NNPC to become a player in the zero-carbon transition
“Critical reforms should focus on:


Hiring expertise to develop an energy transition plan for Nigeria and run an institutional analysis of the role
of each key public or private institution in the energy transition, including NNPC.



Reforming NNPC to ensure it can play this role by:


making NNPC independent from political interference at all operational and management levels, reducing opportunities for corruption,



enshrining transparency and internal as well as external oversight in NNPC’s governance framework,



legally clarifying its funding mechanism and revenue retention model,



institutionalizing principles of climate change governance,



if profound reform is not feasible for lack of political champions inside the government or within NNPC,
a better avenue would be to privatize NNPC or, at least, privatize some of its subsidiaries.



Setting up a separate division of NNPC or, in the case of NNPC privatization, an independent entity with clear
objectives related to the energy transition that are measured by transparent and auditable metrics. This
division or entity would be in charge of developing a timeline to eliminate routine flaring and minimize nonroutine venting and flaring for existing fields; developing criteria to award new fields in accordance with a
stranded asset risk analysis; and establishing carbon emission standards.



Identifying funding sources for this new division or entity in advance and in ways that incentivize desired
results.”

Source: CCSI. 348
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Phasing Out Public Financing for Fossil Fuel Investment
As countries recognize the need to transition away from fossil fuels and toward renewables, they must also redirect
the lending policies of national and multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions
(DFIs) accordingly, so that public finance for development does not counter energy and climate policy goals. This
redirecting is yet to happen, neither globally nor in Africa, and recent numbers indicate concerning trends.
Some development finance institutions are slowly taking steps to change this landscape. In December 2017, the
World Bank Group announced that it would no longer finance upstream oil and gas investments after 2019. 349 The
EIB launched a new climate strategy and energy lending policy in November 2019, committing to end “new financing
for unabated, fossil fuel energy projects, including gas, from the end of 2021 onwards.” 350 And, at a November 2020
summit, 450 of the world’s public development banks pledged to “consider the range of fossil fuel investments in
our portfolios, avoid stranded assets, and work towards applying more stringent investment criteria, such as explicit
policies to exit from coal financing,” 351 even though shying away from a more forceful commitment to “develop
explicit policies to exit from or reduce fossil fuels investments” (including oil and gas) included in an earlier draft. 352
The AfDB had already announced in September 2019 that it would no longer finance coal projects (which in practice
it had anyway not done since 2015), thus catching up with other MDBs with similar policies, such as the World Bank
Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the EIB. Though committed to help African
countries transition away from oil and gas, the AfDB should also conduct economic and energy analysis with a view
to progressively eliminate finance for midstream and downstream fossil fuel projects, 353 which both international
and African stakeholders have called on the bank to exclude from its portfolio. 354 Withdrawing this financing should
be gradual so as to enable Africa to benefit from fossil gas infrastructure as a flexibility provider while incentivizing
the continent to seize the anticipated cost advantage of storage technologies within the next decade.
Research shows that the role of development finance institutions in securing concessional finance and de-risking
investments increases the likelihood of success of energy projects, particularly in countries that are starting to deploy
new technologies. 355 These institutions should, therefore, move away from facilitating fossil fuel investment and
leverage their strength, instead, to facilitate investments in renewables.
The AU, the AfDB, and African states should seize the global momentum to commit to progressively eliminating
public financing for investments not only in coal but also in oil and gas exploration, exploitation, and related infrastructure to incentivize the continent to gradually wean off fossil fuels, which are associated with fiscal, economic,
energy, social, climate, and other environmental risks. The reduction could be more gradual when it comes to gasto-power and gas-to-feedstock projects when the economic and electricity analysis show their value to increase
electricity access. At the same time, the AU, the AfDB, and African states should ensure to redirect these public
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resources to investments in renewable energy generation and energy efficiency, building on the continent’s renewable energy riches and preparing it for the zero-carbon future. As potential beneficiaries of high-return energy investments, African countries and institutions should also express to non-African national and multilateral providers
of development finance that the continent seeks to attract investments not in coal, oil, and gas but in zero-carbon
energy.

3.4.A Timeline for Energy Development from 2021 to 2050
3.4.1. Starting Point in 2021
Electricity
Africa continues to lag other continents on electricity consumption and generation (Figure 22).
Figure 22: Electricity generation and consumption per capita, 2018, kWh

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the World Bank’s Global Electrification Database (GED).
While renewable energy sources are plentiful, they only made up 20% of the installed electricity generation capacity, 356 and renewables-based electricity accounts for only 3.2% of Africa’s energy consumption (Figure 23).
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Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019.
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Figure 23: Share of energy consumption by source in major regions globally

Source: Prepared by the authors based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020.
Africa’s transmission and distribution system needs tremendous strengthening to avoid the incidence of power outages and reduce network losses (18% today) to an acceptable level. 357
In addition, power trade across the region remains low and is mostly conducted through bilateral contracts. The
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) is the only fully functioning and advanced power pool. Some countries sit outside
of the regional grids, and often transmission interconnections are congested and need upgrades. 358
Access to electricity varies by region (see Figure 24), and the disparity is more pronounced in rural areas: NA at 99%,
RSA at 71%, and other SSA countries at 16%. 359 The IEA estimates that 600 million people do not have access to
electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding the Republic of South Africa), out of a total population of 1.1 billion.

357

International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019.

358

Ibid.

359

Ibid.

78

Figure 24: Access to electricity (% population)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) database.
In addition, the cost to obtain a permanent electrical connection is three times higher than the global average and
52 times higher than in high-income OECD countries (Figure 25). 360 Between 2006 and 2018, around 80% of businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, suffered from frequent electricity disruptions, averaging six
hours in length and causing losses of around 8% of annual sales, on average. 361 Similarly worrisome is the proportion
of people with access to clean cooking in sub-Saharan Africa: only 17%. 362

World Bank Group, “Doing Business 2020: Fact Sheet – Sub-Saharan Africa,” (World Bank, 2020), https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/pdf/db2020/DB20-FS-SSA.pdf.
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Figure 25: Electricity availability, accessibility, and affordability compared across global regions

Cote
d’Ivoire

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the World Bank Doing Business database.
Digitization
In the last decade (2010–2019), Africa’s household and individual internet access rates have tripled. While fixed
broadband subscriptions have only grown by 3 million (0.3% points per capita) in this period, mobile broadband has
become increasingly adopted across the continent, growing 18-fold and becoming the primary means by which Africans access the internet, with 89% of the population covered by a 3G network in 2019. 363
However, this growth has not been uniform across the continent. For example, while 98% of the North African population is covered by 3G, this figure is only 67% in Sub-Saharan Africa. 364 While 90% of Kenyans have internet access,
only 5% of Burundians do. In addition, speed and affordability are still a problem. The average mobile broadband
speed of 2.7 Mbps is still half the global average, and fixed broadband connections cost 37% of the average national
income in Africa, compared to 15% globally. 365 See Figure 26 for the range of digital connectivity indices.

363 World Bank Group, Connecting Africa Through Broadband: A strategy for Doubling Connectivity by 2021 and Reaching Universal Access by
2030 (Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, ITU, and UNESCO, October 2019), https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/digitaldevelopment/publication/connecting-africa-to-broadband-a-roadmap-for-inclusive-growth.
364 Ibid.
365 Brahima S. Coulibaly (ed.), Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent 2020–2030 (Brookings Africa Growth Initiative,2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ForesightAfrica2020_20200110.pdf.

80

Figure 26: Key indices of digital connectivity in Africa and other global regions

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database.
Note: CIS is the Commonwealth of Independent States region.
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3.4.2. Milestones to be Achieved by 2030, 2040, and 2050
Table 6 illustrates milestones that Africa could pursue every decade to achieve the continent’s energy transformation. Targets are illustrative and only provide the direction of travel. They are inspired by the most ambitious but
realistic plans developed by experts. While targets should be developed based on a range of studies that should be
already conducted in 2021, setting a long-term strategy and short-to-medium-term targets will guide implementation and garner political buy-in across the continent. The AU has done it in several strategic documents and should
do it for the energy transition. See Section 5 for further details.

82

Table 6: Milestones of Africa’s zero-carbon energy development 2021–2050

Source: Prepared by the authors.
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4. Financing Strategy
As explained in Section 1, we roughly estimate that zero-carbon mass electrification of Africa by 2050, with most
advances by 2030, will require an investment of roughly USD 136 billion per year. As compared to other studies, we
target a somewhat higher level of electricity consumption, in rural areas in particular, and we assume that almost all
new generation investment of the continent will be in renewable energies, with the unit cost of renewable energies
dropping by one-third in 2030 and again in 2050.
The challenge is not unsurmountable: India and China have, respectively, invested 2.6% and 1.9% of their GDP since
2000. 366 By comparison, we assess that this investment will cost Africa around 2% of the continent’s growing yearly
GDP, on average, over 2020–2050.
Infrastructure financing by both China and India has a lot of lessons to teach African countries. China has relied on
low-cost sovereign borrowing to finance large-scale projects, 367 while India has developed innovative financing approaches to mobilize private financing. Both countries have grown tremendously in the past decades based on increasingly sophisticated education and infrastructure services, enabling them to finance their power infrastructure
without bankrupting their economies. We anticipate the same trajectory for Africa.
Planning for clean energy infrastructure deployment to ensure continent-wide electricity access should include solutions for financing adapted to the type of investment, both through massive MDB and DFI low-cost concessional
financing (Section 4.1) and building local investment management capabilities with African governments (Section 4.2).

4.1.MDB and DFI Financing
In 2019, MDBs’ contribution to climate finance 368 stood at USD 61.6 billion, 369 up 43.1% from 2018, and close to their
target to reach USD 65 billion by 2025. 370 Low- and middle-income countries received 67% of those funds, and 76%
(46.6 billion) of those funds went to climate change mitigation. Additionally, USD 102.7 billion were mobilized in cofinancing (by other public 371 and private actors mobilized by the MDBs through blended finance) close to the 2025
target of USD 110 billion. Of this amount, USD 83.2 billion was allocated to mitigation. Low- and middle-income
countries benefited from 36% (USD 30 billion) of mitigation co-financing. 372

366

International Energy Agency (IEA), Africa Energy Outlook 2019.

See for instance the Chinese “Tianjin model” that has underpinned the massive deployment of infrastructure in China in the last 20 years.
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4.1.1. Insufficient Climate Finance Mobilization
While the MDBs are on track to reach their collective target, and many of their individual targets, 373 they fall very
far short of what is needed. As noted in Section 2, to build a robust zero-carbon electricity system to achieve mass
electrification, Africa needs roughly USD 136 billion per year, and Sub-Saharan Africa, other than Southern Africa,
needs USD 105 billion per year. This compares to a current MDB mobilization of USD 3.8 billion per year for SubSaharan Africa in climate mitigation, of which only USD 2.3 billion per year went to building the zero-carbon energy
system. 374 In addition, of the global amount of co-finance that went into climate mitigation in low- to middle-income
countries (USD 30 billion 375), we may assume that only around USD 2.5 billion went to zero-carbon energy systems
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 376
From other estimates, we obtain that, in 2018, the private sector roughly invested USD 5 billion in energy in Africa
and, in 2019, renewable energy investments from all sources were less than USD 4 billion. 377
In short, there is a need to increase climate finance (MDBs and co-finance) mobilization for energy systems in Africa by
10-20 times per year to achieve zero-carbon mass electrification by 2030.
Africa’s historical contribution to greenhouse gas emissions has been minuscule, and as such, Africa is incurring net
damages from climate change that are hugely disproportionate to Africa’s contribution. To ensure a just transition to
zero-carbon, sustainable economies and societies, Africa has the right to receive significant international official financing for mitigating and adapting to climate change.378

4.1.2. Insufficient Concessional Funding
Moreover, 73% of climate finance mitigation is committed through investment loans, and only 6% through grants
and 3% through guarantees (see Figure 27).
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376 Applying to 30 billion, 14% which is the share of MDB finance that went into climate mitigation in sub-Saharan Africa and then 60% which
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378 In 2019, MDBs invested USD3.5 billion in climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa. While this report doesn’t benchmark how it compares
to the need, climate finance for adaptation in Africa is of utmost importance.
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Figure 27: MDB mitigation finance by type of instruments, 2019

Source: Climate Finance report. 379
In addition, there has been a strong trend toward non-concessional funding to grow the pool of finance available for
developing countries. According to the OECD, as of 2016, only one-third of loans are concessional, with 65% of concessional loans going into infrastructure and production sectors. 380 However, this does not include concessional financing from non-OECD countries that are contributing to solar development in Africa (see Box 17).

Box 17: Concessional funding from Abu Dhabi, India, China and South Africa

United Arab Emirates – Abu Dhabi
The IRENA/ADFD Project Facility, mobilizing funds from the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), has provided
concessional loans for 11 renewable energy projects with clear development impact potential in 10 African countries. 381 Loans can cover up to 50% of project costs, have an interest rate of 1% to 2%, 20-year tenor, and 5-year
grace periods. 382

India
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and France’s President Francois Hollande launched the International Solar
Alliance (ISA) initiative during the Paris Climate Conference to promote solar energy development globally. Currently,
the ISA has 121 countries involved, 34 of which are in Africa. 383
These nations have agreed to the framework agreement, whose objectives include mobilizing investment of more
than USD 1 trillion by 2030 from key institutions and reducing the cost of financing by providing innovative financial
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mechanisms. India’s ambition is also to create a cross-border power grid plan—One Sun One World One Grid. 384
Among the active list of current projects are the scaling of solar applications for agricultural use, mini-grids, e-mobility
and storage, and rooftop solar, as well as solar parks and affordable financing at scale. 385
The Export-Import Bank of India (EXIM Bank) has already committed concessional financing for solar projects worth
USD 1.4 billion, while AFD, the bilateral agency of France’s commitment for solar projects, is worth EUR 700 million.
The ISA secretariat has requested Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom to follow suit in providing
concessional funding. 386

Brazil, China, and South Africa
According to a study, as of today, three DFIs provide 61% of the renewable DFI financing in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) region—the China Export-Import Bank, the Brazilian National Development Bank
(BNDES), and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. 387 At least China EXIM Bank and DBSA are involved in concessional finance.

4.1.3. Insufficient Blended Finance
Last, in 2019, MDBs mobilized less than USD 1 from the private sector for every USD 1 of MDB climate finance, except
for the AfDB, which managed to catalyze more (see Figure 28). 388 Between 2013 and the first half of 2018, “outside
South Africa, each dollar of public funding (from DFIs and state budgets) attracted USD 0.6 of private capital either
directly (via equity and direct loan) or indirectly (via guarantee)—the figure is USD 0.4 for renewables. This compares
unfavorably with USD 0.9 for Southeast Asia and more than USD 4 for South Africa.” 389

International Solar Alliance (ISA), “Tender Reference No. 322/2/2020-NSM Corrigendum No. 1 dated 28th September 2020—Sub: Developing a Long-Term Vision, Implementation Plan, Road Map And Institutional Framework For Implementing ‘One Sun One World One Grid’,
dated 27.05.2020” (Haryana, India: 2020), https://mnre.gov.in/img/documents/uploads/file_f-1601537228434.pdf.
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Figure 28: Co-finance mobilized by each dollar of MDB climate finance to low and middle-income countries in 2019

Source: World Resources Institute. 390
In short, not only do concessional finance (loans and grants) make up a very low share of climate finance (roughly
30%), but MDBs’ blended finance schemes have a low multiplier impact on private sector participation.
As a result, Africa’s zero-carbon energy system build-up doesn’t benefit from enough financing, and when it does, this
is most often high cost, high risk, high default for African governments.

4.1.4. Urgent Need to Increase Official Finance
It is, therefore, urgent to tremendously increase the official financing for renewable energy projects in Africa. A lowinterest-rate environment can facilitate a major increase of available financing for renewable energy power projects
in Africa. As we have demonstrated, even a high degree of debt financing would lead to a manageable financial
burden provided that this debt is long term (that is, 30 years or longer) and refundable at low interest. 391 Zerocarbon electrification will propel development, industrialization, and GDP growth, which in turn will guarantee debt
amortization. In addition, renewable energies have a higher upfront cost than fossil fuels, so their bankability is sensitive to the low cost of financing. The use of long-term guarantees should be intensified for the whole gamut of the
types of needed guarantees (see Section 4.1.5 for the Lake Turkana case study for the successful use of multiple
guarantees), and MDBs/DFIs should lower the hurdle rate. 392 Concessional finance in today’s environment should be
facilitated by the low interest rate paid on OECD countries’ government bonds. 393 For instance, in the past decade,
European countries have paid, on average, 1% interest on their bonds. 394 “While median effective interest rates fell
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in developed countries over the last decade, they increased in developing countries. […] The increased reliance in
commercial borrowing, in the context of a relative decline in official development assistance and other forms of
official finance, contributed to growing financial vulnerabilities in some countries, including risks of sudden stops.” 395
Low-cost money from donors’ countries is, therefore, available and should be passed on to developing countries.
This is the most important message for the post-Covid-19 global recovery. Rich countries have been able to finance
enormous budget deficits (in the United States, around 15% of GDP in 2020 and 2021) at very low interest rates. This
has not been possible for developing countries, especially low-income countries. The global priority for international
development should be to extend the creditworthiness of the high-income countries to the developing countries,
mainly, we believe, by strengthening the balance sheets of the multilateral development banks so they can substantially increase their flow of financing for green and digital recovery. Africa’s partners, including the United States,
European Union, China, Japan, Korea, and others, should substantially increase their paid-in capital to the African
Development Bank so that the ADB can spearhead a massive increase of financing for renewable energy and digitalization. Other means— debt relief, debt-for-SDG swaps, bilateral development aid, impact investing, foreign direct
investment, public-private partnerships, blended project financing, and other kinds of risk-sharing (Figure 29)—
should be deployed alongside the sharply higher flows from the ADB. (See section 3.1.6 below).
Figure 29: Spectrum of guarantee mechanisms to support infrastructure deployment

Source: Milken Institute. 396

4.1.5. African Initiatives to Be Monitored, Amplified, and Replicated
Desert to Power Initiative
The design of the Desert to Power Initiative, while in very early stages, achieves many of the above objectives.
The Desert to Power initiative is an investment agreement between the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the AfDB, and
the nations of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The project aims to install 10 GW of solar power
within these countries to both provide electricity and mitigate 18 MtCO2eq emissions. The project consists of four
components: grids investments to de-risk solar IPPs, additional finance for private sector-sponsored solar power
generation, energy access for 1000 localities, and technical assistance. Figure 30 identifies the theory of change
model for the project.
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Figure 30: Theory of change for the Desert to Power initiative

Source: Green Climate Fund. 397
As a result of these components, the creation of this facility hopes to create a backbone grid for the region that can
support up to 3 GW of integrated generation capacity, a regional solar market with the cross-border transmission of
clean energy for up to 3 GW, market opportunities for solar energy that rely less on the balance sheet of single offtakers, IPPs for 700 MW of generation, baseload and stable grids that use utility-scale storage for solar energy, access
to energy for 1000 localities, and local capacity building.
The current risks of the project are the potential operational risks due to safety and armed conflict in the region, as
well as deployment risks associated with the countries’ limited institutional capacity to support such a large endeavor. Nevertheless, the project will be financed in a joint loan fund agreement between the AfDB and the Green
Climate Fund. The breakdown of funding for each subgroup of the project is explained below (Figure 31).
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Figure 31: Breakdown of funding and types of financial instrument for the Desert to Power initiative

Source: Green Climate Fund. 398
In the Desert to Power Initiative, different financial instruments are being used according to risks:


Highly concessional loans will finance public infrastructure such as transmission grids.



Grants will finance ancillary infrastructure, such as storage, which will stay in public ownership and is not
investible.



Loans will provide long-term finance at viable interest rates to the private sector on IPPs.



Reimbursable grants will be offered to de-risk large-scale green mini-grids operations facing revenue uncertainties during the first years of operation. With the proceeds, a Mini-Grid Guarantee Facility will be set up,
and guarantees will be triggered in the event of insufficient revenues in the first year.



Subsidies will be given to attract small-scale mini-grid investors.



Grant instruments will cover technical assistance and capacity-building activities.



Each dollar of GCF funding will leverage an additional USD 2.7 from co-financiers (AfDB and other public and
private partners).

The objective is to accelerate the penetration by IPPs in solar by covering the cost of grid integration for solar power
plants without waiting for public utilities to find the means to do so.
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Africa50 Infrastructure Fund
The Africa50 fund has 23 African countries, AfDB, the Central Bank of West African States, and the Bank Al-Maghrib,
and was capitalized initially by AfDB by an amount of USD 830 million. The objective is to attract funding from the
private sector, governments, and DFIs to provide “early-stage risk capital, as well as expertise and support engaging
investors and stakeholders, from project development to financial close.” It seeks high developmental impact and
aims to deliver differentiated returns across its portfolio.
The Africa50 fund was inspired by India’s approach to attracting private sector financing. In 2000, the Indian government set the India Infrastructure Project Development Fund to support the development of bankable PPPs to bear
the pre-financial close risk in the development of large projects in the infrastructure sector. 399 In 2004, the Viability
Gap Financing scheme was established to support infrastructure projects justified for the public interest but not
financially viable. It has been providing subsidies when user charges cannot be increased to commercial levels. 400
There is also the India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited, 401 a wholly state-owned company set up in 2006 to
fund viable infrastructure projects in consortium by providing long term senior or subordinated debt through direct
lending to infrastructure project companies or refinancing to banks.
Lake Turkana in Kenya and the Use of Guarantees
Lake Turkana is a USD 680 million, 310 MW wind farm—the largest renewable energy project in Africa. After eight
years of planning and five years to build, the project was finally opened in 2019. 402 The risks involved in the financing
of the wind farm ranged from “the absence of sufficient local capital resources, a viability gap between expected and
required electricity revenues, off-taker risks linked to political uncertainty in the Kenyan government, and a lack of
transmission infrastructure.” 403
For this reason, the project included an off-taker guarantee (AfDB and Kenyan government) on a 20-year PPA signed
with utility KPLC and a loan guarantee (Danish Export Credit Agency, EKF) on AfDB and EIB loans. The AfDB also used
its B-loan structure to enable bank participants to enjoy its Preferred Credit Status to mitigate transfer and convertibility risk. The Government of Kenya also assumed liability for political risk, but it was replaced by a sovereign guarantee from the AfDB’s African Development Fund that provides political-risk guarantees. 404 Its capital structure involved senior debt, subordinated debt, concessional equity (EU–Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund), and commercial
equity. 405
While the project is an interesting example of a complex blended finance structure, it is particularly illustrative of the
role of guarantees, with part of them coming from the government itself. 406
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Benban Solar Park
The Benban solar park, the first one on the African continent that is above 1 GW, is a 37-km2, 1.8 GW park located
in the desert in the South of Egypt, built at an approximate cost of USD 4 billion. 407 A critical response to the Government of Egypt’s goal of 20% renewable energy by 2022, Benban park is broken into 41 plots of various sizes, which
collectively accommodate 32 power plants. 408 Once the plots were divided, a consortium of 30 international developers expressed interest in the project, including Spain’s Acciona, UAE’s Alcazar Energy, Italy’s Enerray, China’s Chint
Solar, and Norway’s Scatec Solar. 409 This project was not designed in official phases like the famous Bhadla Park in
India 410 but rather had sections built whenever developers came forward. It has been operational since 2019.
To guarantee buy-in, the government promised a competitive price through feed-in tariffs in a guaranteed 25-year
PPA 411 with the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company (EETC) and backstopped by a sovereign guarantee. Benban solar park developers collectively funded the transmission infrastructure to the project site via a cost-sharing
agreement with EETC and the New and Renewable Energy Agency of Egypt. 412
The AfDB’s Africa50 financing arm signed a Joint Development Agreement with Scatec Solar and Norway’s private
equity Norfund to finance six of the power plants (390 MW). In turn, it has helped secure senior debt from a number
of development banks such as the EBRD, the Netherlands Development Finance Company, the Green Climate Fund,
the Islamic Development Bank, and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector. 413
The IFC also led a consortium of development and commercial banks—including the AfDB, the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, the Arab Bank of Bahrain, CDC of the United Kingdom, Europe Arab Bank, Green for Growth Fund,
FinnFund, ICBC, and OeEB of Austria—for a total of USD 653 million in debt issuance for six project developers, thus
financing 13 of the park’s 32 solar plants (752 MW). World Bank’s Multilateral Investment and Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) provided USD 210 million–worth of political risk insurance. 414 The participation of the IFC enabled the respect
of social and environmental performance standards. 415
Provided that they are planned following sustainability standards and anchored on industrial demands when residential demand is not sufficient, solar parks could facilitate private sector investment in large-scale solar by providing
economies of scale, access to land, and access to transmission infrastructure. This has been the approach taken by
India for much of its solar capacity. 416
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4.1.6. Role of Country Donors in Enabling MDBs and DFIs to Increase Concessional Finance
Country donors to MDBs and DFIs should enable these institutions to significantly increase their lending and equity
investments for energy-system scale-up, especially through new capital increases for the African Development Bank
earmarked for the rapid scale-up of energy sector investments. Other possible steps include the following:


Reviewing the rates of return donors require from MDBs and DFIs to secure more funding in pure grant
form. 417



Reassessing DFI profitability targets: 418 the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development
Office (FCDO) has lowered CDC Group’s required rate of return to 3.5% for its “Growth Portfolio” (investment
out of balance sheet) and “at least break even” over both the Growth and Catalyst portfolios (which is the
impact fund). From December 2012 to 2017, CDC’s average financial returns across the portfolio were
10.6%. 419



Contemplating the creation of special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) focused on providing high-risk capital (for
early-stage finance and high-risk project tranches) (see Figure 32), which is what the AfDB has done. 420 After
some of the initial risks have subsided, the government can sell the loan in the market to investors and use
the revenues to repay the MDB. If the loan is convertible, then the government could reap any upside in the
projects 421 (care should be applied to pass on the social and environmental obligations to the investor).



Creating financing structure to enable the participation of country donors’ institutional investors such as
pension funds, life insurance funds, and sovereign funds in PPPs through project-puttable bonds, whereby
the MDB could provide a put option after the construction early-stage period and receive a guaranteed premium. After the early-stage period, the investor would have the right to exercise the put option to sell the
bond to the MDB if the project did not meet predefined minimum conditions, “such as successful construction completion, minimum coverage ratios, and minimum credit rating conditions.” 422



Exploring the creation of earmarked off-balance-sheet facilities for the MDBs to overcome institutional capital-adequacy constraints. 423



Transparently analyzing whether the capital adequacy ratio is too conservative and the extent to which it
could be lowered without compromising the AAA rating given by the credit rating agencies. 424 A 2018 study
sees potential for the AfDB to increase lending by USD 14.1 billion (almost double its 2017 lending portfolio),
provided that a portion of the callable capital is included in the capital adequacy model. 425



Contemplating relaxing the triple AAA rating. According to some calculations, a small relaxation in the credit
rating could raise USD 1.9 billion in the SADC region. Another estimate gives that, for eight major MDBs,
allowing the credit rating to fall to AA+ opens up an additional USD 320 billion to their lending capacity. 426
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Figure 32: Leveraging a sponsor credit rating

Source: Milken Institute. 427

4.2.Building Local Capabilities to Plan, Procure, and Finance IPPs
In addition to providing the necessary funding infusion, MDBs and DFIs are also critical to building local capabilities
and means to progressively seed independence from foreign aid and shield against currency risk. These efforts should
target ministries of finance or planning and their capacity to prepare and plan for the investment, utilities and their
capacity to run competitive auctions, ministries of mines and energy to leverage the vast mining sector in Africa as
an anchor demand for investment, and the local financial sector (banks and institutional investors as well as the
creation of a bond market). These are discussed below.

4.2.1. Preparing and Planning for the Investment (Ministries of Finance/Planning)
In developing countries, infrastructure project preparation costs generally range from 5 to 10% of the total project
investment. 428 Many countries, including in Africa, have set up central dedicated project development funds (PDFs)
for conducting feasibility studies and transaction advisory support for projects. These PDFs are usually set up under
PPP units, most often sitting at the Ministries of Finance or Planning. Externally funded project preparation facilities
have also been set up by MDBs to help fund governments’ preparation costs (see Section 4.1.5 above on Africa50
Fund).
However, even in Africa, the government budget still covers 70% to 80% of this project preparation funding. 429 This
situation may lead to either abuse of government spending on inefficient project preparation if there is no rigorous
budgetary oversight (see Box 18 on how South Africa remedied the problem) or renouncing project preparation
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funding due to a lack of government budget. Both situations should be closely monitored and addressed by MDBs
and DFIs until sound and sustainable administration and budgeting of project preparation are in place. 430

Box 18: South Africa’s Budget Facility for Infrastructure (BFI)
In South Africa, the BFI was created to improve project preparation and delivery of large infrastructure projects. It
serves as a financing facility, but it is fully integrated into the national budget system. Its objective is to inform the
government and policymakers on the actual funds utilized towards project preparation and ensure a transparent
allocation of fiscal resources. 431

4.2.2. Utilities and Competitive Tenders
Moreover, despite the success of IFC’s Scaling Solar program, capacity-building in designing and conducting competitive tenders and auctions remains critically needed to “a bring a high degree of transparency and predictability,
enhance market confidence and facilitate price discovery.” 432
Without adopting the rigor of competitive bidding, countries are plagued with unsolicited bids that are a conduit for
corruption and system inefficiency. 433
Thanks to IFC’s Scaling Solar program and a well-organized auction process, in December 2019, Ethiopia reached one
of the lowest prices (USD 0. 2526/kWh with Saudi Arabia’s ACWA IPP) 434 on the continent outside of Tunisia (USD
0.24/kWh with Norwegian IPP Scatec Solar) 435 (see Box 19).
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Box 19: Scaling Solar program
The Scaling Solar program offered by the IFC is a one-stop-shop offering a variety of World Bank services to deliver
competitive solar pricing from private IPPs in as little as two years. From the beginning, the program works with
participating governments and developers to ensure that the project has documentation and de-risking solutions.
The process starts with a client government signing into a formal advisory mandate with the IFC Corporate Transaction Advisory Department. The project preparation and structuring follow a set of template documents, including a
term of reference for hiring consultants, the PPA, Government Support Agreement (GSA), and financing documents.
While these templates are customized depending on the project and host country, the goal of the Scaling Solar program is to normalize the templates throughout multiple projects in a variety of countries, standardizing the process
in a way that reduces project preparation and transaction costs to make solar power competitive. 436 While the IFC
helps the client with the procurement process using tendering documents, bidders have access to advantageous
terms for debt financing, political risk insurance, and partial risk guarantees.

4.2.3. Leveraging Mining Sector Investment in Africa (Ministries of Mining and Energy)
As shown in Figure 3 in Section 3.1.2, there are several models possible to leverage mining’s infrastructure demand
to build a robust energy system. One of these is outlined in Figure 33 because it is particularly suitable to attract IPPs.
Figure 33: Structuring the financing of a power plant leveraging the mining company’s demand
Power Developer

Financiers

Mining Company

PPA

Power Plant Project

PPA

Utility

Source: CCSI framework.
In this model, the mining company can facilitate the investment as:


Investment Initiator, whereby the mining company facilitates the investment by bringing strong developers,
EPC contractors, lenders, investors, and advisers. The mining company’s commercial incentives to keep costs
down would facilitate the use of more competitive contractors.
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Equity Investor, whereby the mining company could also contribute to meeting the equity requirements of
the project.



Partial off-taker, whereby the mining company offtakes a certain proportion of the power, making the deal
bankable as the mining company most often is a credible off-taker, so the company’s overall balance sheet
and creditworthiness can help to underpin the deal. 437 The deal would be covering more than the mine’s
needs, leveraging economies of scale and enabling the less-credit-worthy utility to be an off-taker as well.
Alternatively, if the utility’s participation endangers the bankability of the deal, the mine could be the sole
off-taker while selling back excess energy to the grid (assuming this is allowed under the electricity law as it
should be).

As discussed in Section 2.1.2, this model is not new, and MDBs and DFIs could usefully assist the Ministry of Mines
and Energy in structuring these deals.
4.2.4.

Local Financial Sector and Actors

Local banks
The MDBs and DFIs also have a major role to play in strengthening the local financial sector, to sustain a flow of longterm financing to infrastructure projects (through an on-lending facility, for instance) that is shielded from currency
risk (whereby the utilities will incur cost in foreign currencies while receiving revenues in local currency). Despite
some progress, access to financing for infrastructure remains insufficient in all countries besides South Africa (see
Figure 34). 438
Figure 34 also shows that there is currently a mismatch between the tenure of credit and tenure of investment in
many bank credit policies. 439
Figure 34: Private credit and loan maturity of the local banking sector in sub-Saharan Africa, 2016–2017

Source: International Energy Agency. 440
The challenge with existing local bank financing for infrastructure projects is that local banks prefer high-yielding,
short-term investment tools as lower-risk alternatives to the longer-term loans necessary for infrastructure investment.

“The credibility of the mine as an off-taker should be carefully assessed. For instance, some miners are junior companies with an undiversified portfolio. In this situation an IPP would be inherently taking on some country/project specific risk, without the cushion of a multinational balance sheet.” Perrine Toledano et al., Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure, 40.
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Enabling long-term financing by local banks is one of the measures that India took in 2014 to spur investment in
infrastructure. For instance, local banks were exempted from the statutory liquidity ratio and enabled to lend for up
to 25 years while giving the option to refinance the loan every five years (through bond markets or selling to other
banks). 441
The first reason for this is a lack of syndicated loans structured with local banks. The participation of local banks,
when not jointly partnered with international development or commercial banks, creates a level of risk that is often
difficult for local banks to overcome. 442 The second reason relates to a lack of liquidity. Trapped by existing obligations and the upper limit thresholds set by government operating budgets, local banks are out of cash. 443
In this area, MDBs and DFIs “can help by acting as a catalyst, for example by providing guarantees, refinancing or onlending mechanisms” 444 and incentivize local banks to engage in riskier and longer-term operations. 445 This is what is
attempted by the 2019 World Bank’s Regional Off-Grid Electrification Project in the Sahel and West Africa: line of
credits and guarantees are given to local banks to encourage them to lend. 446
One success story in that matter is M-Kopa—headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya—the global leader in “pay-as-you-go”
off-grid energy to enable affordable consumer financing for solar-powered systems. Three DFIs syndicated a local
currency loan facility with two local subsidiaries of Standard Bank. 447
The refinancing facilitated by the World Bank of the Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) is another case in
point. The World Bank restructured USD 500 million of existing commercial debt into two longer-term commercial
loans with lower interest rates. In addition, the World Bank provided USD 250 million of International Development
Association (IDA) concessional credit (to continue operating while paying the debt) and USD 200 million of IDA guarantee in case of default on the commercial loan. This structure enabled the lead arranger to be joined not only by
international banks but also local banks. 448
Local pension funds and institutional investors
Alongside local banks, local pension funds and institutional investors more broadly can also become actors of local
financing for infrastructure. However, outside of Senegal and South Africa, investment vehicles are limited, and
institutional investors lack the expertise to run credit risk evaluation, so they prefer to invest in established realestate holdings, short-term bank deposits, and risk-free government securities. 449
Here, too, DFIs could intervene to bring technical assistance to reinforce the investment capacity. By some account,
when foreign investors co-invest with local pension funds, they might feel more protected from political interference
than under a DFI guarantee. 450 Thus technical assistance targeted at these institutions could drain more private
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finance into infrastructure development. Senegal’s FONSIS is an interesting case in point that might deserve further
study for replicability assessment purposes (see Box 20).

Box 20: FONSIS
Fonds Souverain d'Investissements Stratégiques (or The Sovereign Fund for Strategic Investments, FONSIS) was created in 2012 as a limited liability corporation; it is an investment holding company focused on creating financial
returns while acting as a private equity investor on behalf of the Senegalese government. FONSIS works to boost
domestic investment opportunities and optimize state assets while also increasing its own revenue for greater impact
in the near future. FONSIS has a hurdle rate of 12% and participates in projects under this rate only under specific
conditions. Investment is always through equity co-investment from private investors and non-recourse debt from
commercial and development banks. 451 The figure below shows the general financial structuring for solar projects
taken up by FONSIS. 452 FONSIS has equity in 120 MW of solar energy (four projects) in Senegal. 453
Figure 35: Project finance through FONSIS

Source: African Development Bank. 454
Local infrastructure project bond markets
A solid institutional investor base is also necessary to enable the development of infrastructure project bonds. Both
Kenya and Nigeria are successful examples of where project bonds are being issued by project companies and bought
by institutional investors. In Nigeria, all corporate bonds are tax-exempt, while in Kenya, there are specific exemptions for infrastructure bonds. 455 These bonds are usually issued by an SPV for a stand-alone project and repaid from
the cash flows of that project.
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For corporate issuers, access to domestic capital markets is usually associated with lower costs through lower interest rates and longer maturities as compared to bank loans while providing access to local currency financing, which
mitigates foreign exchange risk. From an investor perspective, corporate bond markets offer more attractive return
opportunities than bank deposits, as well as diversification opportunities. 456 However, outside of Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, the capital market or the investor base are still in the early stages.
Here MDBs and DFIs need to intensify efforts to support governments in creating a government bond market that
will then create liquidity and higher confidence in the bond market for corporate bonds and project bonds to be
issued. 457
Moreover, many sub-national entities are currently not encouraged by the national governments to borrow or issue
bonds, 458 and for some, this is forbidden altogether. South Africa and Nigeria remain an exception, and Nigeria has
jumped on the bandwagon more recently. Even in the more decentralized African countries, local governments remain dependent on national transfers instead of developing autonomy in raising revenues. Building the capacity of
local governments to finance infrastructure has been key to the infrastructure development of many countries and
should be supported by MDBs and DFIs, too.459
Once capital markets get deeper, innovative financial instruments can be developed to drain more finance into zerocarbon projects. For instance, infrastructure projects can be pooled in one instrument. While it can attract a larger
pool of investors, it also enables the diversification of risk by bundling commercially viable and non-viable projects.
India adopted this approach through mutual funds, such as the Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs) promoted
by the Securities and Exchange Board of India. 460 Moreover, covered bonds backed by a pool of loans for various
infrastructure projects, piloted in the 1990s in Germany and now widely used in Europe, 461 can support bank lending
to infrastructure. In covered bonds, bond investors have a claim over a dedicated ‘cover pool’ of assets and against
the issuer itself, which lowers risk and cost. 462 In Africa, Morocco has adapted its legislation to enable banks to issue
covered bonds 463 (while South Africa has declined to do so). 464
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank Group, Recent Developments on Local Currency Bond Markets in Emerging Economies, World Bank Staff Note For The G20 International Financial Architecture Working Group (Riyadh: IMF and World Bank, January, 2020),
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5. Next Steps for 2022
Steps should be taken already in 2022 to ensure that a roadmap for Africa’s zero-carbon mass electrification by 2050
is immediately crafted and rolled out.
First, the AU and the AfDB, in coordination with member states and possibly supported by SDSN, should create a
high-level international advisory group composed of the main institutions working on strategies for Africa’s zerocarbon mass electrification. Such institutions include the IEA, IRENA, GEIDCO, LUT, and KTH, as well as the AfDB’s
Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) agency, the infrastructure programs of the Regional Economic Communities, and the newly launched initiative launched by UNECA, Team Energy.
With the support of this international group, the AU and the AfDB would undertake the following strategic planning
tasks:


Drawing up a continental timeline and strategy to phase out fossil fuels and redirect national and international resources and incentives to zero-carbon energy investment while ensuring that current fossil fuel exploitation and infrastructure serve African countries’ development and electricity access needs.



Setting up a working group to update the Africa Mining Vision in light of the opportunities offered by the
energy transition. At its core should be skill development policies to seize the rising opportunities of the
localization of value chains; the operating principles of shared use of the mining-related infrastructure, in
particular in zero-carbon electricity; and the importance of good governance to avoid missing the windfall of
the energy transition for Africa’s critical minerals.



Conduct a skill diagnostic for the continent to assess the skills to be developed to seize the opportunities of
the energy transition.



Identifying the regional priority projects that will provide for the trunk infrastructure of the continent,
namely, the utility-scale renewable energy projects (solar, hydro, wind, and geothermal) and the regional,
continental, and international interconnections.



Identifying remaining steps to reform regional power pools.



For the utility-scale generation projects, develop the principles of financing and bankability combining concessional finance, political risk, default, currency guarantees, and private capital, building on successful
cases.



Crafting a strategy to strengthen African utilities in their planning, monitoring, and procurement capabilities
and support their financial and operational health.



Upgrading the policy and legal frameworks related to:


Siting policy for renewable energy and land-based solutions;



Consultation processes in energy investment;



Investment in Information and Communications Technologies;



IPP investment in large-scale, mini-grid, or stand-alone generation;



Shared use of the power infrastructure of mining and other energy-intensive investments;



Local bank lending to infrastructure projects;



Standards on EV charging stations;



Standards on importing used vehicles to support the phase-out of ICE vehicles.



Developing an affordability analysis in each country to understand what commercial models and subsidy
levels should be promoted for under-the-grid and off-grid communities.



Develop a communication program on the advantages of renewable energy solutions for the broad Africa
citizenry.
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Regional power grids and interconnectors have been associated with political battles around transmission pricing
and financing, which have stalled the necessary coordination between governments. The work on the above tasks
could be plagued and stalled by similar issues. It is thus urgent for the AU to devise politically sensitive solutions to
overcome these problems and ensure fast-paced progress.
These tasks could be supported by the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICI). Launched during the
23rd meeting of Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) in Kampala in 2010, PICI serves the
role of providing visibility, removing bottlenecks, and coordinating resources to ensure project implementation. Initially encompassing eight projects, PICI has since grown to include nine total projects, which cover the sectors of
transport, energy, ICT, and water. 465 PICI requires five-year implementation updates, which means that every five
years, each project must show significant progress, for example, from feasibility studies to implementation. 466 At the
core of PICI implementation and monitoring sit pan-African institutions with distinct roles: NEPAD acts as the secretariat and executing agency of the PICI and works closely with the country focal points of the respective states; the
African Union Commission (AUC), the regional economic communities (RECs), the AfDB, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) monitor countries’ progress on the implementation of the PICI projects. 467
The early-stage Desert to Power initiative sponsored by the AfDB also indicates how institutional arrangements can
be made for regional coordination around energy deployment. In September 2019, Heads of States of the G5 Sahel
countries endorsed the Desert to Power Initiative and set up a Task Force hosted by the AfDB, steered by the highlevel steering committee chaired by the CEO of the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN), and composed of Ministers of Energy of the G5 Sahel countries and key partners. The task force will work closely with National
Focal Points to support the Ministries of Energy’s programs. The Task Force currently leads resource mobilization
and engages with potential funding partners; each country will nominate executing entities for each component of
the initiative.
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